I am not part of this immediate discussion but I think the problem is that initially the statement suggested a temporal beginning and end and this declension suggests something much more "general" and to be more acceptable and demonstrable reality. The notion that mind is inherent in reality seems to me spot on. Including the suggestion that it is what relates us to reality.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > Please explain or cite the scientific facts that are opposed to the idea > that minds always were and always will be. > > To answer what I think you meant: The big-bang and accelerating expansion > of the universe do not refute the idea that minds always were or that minds > won't adapt to the expansion. I can only imagine you would say what you > said because you either have a definition of "mind" much narrower than > Peirce's, or a weltanshauung very different from his so to interpret > scientific facts as opposing the idea that minds always were and always > will be. > Regarding the weltanshauung, maybe you assumed science agrees with > Cartesian dualism and disagrees with the idealist side of > objective-idealism. > Regarding what I meant by "essence of mind," Peirce did say "Matter is > effete mind", but I think he could have also said the reverse, that 'Matter > is nascent mind.' Maybe some minds are hardening into nothing but habit, > i.e., matter, and some minds hardened into habits are transforming into > what most people would recognize as minds. > > Matt > > > On Jun 15, 2014, at 12:05 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> > wrote: > > Matt: > > Scientific facts are in opposition to your conclusion. > > Cheers > > jerry > > > On Jun 14, 2014, at 5:11 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > Stephen, It appeared to me that you had hijacked the term "pragmaticism", > and I still think you might have. Peirce was an idealist, and the idea that > 'we are reality,' if "we" means those of us whose essence is our mind, is a > cornerstone of pragmaticism. In this sense there never was a reality before > we came into being and there would be no reality after us. > The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective > idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before "us" and > there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. (Although > I was warned that my source, the translations and explanations by Th. > Stcherbatsky, circa 1932, are too "post-Kantian".) I'm not sure what Peirce > thought of the time before us but I suspect he agreed with the Buddhist > logicians. > > Matt > > On Jun 13, 2014, at 10:51 PM, "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > "All people" is my definition of "we" in the following statement: "We > are inevitably social. We are capable of achieving a sense of universality. > This universal sense distinguishes Triadic Philosophy." Triadic philosophy > regards most accepted divisions among human beings as secondary to a > fundamental unity which transcends them all. > > *@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* > > > On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 9:38 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Stephen, please define "we" as you used the word below. >> >> Matt >> >> On Jun 12, 2014, at 5:10 PM, "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Triadic Philosophy honors Peirce by claiming that it is a tiny offshoot >> of what he came to mean by the term pragmaticism. This term was his >> evolution of pragmatism. Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant >> notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our >> individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. >> After we are, reality remains. Pragmaticism opens the door to a metaphysics >> based precisely on the premise that by our fruits we shall be known. It is >> a now metaphysics. It proves out. It is not supposition. >> >> We are inevitably social. We are capable of achieving a sense of >> universality. This universal sense distinguishes Triadic Philosophy. >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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