Mara, list, So I ask someone, "As a cenoscopic scientist, what is your belief about x?" and she offers me, say, a proposition as a statement of her belief. Now that proposition is in extreme scholastic reality either true or it is false or it is nonsense. It would seem that this is where pragmatism leads us, at least in terms of the results of any given inquiry. One certainly can't at the moment of a question such as I hypothetically asked offer the entire theory underlying the proposition offered, nor would anyone demand that of someone. But one can answer a specific question relating to some specific aspect of that theory.
Yet, however this may be in our ordinary day to day belief systems, this would be misleading in science as such because, while some retroductive inferences have very "high degrees of certainty" as to their probability, yet these inferences "do not belong to science" but are, rather "established truths", that is,"they are propositions into which the economy of endeavor prescribes that, for the time being, further inquiry shall cease." [S]cience . . . has nothing at stake on any temporal venture but is in pursuit of eternal verities (not semblances to truth) and looks upon this pursuit, not as the work of one man's life, but as that of generation after generation, indefinitely. Thus those retroductive inferences which at length acquire such high degrees of certainty, so far as they are so probable, are not pure retroductions and do not belong to science, as such; while, so far as they are scientific and are pure retroductions, have no true probability and are not matters for belief. We call them in science established truths, that is, they are propositions into which the economy of endeavor prescribes that, for the time being, further inquiry shall cease. (CP 5.589) And so these "established truths" may be taken up again later as certain doubts surface, for example, those which led us from a Newtonian to an Einsteinian world view. We could, however, probably all of us offer a rather long list of "established truths" which we believe, and this seems necessarily in order to stabilize our belief systems at all. So, from Peirce's standpoint, retroductions in "so far as they are scientific and are pure retroductions, have no true probability and are not matters for belief." This is in line with his notion of science being "a living historic entity" which can never be fully completed at any given moment of that history. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Mara Woods <mara.wo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary, List, > > I apologize for the radio silence. I have been letting home projects take > my attention this week. > > Here I am merely trying to understand Peirce's view here, not suggest my > own. I do think that Peirce's synechism does suggest that all final beliefs > will be related to one another. Indeed, if we were able to look into a > future that happens to contain final beliefs and extract sample > propositions to bring back to our time, I think that we would not find much > use for them even though we have faith that they are true. That is because > we would not have the network of beliefs that the proposition represents to > rely on for interpretation. It gets a little messy here because the purpose > of defining truth, as far as Kees' book suggests, is defining what is meant > by asserting a proposition to be true. I'm not sure how singular > propositions can be true as they cannot capture the entire set of beliefs > required to interpret them, including the definition of some words. > > Perhaps what is meant here, by asserting the truth of a proposition, is > something like, "This proposition, understood in the same way I understand > it, would be affirmed as true by holders of final belief on the matter."? > Perhaps I am missing something here, or perhaps am simply too Kuhnian in my > thinking at the moment, but this seems problematic to me. > > Mara Woods > > > On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 1:31 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> Mara, list, >> >> Sorry that it's taken a while to get back to your stimulating first post >> for this chapter, Mara, but personal matters took over, and some are still >> with me. So, just a few interleaved comments for now, all probably needed >> further reflection. You wrote: >> >> MW: According to [Peirce's] view, the real is that which persists and >> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >> a dynamic or continuous process. >> >> If I understand you correctly, it seems to me that what you offer as an >> alternative to Peirce's view of the real as persisting and so affording >> induction--namely, that "explanation" itself might be seen as "a type of >> regularity-making" about a fluid universe-- represents a version of the >> sort of nominalistic thinking Peirce sought to debunk since it reduces the >> truth of any reality to that "explanation" and so is a kind of a priorism. >> On the other hand, many a postmodernist does seem to hold that alternative >> position and, so, there are many divergent opinions, although "schools" of >> them. >> >> As for the concept of a final belief possibly implying a static >> representation of a dynamic universal process, I would say that by a "final >> belief" Peirce means merely a "regulative principle," the intellectual hope >> that, given continuity/synechism, we may come to know the truth of reality >> of many a thing we may inquire into. But the approach is ever asymptotic. >> You concluded: >> >> MW: Also presumably, just as the object has to be independent, the >> community of inquirers must have empirical and/or logical access to the >> object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of it. Can rational conduct >> simply mean the opinion or definition about the isolated concept? Or does >> it require that the concept fit into a more general theory of how the >> concept is related to other concepts? >> >> Good question. Again, I would appeal to Peirce's synechism to say that >> any final belief that is true will be really related to other true beliefs. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> >> On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Mara Woods <mara.wo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> List, >>> >>> Welcome to the slow read, emceed by Mara Woods and Ben Udell, of >>> Chapter 8, "Truth and reality" in Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by >>> Cornelis de Waal. >>> >>> >>> Let's get started with this introduction provided by Ben Udell: >>> >>> Kees begins the chapter with an excellent summary of Peirce's views on >>> the scope of metaphysics, its place in philosophy, its status as a science, >>> and its being the first science for which (philosophical) logic supplies >>> principles outside of logic itself. >>> >>> As Kees points out, much of his metaphysics consists in drawing >>> implications of logic and pragmatism for reality and the universe. In the >>> course of this book, metaphysics' coming after logic and, in that sense, >>> after epistemology, seems so natural that one needs to stop and note that >>> this comes as a surprise to many readers these days, any number of whom may >>> think that metaphysics, or at least ontology, is more basic than logic and >>> mathematics too, or at least is not in some common structure with those >>> subjects and is not in some ordering involving them. We may want to keep an >>> eye on these aspects of Peirce that many of his readers take for granted >>> but which many others do not, especially as we come to the discussion of >>> nominalism versus realism. >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Below I address some of the questions that arose from my reading of the >>> first sections of the chapter. >>> >>> Kees characterizes Peirce's view of metaphysics as the work that >>> generalizes the experiences of or engagement with the universe. Human >>> intuitions and instincts about the universe developed from our species' >>> practical dealings with that universe in our environment. Getting a general >>> sense of the universe that extends beyond our species' habitual niche into >>> the continually-being-discovered realms by the special sciences involves >>> inducing generals in that universe that explain the variety perceived in >>> particulars. Is this introduction of logic into our conceptions of the >>> universe really justified here by the assumption that the universe can be >>> explained? Is the assumption that the universe is regular enough to afford >>> explanation? Or is it simply an affirmation of the power of the combination >>> of instinct, intuition, logic, mathematics, and phaneroscopy to create >>> explanatory patterns out of randomness? >>> >>> These two assumptions -- that the universe can be subject to general >>> explanation and that the universe consists in great variety -- seem to >>> foreshadow Peirce's dynamic cosmology of change and habit-taking as basic >>> components of the universe. >>> >>> Kees points out that the purpose of metaphysics, according to Peirce, >>> is to develop a general account that can form the basis of the special >>> sciences. Indeed, without this step, scientists rely on their own crude >>> metaphysics, presumably based on instinctive or intuitive notions. He >>> divides metaphysics into three categories: general metaphysics, or >>> questions regarding reality; physical metaphysics, or questions regarding >>> time, space, natural laws, etc.; and psychical metaphysics, or questions >>> regarding God and mind. Chapter 8 is devoted to the first category, also >>> called ontology, and addresses first the issues of truth and reality. >>> >>> According to Kees, the concept of truth is derived from the concept of >>> reality: a statement is true when its immediate object is real. Reality >>> consists in anything that is independent of what we might call interim >>> thoughts about it. That is, it is not what a particular person or group of >>> people think about it now that matters, but what the indefinite community >>> of inquirers would finally think about it. The real's independence from >>> individual thought is what enables the inquirers to eventually have a >>> shared opinion about it. >>> >>> If we apply the related concepts of reality and truth to the original >>> metaphysical assumptions, then the regularities the indefinite community of >>> inquirers would find to be general to our experiences with the universe are >>> to be considered real and statements that express those regularities would >>> be true. According to this view, the real is that which persists and >>> therefore that which affords induction. However, couldn't another >>> interpretation be that explanation is a type of regularity-making about the >>> dynamic, ever-changing qualities of the universe? After all, the concept of >>> a final belief can imply a static or discrete sign attempting to represent >>> a dynamic or continuous process. (I'd like to discuss the nature of the >>> sign and its final interpretant in a later post). >>> >>> Kees, and Peirce, gets to the connection of reality to being the object >>> of final beliefs (final interpretant) by applying the pragmatic maxim to >>> get "reality" to the 3rd grade of clarity (129). Since Peirce limited the >>> pragmatic maxim to intellectual concepts only (115) and "the only >>> intellectual effect such objects can have upon us, Peirce claims, is to >>> produce belief" (de Waal 130), only the (immediate) objects of final >>> beliefs are real. It seems that the import of the intellectual effect of >>> intellectual concepts comes from the pragmatic maxim itself, by which only >>> the consequences for rational conduct is considered (116). Is that because >>> only the habits of which a person is conscious of, agrees with the >>> consequences of, and intentionally maintains are rightly considered >>> beliefs? Or is it because the pragmatic maxim can only be practically >>> applied to those consequences of the acceptance of the maxim to rational >>> conduct that can be foreseen (and therefore are based on known habits)? >>> >>> Kees seems to jump a few steps in the reasoning here, but presumably >>> because the whole conception of all practical consequences of a belief must >>> include what the indefinite community settles on, that aspect of the belief >>> must be included in its definition. Also presumably, just as the object has >>> to be independent, the community of inquirers must have empirical and/or >>> logical access to the object, otherwise no shared belief can come out of >>> it. Can rational conduct simply mean the opinion or definition about the >>> isolated concept? Or does it require that the concept fit into a more >>> general theory of how the concept is related to other concepts? >>> >>> >>> >>> Mara Woods >>> >>> M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >
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