Hello again, This is a continuation of the thread concerning Peirce's philosophy of perception, which was begun under chapter 4 but I think is equally relevant to chapter 5.
Vinicius I apologise for not having responded to your fine initial postings yet. I currently have my head deep in Peirce's philosophy of perception, trying to work it out. I will get there. Jeff wrote: "As a quick response, I think there is some tension between what I've said and the points Peirce makes at 7.19-22. Having said that I think my interpretation fits well with what he says a bit later starting at 7.25. He's trying to hold a number of ideas together and build an account that explains a number of things needed for the sake of the larger logical (i.e., semiotic) theory. As a starting point, I'd want to get clear on the phenomena that need to be explain and the method being used in the analysis. Peirce explicitly says that he's not doing empirical psychology." The questions I currently have, which concern the theory of perception presented in "Telepathy and Perception": (CP 7.597-688) are as follows: - I take it that the percept, perceptual judgement and percipuum are meant to be in the order 1-2-3. But then Peirce says that the percept contains 1ness and 2ness, and the perceptual judgment has a residual kind of 3ness insofar as it purports to represent the percept. So what exactly is the difference between the perceptual judgment and the percipuum?? - Sandra Rosenthal's paper "The Percipuum and the Issue of Foundations", which Ben referred to a while back, which is really excellent, notes that percept and perceptual judgement (and indeed other 'parts' of perception such as the antecept and the ponecept) should not be viewed so much as objects but more as abstractions for the purposes of theoretical analysis. That is fine, but then Peirce says that the relation between percept and perceptual judgment is that the percept causes the perceptual judgment while not being the source of its content. (Am I right about this?) Now my question is how something that is only an abstraction can be a forceful cause - ? Cheers, Cathy
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