Ulysses, Matt, Mara, list,
I think that Peirce would agree with Matt's posted criticism by Swigart
of Mill https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2014-05/msg00066.html
so far as it goes. Mill is trying to re-cast induction as deduction from
some postulated or inductively inferred uniformity of nature.
In "Grounds of the Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences
of the Four Incapacities" (1868),
http://www.peirce.org/writings/p41.html and, taking into account the
idea of infinite universe, in "The Probability of Induction,"
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_12/April_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_IV,
Peirce argues, in more detail than I can recapitulate here, that
induction’s validity depends not on some determinate state, especially
an orderliness, of the universe, but on its method - in particular, fair
sampling - and on the reality ( = the cognizability) of generalities and
of being as general (such that objects can share characters). (Peirce
would, I think, argue that, as far as the logical critique of induction
is concerned, induction does not take its principles from any particular
metaphysical doctrine about real generalities. ) Since inductions can't
be claimed generally conclude in truths, but only to approximate to
truth, inductions (and hypothetical inferences) depend for their
validity on their eventual correctability (I'd say that that's true even
for deduction since deduction is not always simple) and on the real's
being only that which would be found sooner or later but still
inevitably by sufficient investigation. Note that in "Grounds" he refers
to induction and hypothetical inference as "probable inference" and such
should not be confused with that which he later calls "probable deduction."
In "The Probability of Induction," Peirce focuses on an illusion-riddled
infinite universe (CP 2.684) in which an observed orderliness of nature
would be a transitory illusion; his argument there becomes that we find
that case to be contrary to our most settled _/belief/_, and that we
would only stultify ourselves by accepting it; this echoes back to
Peirce's argument in "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" against
merely verbal doubts. In "The Probability of Induction," Peirce goes on
to remark that preconceptions about universal distributions, random or
otherwise, would make some sense only if we could freely sample
universes, and even those would belong to a higher universe, one to
which the conception of probability would not apply. (Shades of the
multiverse and its reported 'measure problem'!)
Peirce wrote in 1900 that "[Induction] supposes that there is a certain
course of experience, and that the sample has been so drawn as to be
governed by that same course of experience." (A Letter to Langley,
_Historical Perspectives_ 2:878). In his 1913 letter to F.A. Woods (CP
8.385-387) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/induction.html,
saying that "_/Induction/_ [...] depends upon our confidence that a run
of one kind of experience will not be changed or cease without some
indication before it ceases [...]"
Then there is Peirce's contribution
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Uniformity to the article
"Uniformity" in Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_
Volume 2 (1902).
Also see the Drafts D and A of Memoir 23 "On the Validity of Induction"
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-07.htm#m23 in
the Carnegie application (1902).
Best, Ben
On 5/5/2014 9:37 PM, U Pascal wrote:
Mara, Ben, List
I'm excited for the discussion that you have set up with your
introductory remarks. Keeping it brief, (I'm sneaking this email in
while at work) I wanted to focus one of your first questions:;
Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford
explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the
combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and
phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness?
Peirce's argument against Mill's notion that we can form knowledge
about the universe because it is regular has always puzzled me. It
strikes me that this argument is of fundamental importance (especially
when dealing with themes the of truth & reality), however I've always
felt something lacking in my understanding of Peirce's take down. If
somebody is willing to rehearse Mill's position and Peirce's response,
I think we could get closer to answering Mara & Ben's question.
Best,
Ulysses
On 5/5/2014, Mara Woods wrote:
List,
Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of
Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed
by Cornelis de Waal.
Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell:
Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views
on the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a
science, and its being the first science for which (philosophical)
logic supplies principles outside of logic itself.
As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing
implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In
the course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that
sense, after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop
and note that this comes as a surprise to many readers these days,
any number of whom may think that metaphysics, or at least ontology,
is more basic than logic and mathematics too, or at least is not in
some common structure with those subjects and is not in some ordering
involving them. We may want to keep an eye on these aspects of Peirce
that many of his readers take for granted but which many others do
not, especially as we come to the discussion of nominalism versus
realism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of
the first sections of the chapter.
Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that
generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe.
Human intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our
species' practical dealings with that universe in our environment.
Getting a general sense of the universe that extends beyond our
species' habitual niche into the continually-being-discovered realms
by the special sciences involves inducing generals in that universe
that explain the variety perceived in particulars. Is this
introduction of logic into our conceptions of the universe really
justified here by the assumption that the universe can be explained?
Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford
explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the
combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and
phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness?
These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general
explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem
to foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking
as basic components of the universe.
Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to
Peirce, is to develop a general account that can form the basis of
the special sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on
their own crude metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or
intuitive notions. He divides metaphysics into three categories:
general metaphysics, or questions regarding reality; physical
metaphysics, or questions regarding time, space, natural laws, etc.;
and psychical metaphysics, or questions regarding God and mind.
Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also called ontology, and
addresses first the issues of truth and reality.
According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept
of reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real.
Reality consists in anything that is independent of what we might
call interim thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular
person or group of people think about it now that matters, but what
the indefinite community of inquirers would finally think about it.
The real's independence from individual thought is what enables the
inquirers to eventually have a shared opinion about it.
If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original
metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite
community of inquirers would find to be general to our experiences
with the universe are to be considered real and statements that
express those regularities would be true. According to this view, the
real is that which persists and therefore that which affords
induction. However, couldn't another interpretation be that
explanation is a type of regularity-making about the dynamic,
ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of a
final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to
represent a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the
nature of the sign and its final interpretant in a later post).
Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the
object of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the
pragmatic maxim to get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129).
Since Peirce limited the pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts
only (115) and "the only intellectual effect such objects can have
upon us, Peirce claims, is to produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the
(immediate) objects of final beliefs are real. It seems that the
import of the intellectual effect of intellectual concepts comes from
the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only the consequences for
rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because only the habits
of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the consequences of,
and intentionally maintains are rightly considered beliefs? Or is it
because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically applied to those
consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational conduct that
can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)?
Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably
because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a
belief must include what the indefinite community settles on, that
aspect of the belief must be included in its definition. Also
presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the community
of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the object,
otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct
simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or
does it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of
how the concept is related to other concepts?
Mara Woods
M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu
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