Sun and earth do communicate, but resulting directly dyadic rather than triadic 
relations, and with no involvement of cognition. The point can be generalized: 
communication is broader than cognition.

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 15:02
To: Frederik Stjernfelt; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions


On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
<stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote:

Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition 
and communication processes - biology does.

and

On Sep 4, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
<stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>> wrote:

My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My 
observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in 
physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes, 
while physics, including QM, does not. This observation, of course, only holds 
for the present state - as sciences evolve, it may be proved wrong by further 
developments in physics. You might also state my view by saying that biology 
constitutes the semiotic part of physics.


This is what I’m still not sure about. Certainly if one uses a Hamiltonian form 
then there’s less sign process. But it seems to me the Newtonian form of 
mechanics and the Feynman form of QM are inherently a sign process just as in 
biology. Further it is all about communication with forces being the 
interactions between particles. Likewise even classic E&M seems to be a 
semiotic process, although certainly one can conceive of it as an equation that 
evolves.


Not criticizing, just trying to figure out what you mean. Do you think that say 
a Feynman diagram isn’t a communication process?


Perhaps not cognition in a normal sense, but in the Peircean sense (where he 
saw mind operative in chemical processes like crystal formation) it seems to 
be. However even if you are just requiring cognition or quasi-cognition (say 
with insects or microbiology) I’m not sure but what you don’t have virtual 
cognition in many forms QM takes. (I’m not saying the observer is a real 
cognition - I tend to see it as an accidental artifact - but it does seem to 
end up meaning QM takes a form similar to biology)


Now I fully agree that the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian forms of mechanics and 
quantum mechanics aren’t really sign oriented. But I bet more people *think* 
and *talk* in terms of the more Newtonian conception (in terms of math/signs) 
even if the other forms of calculating are pretty common.


Sorry, not trying to take things down a tangent, just very curious as to this 
point. I think Peirce tended to adopt more biological conceptions and apply 
them to physical ones whereas especially in the 19th century that was far less 
common.

While it is a tangent, it seems to be a tangent with important implications for 
the main topic.

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