Thanks, Frederik. I agree that biology does need semiosis to understand what
is going on because this realm is 'informationally explosive', filled with
diversity, adaptations, interactions, all of which require networked
informational processes....while the physico-chemical realm is relatively
stable.
My own view is that the stability of the physico-chemical realm is a necessary
ground for the diverse and rapid informational processes of the biological
realm;; this stability enables biological systems to functionally interact
across wide spatial domains and over long periods of time.
But, I feel that the semiotic results - leading to the atom, to molecules, to
the various chemicals etc... within the physico-chemical realm developed
rapidly after the 'Big Bang'; and that Thirdness and the habits of formation
developed rapidly and 'froze', with an almost null possibility of change. But
because this realm has, fortunately, little capacity for change, does not mean
that it did not develop itself a million and more years ago, within a semiosic
process.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Frederik Stjernfelt
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 4:47 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6630] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear Gary, Edwina, list
This is an recurrent discussion in P scholarship. It may be rephrased as
pansemiotics versus biosemiotics, or it may be expressed as the claim that all
true triadic relations are signs vs. the claim that signs only comprise a
subset of triadic relations. Both tendencies are in Peirce so the isssue can
not be resolved by Peirce scholarship.
Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the
observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the
description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while
biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from
biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find "genetic code", "Information",
"signals", "cues" etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of
biology. For that reason, I think pre-biological nature could be seen as a sort
of semiotic zero-case. Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical
events can be done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them -
while in our understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are
always-already there.
I do not discuss this deeply in "Natural Propositons" but of course it forms
the prerequisite to my discussing biological sign processes but not purely
physical events conceived as semiotics.
But I think deciding pro or con pansemiotics is no prerequisite for following
the book's argument.
Best
F
Den 03/09/2014 kl. 16.08 skrev Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>:
Jon, Edwina, lists,
Yes, I read McCullough a few decades ago and learned a lot from him, long
before I started reading Peirce). But I think part of the problem here is
that for Peirce, and I think for his contemporaries, "physiology" is closer
to "phenomenology" than it is to "physics". It is the study of forms and
sturctures generally, not only of physical forms and biological structures.
For instance, in his classification of sciences where he's discussing
phenomenology, esthetics and ethics, he writes:
"The true principal purpose of these sciences is the Classification of
possible forms. But this must be founded on a study of the Physiology of
those forms, their general elements, parts, and mode of action. Thereupon
should follow the Classificatory part, including the general discussion of
what is good and what bad; and this should be followed up by a study of the
principles that govern the production of such forms" (EP2:272).
The same applies to the usage of "physiology" in the 1883 quote I posted
today. Peirce is talking about the physiology of *logic* (i.e. of semiosis
as he would put it later on), not primarily about biology or physics or
psychology. That excerpt is about the connection of syllogistic logic with
primitive forms of *cognition*, but Edwina reads it pansemiotically as
applying to physical "organization of matter" all the way down to the
molecular (maybe the atomic?) level, and thus doesn't distinguish between
cognitive and physical processes. But for purposes of NP, we don't need to
engage in the endless debate over pansemiotics; primitive cognition is as
far down as we need to go in theorizing its continuity with reasoning.
gary f.
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