Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much Peirce as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and to inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce and you have to use them as he used them.

I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't.

And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the science of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and misunderstanding of Peircean terms?

I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent to the original writings of Peirce. Your failure to read Peirce in the original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your own outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary sources or Peirce. It's your outline.

Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of Peircean semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre crosstabs table of the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, your equation of Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the Representamen (and that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework.

That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen'. Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the thing-in-itself (in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real but not singularly existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or material particular existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was Aristotelian. So, a material thing does not act as a representamen; the habits of formation act as the representamen and transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something which you also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago).

This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to divert the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into diversions and irrelevancies.

Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms.

Edwina


----- Original Message ----- From: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
Cc: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>; "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>; "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for


Edwina wrote (073114-1):

"Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's      (073114-1)
original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary
writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works."

You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my
views on signs that differ from yours.  There are several things that seem
wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as "childish", because:
(1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she
studied Peirce as much a as you have.  This cannot be true because

"There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to     (073114-2)
the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born
or independently of Peirce's work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913)."

(2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as
reliable as Peirce's original writings.  This may be true in some cases
but not always.

(3) The science of signs is "larger" than Peircean semiotics, because

"The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly      (073114-3)
evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural
and human sciences and communication engineering."

For these reasons I am inclined to believe that

"Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth
    (073114-4)
about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not
necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries."

So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the
following admonition to you from me:

"Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to     (073114-5)
discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be
able to discuss energy."

Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on
cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:

"Written words are representamens and spoken             (073114-7)
(and understood) words are signs."

No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in
itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process.

It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that
make semiosis possible.  In other words, you may be conflating nodes and
edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes !   Likewise, you
cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens.  If
you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis
takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by
definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY
being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory).

The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation.

You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am
July 31, 2014.  See Equation (073114-4) therein.

In both cases if
you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the
'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the
two has
nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation.

Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list
dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm.  I think Ben has a much more realistic
understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic  issues involved here.

In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are
objects; there is only a material difference in their composition -
similar  to frozen and liquid water.

See above.

One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken
form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one
spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the word
remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material
entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic
object.
The spoken word functions as a dynamic object.


See above.


Edwina


With all the best.

Sung
__________________________________________________
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on
cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:

"Written words are representamens and spoken                (073114-7)
(and understood) words are signs."

No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in
itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is
the
full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation.  In both cases if
you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the
'word'
is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has
nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation.  In a
semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are
objects; there is only a material difference in their composition -
similar
to frozen and liquid water.

One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken
form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one
spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the word
remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material
entity
on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object.
The
spoken word functions as a dynamic object.

Edwina











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