Jeff, I was leaving it to Frederik to comment on this, but he seems to be
out of the loop for the moment ... anyway I think it's a superb summary of
how Peirce can take us from logic to biosemiotics. Especially in the way
you
show how degrees of consciousness are aligned with the continuum of
intentionality (if I may call it that).
gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 25-Sep-14 12:05 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Frederik, Lists,
You say: "Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points
were
propositions."
For the sake of sorting through some of the disagreements that have been
voiced about what kinds of signs or representamens may be found in the
physical, chemical, biological or social parts of nature, let me try to
provide a quick summary of the position that is established in the
normative
sciences:
Peirce establishes this much in the speculative grammar and critical
logic:
1) thought is an end directed inference chain whose resting points are
decisions;
2) conscious thought is realized in greater degrees when the inferences
are
self controlled argument and argumentation chains directed towards ends
that
are held to be good for their own sake (e.g., towards the truth), where
the
resting points are dicisigns that take symbolic forms and are called
propositions. Those inference chains that appear to embody final causes
that are held by the mind that interprets them to be good for their own
sake
are argument and argumentation chains because the mind that does the
interpretation is able to consciously evaluate those arguments by
examining
the degree to which they serve the larger aims. The highest levels of
self-control involve the evaluation and criticism of the leading
principles
of inquiry and the larger ideals that animate those principles.
Based on this understanding of inference and argument, we have reason to
adopt the following as regulative ideas in our methodeutic:
3) all regularities-wherever they are found--may be conceived as inference
chains. Those inference chains that are no longer evolving in their
embodied regularities no longer appear to be changing towards some end and
may, at that point in time, be conceived simply as mechanical causes.
They
can be thought of as mechanical because the inferences all seem to have a
demonstrative form and the synthetic inferences that involve continued
growth do not appear to be present. Those regularities that are still
evolving may reasonably be supposed to involve something like an end (more
or less determinate), where the end is one of the things that may be
undergoing evolution. Those processes that are merely finious, but not
entirely final, may be conceived as inference chains where the resting
points are representamens that may have a structure that is similar in
some
respects to a dicisign. Those inference chains that appear to embody
final
causes may be conceived as thoughts that are directed towards some natural
end, where the resting points of the chains are dicisigns. When the
interpretants of this process involve only the lower degrees of
self-control, we may reasonably suppose that there is a quasi-mind that
serves as interpreter. Consequently, we may conceive of all regularities
as
inference chains where the evolution of those regularities involve greater
and lesser degrees of control over the processes that are involved in the
modification and adaptation of those regularities in relation to ends that
are more or less determinate, where those ends themselves have something
like a life history-some are dying or are dead, and some are alive are
growing.
These regulative ideas are put to use in metaphysics as Peirce tries to
articulate the assumptions we should adopt as we seek to explain all of
the
basic kinds of things that call out for explanation in the special
sciences.
The goal is to keep the door of inquiry open by avoiding any explanatory
move that will make it impossible to explain what needs to be explained.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2014 6:48 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear John, lists,
I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose
resting
points were propositions.
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
:
At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote:
Dear Sung, lists -
To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead
us
astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a
psychological process only.
Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the object
of thought and the structure of sound reasoning.
So, you might as well say that thought is the result of the norms of
reasoning and the features of the object thought about. Thinking then is
the
process combining these - but not the process producing thought as such.
Just like the TV-series you watch is not the product of the printing of
the
DVD only. Or the meal you prepare in your casserole is not only the
product
of the cooking process - but also of the objects you add to the casserole
and the recipe you follow.
Best
F
I agree with what you say here, but I was wondering if it does not go
further. Frege used "thought" to refer to propositions, as I understand
him,
and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. (I studied with a number
of
Frege experts, but never had a Peirce expert on my committee, though my
thesis does make homage to Peirce.) I am thinking in particular of a
peculiar passage that Vinicius Romanini brought to my attention:
() if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations
upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection with
chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were
embedded,
will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an
argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a
conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical
sense,
that thought has already all the reality it ever will have, although as
yet
the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to perform
that reasoning. For the fish is there, and the actual composition of the
stone already in fact determines what the chemist and the paleontologists
will one day read in them. () It is, therefore, true, in the logicians
sense
of the words, although not in that of the psychologists, that the thought
is
already expressed there (EP2: 455).
This passage makes much more sense to me, and fits much better my
information based ontology, if "thought" means what I would mean by
"proposition".
John
Frederik wrote:
"Thinking, in this sense, may be the object of, (6729-1)
psychology thought not so ."
Can you separate thinking and thought? Isn't the latter the result of the
former? If so, why can't the latter be the object of psychology as well ?
With all the best.
Sung
________________________________
John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
<http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
