6.220 is from the Logic of Events, 1898- and that section refers, as John was
talking about, to the nature of potentiality.
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 7:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be
general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular.
However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form) is
embedded within the particular instantiation, even though, in itself, it is not
a material form.
I’ve not read too many arguments on how Aristotilean Peirce is here. As I
recall I was curious a few months back of how to distinguish say Armstrong’s
view of universals from Peirce’s view of generals here. That is if the general
is a habit to what degree is it tied to the matter. Which is what I think John
was getting at. Sadly I just don’t have time to get into that. I’m far from
convinced there’s a simple answer in Peirce though. I think there are places
where he seems to distinguish qualities from matter. The question ends up being
whether generals as generals are just habits or whether they also relate to
possibility as possibility. The quote I gave earlier from CP 6.220 touches on
that. I forget the exact date of that document but off the top of my head I
think it was in the 1870’s. So a debate of the evolution of Peirce’s thought
seems quite relevant as well.
EDWINA: Yes - I'm aware of the fuzziness of the term postmodernism; a more
modern term is 'constructivism', I think; but the point remains - that it views
the world through the individual human agent's eyes.
Well as a side tangent I’m not sure I’d agree the important figures under the
postmodern rubric are constructivists. Many are, of course. Some major figures
like Heidegger or Derrida can easily be read in very realist ways. That is they
emphasize construction in order to get at the Other of construction. One could
argue the so-called theological turn in French theology also is because of this
kind of realism. Interesting this gets one to the parallels with Plotinus’
emanation theory. Is the Other the pure One of Plotinus or is the Other the
pure privation or Matter of Plotinus. The logic tends to work either way, I
think.
I don’t want to go down that tangent right now, but I do think some of the
issues are quite relevant in Peirce as well.
EDWINA: I would consider Sung a nominalist - but not John. A general
signifying a general is only one class of sign: the pure Argument, where all
three - the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are in a mode of Thirdness. Such
a sign is, in my view, both aspatial and atemporal, and thus, purely
conceptual. It might be carried by words - but, in itself, it is 'purely
mental’.
Yes, but a more nominalist reading of Peirce will tend to see such signs as
regulatory or ideal limits at best. However clearly you and I tend to agree on
how to read Peirce here. <grin>
Really? I'd consider that his more mature era rejected the Hegelian
analytic frame, which, after all, essentially ignored Secondness - and was,
again my view, most certainly not Platonic.
I’m thinking particularly of the Cambridge Lectures where Peirce shocked
quite a few at how Hegelian he was. Unexpectedly so given what most knew of his
thought. Exactly how Hegelian seems an ongoing debate I’m not qualified to take
a position on. I’ll confess that while I’m comfortable with saying a bit about
his early ontology, I’m not sure in his mature thought he’s usually talking
ontology. So I’m far more loath to say he’s making ontological commitments. If
so (and I’m hardly an expert here) it’s not at all clear how to take the
significance of his early thought.
Kelly Parker attempts to paint there being a fair bit of continuity. I think
his assertions outstrip his evidence in many key places though. So I tend to
simply be agnostic as to Peirce’s particular ontology in his mature thought.
Parker’s view can be found in The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s been
long enough since I last read it that I’m loath to summarize any view from it
though.
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