Frederik, Lists, You say: "Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions."
For the sake of sorting through some of the disagreements that have been voiced about what kinds of signs or representamens may be found in the physical, chemical, biological or social parts of nature, let me try to provide a quick summary of the position that is established in the normative sciences: Peirce establishes this much in the speculative grammar and critical logic: 1) thought is an end directed inference chain whose resting points are decisions; 2) conscious thought is realized in greater degrees when the inferences are self controlled argument and argumentation chains directed towards ends that are held to be good for their own sake (e.g., towards the truth), where the resting points are dicisigns that take symbolic forms and are called propositions. Those inference chains that appear to embody final causes that are held by the mind that interprets them to be good for their own sake are argument and argumentation chains because the mind that does the interpretation is able to consciously evaluate those arguments by examining the degree to which they serve the larger aims. The highest levels of self-control involve the evaluation and criticism of the leading principles of inquiry and the larger ideals that animate those principles. Based on this understanding of inference and argument, we have reason to adopt the following as regulative ideas in our methodeutic: 3) all regularities—wherever they are found--may be conceived as inference chains. Those inference chains that are no longer evolving in their embodied regularities no longer appear to be changing towards some end and may, at that point in time, be conceived simply as mechanical causes. They can be thought of as mechanical because the inferences all seem to have a demonstrative form and the synthetic inferences that involve continued growth do not appear to be present. Those regularities that are still evolving may reasonably be supposed to involve something like an end (more or less determinate), where the end is one of the things that may be undergoing evolution. Those processes that are merely finious, but not entirely final, may be conceived as inference chains where the resting points are representamens that may have a structure that is similar in some respects to a dicisign. Those inference chains that appear to embody final causes may be conceived as thoughts that are directed towards some natural end, where the resting points of the chains are dicisigns. When the interpretants of this process involve only the lower degrees of self-control, we may reasonably suppose that there is a quasi-mind that serves as interpreter. Consequently, we may conceive of all regularities as inference chains where the evolution of those regularities involve greater and lesser degrees of control over the processes that are involved in the modification and adaptation of those regularities in relation to ends that are more or less determinate, where those ends themselves have something like a life history—some are dying or are dead, and some are alive are growing. These regulative ideas are put to use in metaphysics as Peirce tries to articulate the assumptions we should adopt as we seek to explain all of the basic kinds of things that call out for explanation in the special sciences. The goal is to keep the door of inquiry open by avoiding any explanatory move that will make it impossible to explain what needs to be explained. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Frederik Stjernfelt [stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2014 6:48 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions Dear John, lists, I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions. Best F Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> : At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote: Dear Sung, lists - To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead us astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a psychological process only. Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the object of thought and the structure of sound reasoning. So, you might as well say that thought is the result of the norms of reasoning and the features of the object thought about. Thinking then is the process combining these - but not the process producing thought as such. Just like the TV-series you watch is not the product of the printing of the DVD only. Or the meal you prepare in your casserole is not only the product of the cooking process - but also of the objects you add to the casserole and the recipe you follow. Best F I agree with what you say here, but I was wondering if it does not go further. Frege used "thought" to refer to propositions, as I understand him, and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. (I studied with a number of Frege experts, but never had a Peirce expert on my committee, though my thesis does make homage to Peirce.) I am thinking in particular of a peculiar passage that Vinicius Romanini brought to my attention: () if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical sense, that thought has already all the reality it ever will have, although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to perform that reasoning. For the fish is there, and the actual composition of the stone already in fact determines what the chemist and the paleontologists will one day read in them. () It is, therefore, true, in the logicians sense of the words, although not in that of the psychologists, that the thought is already expressed there (EP2: 455). This passage makes much more sense to me, and fits much better my information based ontology, if "thought" means what I would mean by "proposition". John Frederik wrote: "Thinking, in this sense, may be the object of, (6729-1) psychology thought not so ." Can you separate thinking and thought? Isn't the latter the result of the former? If so, why can't the latter be the object of psychology as well ? With all the best. Sung ________________________________ John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
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