Soeren wrote: "We can get all kinds of knowledge. They just have a prize."
Yes. I agree that knowledge can lead to a 'prize' occasionally but entails paying 'a price' everytime. With all the best. Sung > Dear Gary and Phyllis > > I have become fond of the term Hypercomplexity as a solution to the > problem of change and realism as it signifies that there is order in > process but it is not reducible to one model as there are multiple aspects > and dynamics working at the same time. It is a bit what Prigogine and > others points out that you create more entropy than you reduce when you > try to get writ of it in searching for true and simple knowledge of a > complex system, because no system can be completely isolated from outside > interference and in doing science you always use energy and produce > entropy. We can get all kinds of knowledge. They just have a prize. Which > we by the way all know from our own lives. > > Best > Søren > > Fra: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > Sendt: 13. maj 2014 03:00 > Til: Phyllis Chiasson > Cc: Mara Woods; peirce List > Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 8, Truth and reality > > Phyllis, List, > > Gee, why wouldn't I get that you'd be thinking in terms of the NA at the > moment?! Anyhow, I'm going to skip ahead to Chapter 13 of your Peirce's > Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking to try to get a heads up on your > thinking in this matter. You wrote: > > PC: But my point was that if the possibility of Chance is real in the > sense of actions in mind or matter (degraded mind), then everything > evolves somewhat unpredictably (or devolves if chance destroys its form > into chaos). In any case, whatever something was was before it manifested > would be real, according to Peirce, but may not enter into general > experience until it is apprehended in actuality, then classified & > named--or until it is described in such a way as it can be mentally > apprehended. > > Hm. I have a few reservations here. First, I don't think that matter is > "degraded mind," only "mind hidebound with habits." > > (W)hat we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound > with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in that > diversification there is life (CP 6.158). > > Yes, there is that moment--that moment of bifucation in Prigogine's > version of chaos theory--where something either evolves or devolves. But > there is more than mere chance in it--Peirce resisted his own philosophy > being thought of solelhy in terms of his Tychism. > > There is no reality without the possibility of manifestation. This is the > problem Peirce has with Hegel, that Hegel doesn't see the essential > necessity of 2ns, of brute existence in reality. Well, that could have > been stated better. So, an example: > > If, say, I am walking down the street and a brick dislodges itself from a > building I'm passing and hits me on the shoulder, it may be that it will > afterward be "classified & named," but its reality for me is very much an > existential occurrence in its happening. And if I were, say, a dog, I > wouldn't 'know' anything more than that shock and pain, etc. Reality > implies all 3 categories being operative. > > Perhaps I am missing your point in one matter since, for me, a "would-be" > is nothing that merely happens "unpredictably," but rather it is that > which would come into existence if the conditions were set (or came about) > for its happening. For example, in my ordinary day to day life I have > rather considerable control over what "would be" the activities of my next > day were I to plan it: say, lunch with a friend, and theater in the > evening with my spouse. We make our lunch plans and I buy the theater > tickets. That doesn't mean that it necessarily will happen--chance > certainly enters into it if I suddenly have a dental emergency, say. > > But "would-bes" are category 3ns, the category of necessity--all things > being equal. And, all things being equal, I will have lunch with my friend > tomorrow, and I will go to the theater with my spouse--unless something > unexpected, something untoward, happens--because I created the conditions > for those events to occur (nature does something equivalent to this). Most > often--but certainly not always--events in my life do frequently happen as > planned. You concluded: > > PC: I can see how easy it is to seem nominalistic when describing stuff > without the categories, because it is in naming or understanding signs > that they become real to us. Sometimes, I feel very nominalistic myself, > because it feels as though I actually taught someone how to be smarter > --me me me--instead of enabling someone to evolve and express his or her > innate potential. > > I agree that it's very difficult to divest ourselves of all traces of > nominalism. Certainly Peirce--of all people!--was himself challenged in > this regard. So what's to be done? Well, for me, it's a matter of trying > to see those remnants of nominalism in my thinking--no easy matter--and > the very self-awareness of them helps me eliminate them. > > I hear an echo of Rilke in your saying that it is by naming things that > they become real to us, that, as Rilke saw it, we are here on earth > perhaps precisely to name things: the forest, a rose bloom, my bedroom, > love in all its varieties, my grief. I'm not at all sure about that, I > mean that it's our sole reason for existing. But I am sure that Rilke was > one of the greatest of modern poets and that there is some significant > truth in it. > > And, yes, I agree that we (you and I) need the categories in some strange > and important sort of way. And we surely can't rest in thirdness as Hegel > did, and we oughtn't stop at 2ns as some of the existentialists and > "strict individualists" did and do, and valorizing 1ns is swell for > artists in terms of their art creation, but from the perspective of > philosophy (and the 7 systems of philosophy which Peirce analyzes in the > 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism), it can result in a nihilistic > philosophy, or one of "Idealistic Sensualism," as Peirce phrases it in the > lecture in question. > > So, all three categories need be embraced in the natural evolution of the > person--of you and me--the idea with which you conclude your post. But one > has to embrace Peirce's categories to feel this way, and many do not. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 7:41 PM, Phyllis Chiasson > <ath...@olympus.net<mailto:ath...@olympus.net>> wrote: > Gary, > I was really thinking of Real vs Actual in terms of the Neglected > Argument, which is much on my mind today, and his essay, What Pragmatism > Is. I suppose Evolutionary Love is rattling around in there too, as I've > read it often. He addresses evolution in terms of thought and general > ideas in the latter essay (I discuss it in Chapter 13 of PEIRCE'S > PRAGMATISM: The Design for Thinking. ) > > But my point was that if the possibility of Chance is real in the sense of > actions in mind or matter (degraded mind), then everything evolves > somewhat unpredictably (or devolves if chance destroys its form into > chaos). In any case, whatever something was was before it manifested would > be real, according to Peirce, but may not enter into general experience > until it is apprehended in actuality, then classified & named--or until it > is described in such a way as it can be mentally apprehended. > > In NA Peirce writes "...for in most instances where the conjecture reaches > the high peaks of Plausibility--and is really most worthy of > confidence--the inquirer is unable definitely to formulate just what the > explained wonder is; or can only do so in light of the hypothesis." > > I think both his metaphysics and abduction/retroduction (which he says is > the way great systems, including newspapers and the cosmos work) are so > dependent upon his phenomenology (and probably mathematics as well, which > is beyond my ken) that they probably can't be understood well without > somehow finding a way to clearly, and as literally as possible, braid the > categories into relation into every explanation. Peirce does that, of > course, but I have to do it myself (again, chickens & ducks) to relate to > what he means. > > I can see how easy it is to seem nominalistic when describing stuff > without the categories, because it is in naming or understanding signs > that they become real to us. Sometimes, I feel very nominalistic myself, > because it feels as though I actually taught someone how to be smarter > --me me me--instead of enabling someone to evolve and express his or her > innate potential. It's a school teacher's conceit, i guess. > > Regards, > Phyllis > > Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> > wrote: > Phyllis, Mara, List, > > The position I assume you're alluding to, Phyllis, is Peirce's Extreme > Scholastic Realism, the reality of possibles and would-bes. Indeed, > agapasm, as outlined, for example, in "Evolutionary Love," is a strictly > evolutionary theory. > > Speaking here of Lamarckian evolution (also beginning to come back into > fashion, although, of course, necessarily revised in the of decades of > research since Peirce reflected on it), Peirce comments on the "double > part" which habit plays in evolution,and how Lamarckian evolution in > Peirce's understanding "coincides with the general description of the > action of love": > > . . . Habit is mere inertia, a resting on one's oars, not a propulsion. > Now it is energetic projaculation . . .by which in the typical instances > of Lamarckian evolution the new elements of form are first created. Habit, > however, forces them to take practical shapes, compatible with the > structures they affect, and, in the form of heredity and otherwise, > gradually replaces the spontaneous energy that sustains them. Thus, habit > plays a double part; it serves to establish the new features, and also to > bring them into harmony with the general morphology and function of the > animals and plants to which they belong. But if the reader will now kindly > give himself the trouble of turning back a page or two, he will see that > this account of Lamarckian evolution coincides with the general > description of the action of love. . . (CP 6.300, EP1:360). > > In Peirce's view the cosmos itself is evolving as you noted, Phyllis, > apropos of the evolution of natural laws, while the 'last frontier' of > evolution is the evolution of consciousness, of mind itself (recalling > that in Peirce's synechastic philosophy matter is really mind). I'm > quoting the following passage at some length (but with a few ellipses and > broken up into shorter paragraphs for readability) because it seems to me > a kind of précis of Peirce's views on evolution as it relates to the > growth of learning (and, indirectly, to the evolution of consciousness). > Philosophers, especially, should take note of the final segment below. > > Remembering that all matter is really mind, remembering, too, the > continuity of mind, let us ask what aspect Lamarckian evolution takes on > within the domain of consciousness. Direct endeavor can achieve almost > nothing. It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one's stature > as it is to produce an idea acceptable to any of the Muses by merely > straining for it before it is ready to come. . . . > > Besides this inward process, there is the operation of the environment, > which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render > the mind lively. Everybody knows that the long continuance of a routine of > habit makes us lethargic, while a succession of surprises wonderfully > brightens the ideas. Where there is a motion, where history is a-making, > there is the focus of mental activity . . . Few psychologists have > perceived how fundamental a fact this is. A portion of mind, abundantly > commissured to other portions, works almost mechanically. It sinks to a > condition of a railway junction. But a portion of mind almost isolated, a > spiritual peninsula, or cul-de-sac, is like a railway terminus. Now mental > commissures are habits. Where they abound, originality is not needed and > is not found; but where they are in defect spontaneity is set free. Thus, > the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is the putting of > sundry thoughts into situations in which they are free to play. > > As to growth by exercise, I have already shown, in discussing "Man's > Glassy Essence," . . . . what its modus operandi must be conceived to be . > . .. Namely, it consists of the flying asunder of molecules, and the > reparation of the parts by new matter. It is, thus, a sort of > reproduction. It takes place only during exercise, because the activity of > protoplasm consists in the molecular disturbance which is its necessary > condition. > > Growth by exercise takes place also in the mind. Indeed, that is what it > is to learn. But the most perfect illustration is the development of a > philosophical idea by being put into practice. The conception which > appeared, at first, as unitary splits up into special cases; and into each > of these new thought must enter to make a practicable idea. This new > thought, however, follows pretty closely the model of the parent > conception; and thus a homogeneous development takes place. The parallel > between this and the course of molecular occurrences is apparent. Patient > attention will be able to trace all these elements in the transaction > called learning (CP 6.301, EP1:361). > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 4:12 PM, Phyllis Chiasson > <ath...@olympus.net<mailto:ath...@olympus.net>> wrote: > Mara, Gary, List, > > Or could it be both? Peirce identifed pure chance as a real and operable > element of reality. If chance is real, as however small an element of > reality, then the idea that laws (and even the universe itself) evolve > would be real as well. There must be a Peircean (non-nominalistic) way of > stating that, especially now that new cosmological discoveries are > suggesting he is correct about laws of nature evolving. > > Of course it is not our naming them that makes them real, but pure chance > does imply something ocurring/coming to exist that never was before. For > example, maybe it was pure abductive-like chance that a 3M chemist thought > to use a failed & worthless non- super glue on scraps of paper, to mark > pages in his choir book? The potential usefulness of the USELESS glue > evolved right out of the "discovery" that the hoped for super glue didn't > work. I don't know how I'd ever keep things straight in my mind these days > without Post It Notes. Were they only real after they were invented and > named? Or was the potential for their reality inherent all along--even > BEFORE that glue failure? > > Regards, > Phyllis > > > > Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> > wrote: > Mara, list, > > Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post > for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still > with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed > further reflection. You wrote: > > MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and > therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another > interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about > the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the > concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting > to represent a dynamic or continuous process. > > If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an > alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording > induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of > regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the > sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the > truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. > On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative > position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of > them. > > As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static > representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a > "final belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the > intellectual hope that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know > the truth of reality of many a thing we may inquire into. But the > approach is ever asymptotic. You concluded: > > MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the > community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the > object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational > conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? > Or does it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how > the concept is related to other concepts? > Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that any > final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods > <mara.wo...@gmail.com<mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > List, > > Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of Chapter > 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis > de Waal. > > > > Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: > > Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on the > scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, > and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies > principles outside of logic itself. > > As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing > implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the > course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, > after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that > this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom > may think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic > and mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with > those subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to > keep an eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for > granted but which many others do not, especially as we come to the > discussion of nominalism versus realism. > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the > first sections of the chapter. > > Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that > generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human > intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' > practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a > general sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual > niche into the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences > involves inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety > perceived in particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our > conceptions of the universe really justified here by the assumption that > the universe can be explained? Is the assumption that the universe is > regular enough to afford explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of > the power of the combination of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, > and phaneroscopy to create explanatory patterns out of randomness? > > These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general > explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to > foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic > components of the universe. > > Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, is > to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special > sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude > metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He > divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or > questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding > time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions > regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also > called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. > > According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of > reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality > consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim > thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of > people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community > of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from > individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a > shared opinion about it. > > If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original > metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community > of inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe > are to be considered real and statements that express those regularities > would be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and > therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another > interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about > the dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the > concept of a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting > to represent a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the > nature of the sign and its final interpretant in a later post). > > Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object of > final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to get > "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the > pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only > intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to > produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of final > beliefs are real. It seems that the import of the intellectual effect of > intellectual concepts comes from the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only > the consequences for rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because > only the habits of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the > consequences of, and intentionally maintains are rightly considered > beliefs? Or is it because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically > applied to those consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational > conduct that can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)? > > Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably > because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a belief > must include what the indefinite community settles on, that aspect of the > belief must be included in its definition. Also presumably, just as the > object has to be independent, the community of inquirers must have > empirical and/or logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief > can come out of it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or > definition about the isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept > fit into a more general theory of how the concept is related to other > concepts? > > > > > > Mara Woods > > M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe > PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > >
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