Now that our seminar on NP is under way, I've been asked to post the
"reading schedule" for it, so I'm attaching and inserting it at the bottom
of this message, along with the list of threadleaders. It is subject to
change if necessary, but should give list members time enough to read each
chapter as it's being discussed.
For those who haven't yet obtained the book or read the introduction, I'd
like to present here a quotation from Peirce which shows that long before he
developed the famous ten classes of signs (diagram EP2:296), he was already
thinking (as Frederik put it yesterday) that "the main phenomenon is
reasoning, the chain of arguments - and the whole of the semiotic machinery
is developed to understand the physiology of reasoning - so icons, rhemes,
etc. refer to specific aspects of the chain of reasoning." For Peirce, this
"physiology of reasoning" extends from the formal syllogism all the way down
to the most primitive forms of cognition, and NP p.5-6 quotes this example
from 1883:
The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature
of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the
general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes
up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of
a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion. In point of fact,
a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a
decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve,
whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is
the physiological analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the
ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form
of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically
considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent
nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition,
and logically the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the
highest forms of inervation, the physiological equivalents escape our
observation; but, psychologically, we still have, first, habit--which in its
highest form is understanding, and which corresponds to the major premiss of
Barbara; we have, second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding
to the minor premiss of Barbara; and we have, third, volition, corresponding
to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies,
like all very broad generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight,
yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am
confident they will appear. They give a significance to the ancient system
of formal logic which no other can at all share. ("A Theory of Probable
Inference", 1883, 2.711 )
Here's the reading schedule with threadleaders and starting dates:
Chapter
Natural Propositions
Threadleader(s)
Start date
1
introduction
Frederik Stjernfelt
1 Sep
2
anti-psychologism
Jeff Kasser
8 Sep
3.1-7
dicisigns I
Gary Fuhrman
22 Sep
3.8-14
dicisigns II
Jeff Downard
6 Oct
4
naturalization
Tyler Bennett
20 Oct
5
cognition
Mara Woods
3 Nov
6
evolution
John Collier
17 Nov
7
beyond language
Tom Gollier
1 Dec
8
iconicities
Gary Richmond
15 Dec
9
diagrams I
29 Dec
10
diagrams II
5 Jan
11-12
enlightenment
Yogi Hendlin
12 Jan
By the way we're still open to volunteers for co-leading any of these
threads.
gary f.
| Chapter |
Natural Propositions |
Threadleader(s) |
Start date |
| 1 |
introduction |
Frederik Stjernfelt |
1 Sep |
| 2 |
anti-psychologism |
Jeff Kasser |
8 Sep |
| 3.1-7 |
dicisigns I |
Gary Fuhrman |
22 Sep |
| 3.8-14 |
dicisigns II |
Jeff Downard |
6 Oct |
| 4 |
naturalization |
Tyler Bennett |
20 Oct |
| 5 |
cognition |
Mara Woods |
3 Nov |
| 6 |
evolution |
John Collier |
17 Nov |
| 7 |
beyond language |
Tom Gollier |
1 Dec |
| 8 |
iconicities |
Gary Richmond |
15 Dec |
| 9 |
diagrams I |
|
29 Dec |
| 10 |
diagrams II |
|
5 Jan |
| 11-12 |
enlightenment |
Yogi Hendlin |
12 Jan |
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