RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

[Gary Fuhrman]

John, in order to “make sense” (i.e. to convey any information in the
Peircean sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a
dicisign. A legisign has to be habitual, but an index cannot be habitual,
because it must designate something here and now: an individual, not a
general. This is the germ of the idea that Natural Propositions is about.

 

gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM
To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for

 

Clark, I don’t think something can be a sign unless it is habitual. How
could it make any sense otherwise?

 

John

 

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: July 31, 2014 10:16 PM
To: Søren Brier; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for

 

 

On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier <sb....@cbs.dk> wrote:

 

My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they
manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and
thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal
communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to
produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view
(but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in
saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production.

 

Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirce’s conception of mind
and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of
matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not
matter. That’s more the issue I’m getting at.


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