Phyllis, Mara, List, The position I assume you're alluding to, Phyllis, is Peirce's *Extreme Scholastic Realism*, the reality of possibles and would-bes. Indeed, *agapasm*, as outlined, for example, in "Evolutionary Love," is a strictly evolutionary theory.
Speaking here of Lamarckian evolution (also beginning to come back into fashion, although, of course, necessarily revised in the of decades of research since Peirce reflected on it), Peirce comments on the "double part" which habit plays in evolution,and how Lamarckian evolution in Peirce's understanding "coincides with the general description of the action of love": *. . . Habit is mere inertia, a resting on one's oars, not a propulsion. Now it is energetic projaculation . . .by which in the typical instances of Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. Habit, however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, habit plays a double part; it serves to establish the new features, and also to bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they belong. But if the reader will now kindly give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two, he will see that this account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general description of the action of love. . . (CP 6.300, EP1:360).* In Peirce's view the cosmos itself is evolving as you noted, Phyllis, apropos of the evolution of natural laws, while the 'last frontier' of evolution is the evolution of consciousness, of mind itself (recalling that in Peirce's synechastic philosophy matter is really mind). I'm quoting the following passage at some length (but with a few ellipses and broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability) because it seems to me a kind of précis of Peirce's views on evolution as it relates to the growth of learning (and, indirectly, to the evolution of consciousness). Philosophers, especially, should take note of the final segment below. Remembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, the continuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes on within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can achieve almost nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one's stature as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by merely straining for it before it is ready to come. . . . Besides this inward process, there is the operation of the environment, which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the mind lively. Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of habit makes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully brightens the ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making, there is the focus of mental activity . . . Few psychologists have perceived how fundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind, abundantly commissured to other portions, works almost mechanically. It sinks to a condition of a railway junction. But a portion of mind almost isolated, a spiritual peninsula, or cul-de-sac, is like a railway terminus. Now mental commissures are habits. Where they abound, originality is not needed and is not found; but where they are in defect spontaneity is set free. Thus, the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting of sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play. As to growth by exercise, I have already shown, in discussing "Man's Glassy Essence," . . . . what its modus operandi must be conceived to be . . .. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of molecules, and the reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a sort of reproduction. It takes place only during exercise, because the activity of protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its necessary condition. Growth by exercise takes place also in the mind. Indeed, that is what it is to learn. But the most perfect illustration is the development of a philosophical idea by being put into practice. The conception which appeared, at first, as unitary splits up into special cases; and into each of these new thought must enter to make a practicable idea. This new thought, however, follows pretty closely the model of the parent conception; and thus a homogeneous development takes place. The parallel between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent. Patient attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction called learning (CP 6.301, EP1:361). Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 4:12 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net>wrote: > Mara, Gary, List, > > Or could it be both? Peirce identifed pure chance as a real and operable > element of reality. If chance is real, as however small an element of > reality, then the idea that laws (and even the universe itself) evolve > would be real as well. There must be a Peircean (non-nominalistic) way of > stating that, especially now that new cosmological discoveries are > suggesting he is correct about laws of nature evolving. > > Of course it is not our naming them that makes them real, but pure chance > does imply something ocurring/coming to exist that never was before. For > example, maybe it was pure abductive-like chance that a 3M chemist thought > to use a failed & worthless non- super glue on scraps of paper, to mark > pages in his choir book? The potential usefulness of the USELESS glue > evolved right out of the "discovery" that the hoped for super glue didn't > work. I don't know how I'd ever keep things straight in my mind these days > without Post It Notes. Were they only real after they were invented and > named? Or was the potential for their reality inherent all along--even > BEFORE that glue failure? > > Regards, > Phyllis > > > > Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Mara, list, > > Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post > for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still > with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed > further reflection. You wrote: > > MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and > therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another > interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the > dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of > a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent > a dynamic or continuous process. > > If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an > alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording > induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of > regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the > sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the > truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. > On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative > position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of > them. > > As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static > representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final > belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope > that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality > of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. > You concluded: > > MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the > community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the > object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct > simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does > it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the > concept is related to other concepts? > > Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any > final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods <mara.wo...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List, >> >> Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter >> 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis >> de Waal. >> >> >> Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: >> >> Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on >> the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, >> and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies >> principles outside of logic itself. >> >> As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing >> implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the >> course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, >> after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that >> this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may >> think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and >> mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those >> subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an >> eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted >> but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of >> nominalism versus realism. >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the >> first sections of the chapter. >> >> Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that >> generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human >> intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' >> practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general >> sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into >> the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves >> inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in >> particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the >> universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be >> explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford >> explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination >> of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create >> explanatory patterns out of randomness? >> >> These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general >> explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to >> foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic >> components of the universe. >> >> Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, is >> to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special >> sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude >> metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He >> divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or >> questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding >> time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions >> regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also >> called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. >> >> According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of >> reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality >> consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim >> thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of >> people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community >> of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from >> individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a >> shared opinion about it. >> >> If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original >> metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of >> inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are >> to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would >> be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and >> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >> a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the >> sign and its final interpretant in a later post). >> >> Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object >> of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to >> get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the >> pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only >> intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to >> produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of final >> beliefs are real. It seems that the import of the intellectual effect of >> intellectual concepts comes from the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only >> the consequences for rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because >> only the habits of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the >> consequences of, and intentionally maintains are rightly considered >> beliefs? Or is it because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically >> applied to those consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational >> conduct that can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)? >> >> Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably >> because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a belief must >> include what the indefinite community settles on, that aspect of the belief >> must be included in its definition. Also presumably, just as the object has >> to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or >> logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of >> it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the >> isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more >> general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? >> >> >> >> Mara Woods >> >> M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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