Jeff, Vinicius, list,
It would be difficult for me at the present time to gather up the
evidence, but, based on long experience at peirce-l, I am fairly certain
that Joe Ransdell regarded the semiotic object, in particular the
dynamical object, as having the efficient-causal role in semiosis, not a
final-causal role.
Best, Ben
On 3/26/2014 10:59 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Vinicius, List,
You provide the following account of Peirce's conception of a dynamic
object: it is independent of any purpose that I, you or any number of
minds could have in our reasoning." It is the "efficient cause of
semeiosis."
I'd like to ask a question about the manner in which the dynamic
object operates: is it an efficient cause of semiosis, as you
suggest, or is it the final cause of semiosis?
Here are two glosses on the conception: Ransdell describes the dynamic
object as the “object as it really is”, (1977, 169) and Hookway
describes it as “the object as it is known to be [at the end of
inquiry].” (1985, 139) Both agree with your first description as
something that is independent of what you or I happen to think about it.
Having said that, Ransdell's gloss seems open to an interpretation
as either an efficient or a final cause. Hookway's gloss seems to
suggest that it is operating as a final cause.
Do you disagree with Hookway? I'm wondering what textual evidence you
have for thinking the dynamical object should be understood primarily
or solely as something that operates as an efficient cause.
I tend to think that much depends upon the character of the dynamical
object we're talking about and the relationship between this object
and one or another sign or interpretant that is operating in a
semiotic process. That is, actual objects (e.g., a ball flying through
the air) are related as efficient causes to the indices that draw our
attention in a particular direction. Real objects (e.g., a real law
that governs the forces operating between the earth and the mass) are
related as final causes to the explanations that are offered as
interpretations of the public signs of those objects.
Hope that helps to clarify some points where we may disagree about
Peirce's conception.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
*From:* Vinicius Romanini [vinir...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Wednesday, March 26, 2014 7:11 PM
*To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or
the doctrine of signs
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