"Peirce was Aristotelian" in this context? Or entirely? I agree with your note but this confuses me.
*@stephencrose <https://twitter.com/stephencrose>* On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not > saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much > Peirce as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who > constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and > to inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce > and you have to use them as he used them. > > I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis > differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. > Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it > isn't. > > And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you > tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the > science of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and > misunderstanding of Peircean terms? > > I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent > to the original writings of Peirce. Your failure to read Peirce in the > original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your > own outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary > sources or Peirce. It's your outline. > > Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of > Peircean semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre > crosstabs table of the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, > your equation of Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the > Representamen (and that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not > confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you > choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a > Peircean framework. > > That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen'. > Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the > representamen within Peircean semiosis. You are merging the abstract > habit-of-formation (the Representamen in Thirdness) with the > thing-in-itself (in Secondness). The abstract habits of formation are real > but not singularly existential; they are embedded within a conceptual or > material particular existentiality. Pure Aristotle and Peirce was > Aristotelian. So, a material thing does not act as a representamen; the > habits of formation act as the representamen and transforms the input data > from the object into the interpretant. Rather like a syllogism (something > which you also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). > > This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to > divert the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, > your complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his > terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the > world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into > diversions and irrelevancies. > > Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> > Cc: "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>; "Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com>; > "Benjamin Udell" <bud...@nyc.rr.com>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 3:01 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis > for > > > Edwina wrote (073114-1): >> >> "Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) >> original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary >> writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works." >> >> You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my >> views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that seem >> wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as "childish", because: >> (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she >> studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because >> >> "There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) >> the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born >> or independently of Peirce's work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913)." >> >> (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as >> reliable as Peirce's original writings. This may be true in some cases >> but not always. >> >> (3) The science of signs is "larger" than Peircean semiotics, because >> >> "The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly (073114-3) >> evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural >> and human sciences and communication engineering." >> >> For these reasons I am inclined to believe that >> >> "Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth >> (073114-4) >> about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not >> necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries." >> >> So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the >> following admonition to you from me: >> >> "Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to (073114-5) >> discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be >> able to discuss energy." >> >> Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, >>> rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on >>> cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: >>> >>> "Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) >>> >>>> (and understood) words are signs." >>>> >>> >>> No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing >>> in >>> itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. >>> >> >> It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that >> make semiosis possible. In other words, you may be conflating nodes and >> edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes ! Likewise, you >> cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens. If >> you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis >> takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by >> definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY >> being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory). >> >> The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. >>> >> >> You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am >> July 31, 2014. See Equation (073114-4) therein. >> >> In both cases if >>> you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the >>> 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the >>> >> two has >> >>> nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. >>> >> >> Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list >> dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm. I think Ben has a much more realistic >> understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic issues involved here. >> >> In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both >>> are >>> objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - >>> similar to frozen and liquid water. >>> >> >> See above. >> >> One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken >>> form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one >>> spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the >>> word >>> remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material >>> entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic >>> >> object. >> >>> The spoken word functions as a dynamic object. >>> >>> >> See above. >> >> >> Edwina >>> >>> >>> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> __________________________________________________ >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, >>> rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on >>> cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: >>> >>> "Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) >>> >>>> (and understood) words are signs." >>>> >>> >>> No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing >>> in >>> itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is >>> the >>> full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. In both cases if >>> you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the >>> 'word' >>> is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has >>> nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. In a >>> semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are >>> objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - >>> similar >>> to frozen and liquid water. >>> >>> One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken >>> form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one >>> spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the >>> word >>> remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material >>> entity >>> on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object. >>> The >>> spoken word functions as a dynamic object. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
