Exactly. The Sign, that 'irreducible triad' is a syllogism. The major premise 
is the Representamen relation; the minor premise is the Object relation; 
Conclusion is the Interpretant. This is a dynamic process, a transformative 
process and despite the criticism of some, I consider these three parts of the 
syllogism/Sign to be interactions, as each site or premiss does something 
transformative to the input data. It's not just a conveyor belt; the 
information is acted upon and 'thought about' from input sensation to result. 
And just as the syllogism is not made up of dyads but is always triadic, so the 
sign is also not made up of dyads but is triadic; that mediative Relation of 
the Representamen is vital.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Gary Fuhrman 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List' 
  Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2014 8:21 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions


  Now that our seminar on NP is under way, I've been asked to post the "reading 
schedule" for it, so I'm attaching and inserting it at the bottom of this 
message, along with the list of threadleaders. It is subject to change if 
necessary, but should give list members time enough to read each chapter as 
it's being discussed.

   

  For those who haven't yet obtained the book or read the introduction, I'd 
like to present here a quotation from Peirce which shows that long before he 
developed the famous ten classes of signs (diagram EP2:296), he was already 
thinking (as Frederik put it yesterday) that "the main phenomenon is reasoning, 
the chain of arguments - and the whole of the semiotic machinery is developed 
to understand the physiology of reasoning - so icons, rhemes, etc. refer to 
specific aspects of the chain of reasoning." For Peirce, this "physiology of 
reasoning" extends from the formal syllogism all the way down to the most 
primitive forms of cognition, and NP p.5-6 quotes this example from 1883:

  The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of 
a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the general 
nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into 
present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of a decision 
to act in a particular way on a given occasion. In point of fact, a syllogism 
in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated 
frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may 
be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological 
analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, 
owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, 
psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the 
occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the 
physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically 
the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of 
inervation, the physiological equivalents escape our observation; but, 
psychologically, we still have, first, habit--which in its highest form is 
understanding, and which corresponds to the major premiss of Barbara; we have, 
second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to the minor premiss 
of Barbara; and we have, third, volition, corresponding to the conclusion of 
the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies, like all very broad 
generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader 
reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident they will appear. 
They give a significance to the ancient system of formal logic which no other 
can at all share. ("A Theory of Probable Inference", 1883, 2.711 )

   

  Here's the reading schedule with threadleaders and starting dates:

   

        Chapter
       Natural Propositions
       Threadleader(s)
       Start date
       
        1
       introduction
       Frederik Stjernfelt
       1 Sep
       
        2
       anti-psychologism
       Jeff Kasser
       8 Sep
       
        3.1-7
       dicisigns I
       Gary Fuhrman
       22 Sep
       
        3.8-14
       dicisigns II
       Jeff Downard
       6 Oct
       
        4
       naturalization
       Tyler Bennett
       20 Oct
       
        5
       cognition
       Mara Woods
       3 Nov
       
        6
       evolution
       John Collier
       17 Nov
       
        7
       beyond language
       Tom Gollier
       1 Dec
       
        8
       iconicities
       Gary Richmond
       15 Dec
       
        9
       diagrams I
        29 Dec
       
        10
       diagrams II
        5 Jan
       
        11-12
       enlightenment
       Yogi Hendlin
       12 Jan
       

   

  By the way we're still open to volunteers for co-leading any of these threads.

   

  gary f.

   



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