Vinicius, List, You provide the following account of Peirce's conception of a dynamic object: it is independent of any purpose that I, you or any number of minds could have in our reasoning." It is the "efficient cause of semeiosis."
I'd like to ask a question about the manner in which the dynamic object operates: is it an efficient cause of semiosis, as you suggest, or is it the final cause of semiosis? Here are two glosses on the conception: Ransdell describes the dynamic object as the “object as it really is”, (1977, 169) and Hookway describes it as “the object as it is known to be [at the end of inquiry].” (1985, 139) Both agree with your first description as something that is independent of what you or I happen to think about it. Having said that, Ransdell's gloss seems open to an interpretation as either an efficient or a final cause. Hookway's gloss seems to suggest that it is operating as a final cause. Do you disagree with Hookway? I'm wondering what textual evidence you have for thinking the dynamical object should be understood primarily or solely as something that operates as an efficient cause. I tend to think that much depends upon the character of the dynamical object we're talking about and the relationship between this object and one or another sign or interpretant that is operating in a semiotic process. That is, actual objects (e.g., a ball flying through the air) are related as efficient causes to the indices that draw our attention in a particular direction. Real objects (e.g., a real law that governs the forces operating between the earth and the mass) are related as final causes to the explanations that are offered as interpretations of the public signs of those objects. Hope that helps to clarify some points where we may disagree about Peirce's conception. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Vinicius Romanini [vinir...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2014 7:11 PM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 5, Semeiotics, or the doctrine of signs Jeff, Jon, list Jeff said: Your reference to the Latin and Greek roots of the words 'purpose' and 'object' make me think about the purpose of a theory of semiotics. For the sake of reading Peirce, I've mainly assumed that the purpose is articulated in the science of esthetics and then refined in the science of ethics. The purpose of a theory of semiotics is to foster good reasoning. and one of the logical requisites is a clear distinction among the aspects of the sign involved. The term "purpose" is linked with final causation, with how propositions are able to produce general types of interpretants in self-controlled reasoning. Now, when we talk of objects in semeiosis, we must separate the dynamic object (which is independent of any purpose that I, you or any number of minds could have in our reasoning - the efficient cause of semeiosis), and the immediate object (the aspect that I, you or a community of minds engaged in inquiry must represent inside the sign). It is, then, an internal aspect of the sign, and it must be unconscious. The immediate object is gained by collateral experience, during perception, and do represent esthetic ideals. Being an idea, the habits that the immediate object eventually embodies are always normative ideals. And its correlate immediate interpretant is interpretability of these ideals. Not an intellectual purpose, but an non-conscious natural attractiveness towards the qualitative wholeness of what is represented in the mind, by the immediate object. In fact, the immediate interpretant offers the ground for the dynamic interpretants that will be the effective interpretations for the sign. But the immediate object, the idea gathered during perception, the familiarity with the real gained in experience, is the ground of representations. If it is quality, the representation is an icon. If it is an existent, the representation can be an index. If it is a habit, the representation can be a symbol (but also a metaphor). A symbol grows when its immediate object grows, and different immediate objects mean different signs. The immediate object is the uberty of semeiosis, the womb where all different signs come from. I have here in the list argued that habitual immediate objects produce the sense of external space, and habitual immediate interpretants produce the sense of internal time. Being connected with esthetics, you know what this means. Vinicius -- Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies School of Communications and Arts University of Sao Paulo, Brazil www.minutesemeiotic.org<http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/> www.semeiosis.com.br<http://www.semeiosis.com.br/> Skype:vinicius_romanini
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