The word "sign" (S) can appear on both sides of the equation that defines
its meaning, i.e., it is recursive:

"S = the irreducible triad of S, O, and I"                   (073114-4)

where O is object and I is interpretant. To avoid possible confusions due
to this recursivity of the word "sign", I often prefer replacing the S on
the right hand side of the equation with R, representamen, as Peirce often
did (for the same reason, I think).

Also I think we can say that

"Sign is not a sign until and unless it 'semioses'."        (073114-5)

where 'semiose' is the verb indicating a process requiring the dissipation
(i.e., the conversion of free energy to heat) of a finite amount of
energy.

This leads me to conclude that

"Sign can but representamen cannot semiose."                (073114-6)

and that

"Written words are representamens and spoken                (073114-7)
(and understood) words are signs."

With all the best.

Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net



> One brief last point. I think Peirce’s distinctions between token, type,
> and tone are rather helpful here and should be kept in mind. Of course the
> token/type distinction in particular can be blurry but I’m not sure that’s
> relevant to the discussion at hand.
>
> My sense is that the metaphysics/epistemology distinction is also at play.
> I’d just note that we can talk about a sign process without requiring that
> anyone be able to know that sign as a sign. That is some unseen entity
> could signify a particular interpretant without any person being able to
> know it. That’s why I think semiotics and physics should be kept clearly
> separated. One might say that because of the structure of some physical
> phenomena it can’t communicate information due to the physics but that
> doesn’t mean there aren’t other semiotic analysis at work.
>
> To give an example of this consider the group velocity and the phase
> velocity of a wave. One can go faster than the speed of light while the
> other can’t. And it’s trivial to show that according to relativity one
> can’t transmit useful information faster than the speed of light. However
> we must be careful not to limit semiotical structures just to this
> information that can be communicated only at the speed of light or slower.
> Put an other way, we have to be careful not to equivocate over the term
> “information" while moving back and forth between physics and semiotics.
> Again as I mentioned earlier an excellent example of this are Feynman
> Diagrams. These diagrams clearly are a type of semiotic analysis of
> interactions even if the nature of the interactions become problematic
> when treated materially.
>
> Hopefully that clarifies things rather than confuses them.



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