Stan, Gary F., list,
When mathematicians start basing their findings on those of neurology,
I'll start to think that maybe there's something to the idea that
mathematics is a neural phenomenon. Instead, mathematics is applied in
neurology, not vice versa, and there seem good reasons in practice for
it. Now, the process of discovery is influenced, promoted, limited,
etc., by pscyhological (and social) factors. But to say that math is the
study of certain neural phenomena is like saying that astronomy is the
study of telescopes (and of certain neural phenomena), as if stars were
only secondarily real. The question is not whether numbers exist like
stars, hardly anybody thinks that. The question is whether they can be
objectively investigated as numbers. We commonly think that a broadcast
of the first 20 prime numbers what indicate an extra-terrestrial
intelligence, although that E.T. might differ psychologically and
socially so much from us as to be generally bewildering to us. We don't
think that they'll find different properties of prime numbers than we
do. To be consistent with the view that math is a neural phenomenon, one
should also say that biology is a neural phenomenon, chemistry is a
biological and neural phenomenon, and physics a chemical, biological,
and neural phenomenon. It actually starts to make some sense, albeit
with some sort of shift in the sense of the word 'phenomenon'.
Areas of research can be ordered according to their bases in principles
of how we know things (/ordo cognoscendi/, the order of learning or
familiarity) and, in pretty much reverse order, in principles (entities,
laws, etc.) whereby we explain things (/ordo essendi/, the order of
being). The order of being is often preferred in the special sciences
(physics first, etc.), while the order of learning and of the
verificatory bases on which we know things is sometimes preferred in
maths (where such preference tends to put mathematical logic and theory
of structures of order first).
"Basic" versus "low", /profundus/ versus /bathos/: Too much feeling of
prestige or status sometimes rides on these discussions. One may
characterize phenomena as "more basic" and "less basic", which tends to
be taken to make physics, for example, seem better than psychology, for
example; or as "lower" and "higher," which tends to be taken to make
psychology seem better. This issue has turned up in one form on a US
sitcom: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FitG_PLO9Rg (scene 2 min., 22
secs long; pardon the ad).
Maybe those researches which I call "sequenced in the order of being"
you would call "sequenced in the order of abstractness." Still could
well be the same ordering.
I'm not saying that the ontological questions are unimportant, to the
intellectual climate, the human spirit, and the ultimate bearings which
people take in their decisions. But when an ontological view conflicts
with the structures of dependences among sciences and math, to me it
signifies that one's classification is either deficient in firm and
fertile constraints or just plain nebulous. And, if people argue over
whether some sciences should be ordered by increasing concreteness or
increasing abstractness, and if it's essentially the same ordering
forwards versus backwards,♂♀✳†∞$ versus $∞†✳♀♂ , then they're arguing
over a shiny gewgaw, the right of some science to be called "1st" rather
than "last"; the real classificational choices have already been made,
and the two orderings just need to be distinctly named, so that people
can specify the sense of the ordering. Various orderings can be quite
compatible when distinguished by an articulated sense or standard of the
ordering. Questions of ontology and questions of research-classificatory
preference are often best separated. Same is true for the topic of
logical quantity and any connected research-classificatory preference
issues.
Best, Ben
On 9/15/2014 11:43 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Stan,
In Peirce’s view (and mine, and Frederik’s), fallibilism is part of
the core logic of science. It is a historical fact that scientists
very often choose to ignore or deny the fallibility of their favorite
theories. But this only shows that scientists can do bad science; it
does not alter the normative logic of science. Trying to base your
logic, your epistemology or your metaphysics on facts about the
sociology of science is just another variant of the “psychologism”
that would base logic on psychology, and I think Frederik has already
explained why it’s invalid.
The problem with social constructivism (when taken beyond the obvious
truth that scientific theories ARE socially constructed) is that it
doesn’t allow for fallibilism, because it doesn’t admit that any
hypothesis can be conclusively proven /false/ . That move — unlike
fallibilism — renders the concept of truth meaningless, and therefore
reduces science into a political struggle. If you hold to it
consistently, you can’t even assert that social constructivism itself
is true, because it would just be a theory constructed to serve your
own political purposes. It’s a self-destructive theory.
Anyway, I think there’s more to life than politics.
gary f.
*From:* Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
*Sent:* 15-Sep-14 10:48 AM
*To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:6836] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Gary -- replying to:
GF: We are indeed immersed in intersubjectivity when we engage in
scientific thought. But we are /also/ relying on the assumption that
the phenomena which are the objects of our study (including those that
are /general/ or typical) have their being independently of our
construction of theories about them, which entails that actual
experience can tell us if those theories are false. Social
constructivism, as I understand the term, does not include that
assumption. And that’s the difference, as I see it.
S: This goes beyond the boundaries of what I was commenting on. But...
social construction has addressed this point. Testing VERY generally
-- 'yes, objects only fall down' -- has already been accomplished in
the past by successful cultures. The more recondite testing done in
the laboratories of scientists is a more 'iffy' and subtle phenomenon.
If it does not relate to societal interests it won't be carried out
in the first place. If it has been blessed with societal support it is
still problematic from an 'objective' perspective. When is a result
deemed definitive? How to determine when an experiment is finished?
How do the results appear to those holding competing theories (the
experimenter was a holder of some theory)? These questions will depend
also upon the social conditions bearing at the time when the results
came in. Consider the single seemingly definitive test of curved
spacetime (the sun's rays appearing before the sun's perisphere (?)
had peeked from behind the moon). The result was immediately taken as
definitive given the popular notoriety of Einstein at the time,
'proving' his views. Well, there are in fact other interpretations,
and, indeed, the interpretation of any experimental results depends
upon theories held by the investigators. It is well-known that these
interpretations are theory laden, as was the experiment -- in a
carefully planned experiment you can only find (or not) what you are
searching for. This is why Popper tried so hard to suggest that
theories are meant to be rejected, and that all WILL be disproven
given time (during which, of course, a culture will have continued to
evolve as well).
It was this kind of thinking that so, understandably, 'ticked off' the
scientific community against social constructivism.
STAN
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