On to the third section of NP Chapter 3:
Here we come to the intension (depth), i.e. the definition, of the dicisign — first in the definition of “proposition” (from “Kaina Stoicheia”) as “a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.” Separately from what? From the rest of the sign. In a verbal replica of a proposition, the part which indicates the object is called the subject. Like all words, it is symbolic — but this is not definitive of its function in the proposition. What is definitive is not the symbolic but the indexical function. Thus the definition applies equally well to a sign which is not verbal or symbolic. An index alone, though, would indicate the object without giving us any information about it. The part of a verbal proposition which does tell us something about its object is called the predicate. But here too, the symbolicity of the predicate part is not definitive of its function; what’s definitive of that function is the iconicity of the sign. Thus “the vital spark of every proposition, the peculiar propositional element of the proposition, is an indexical proposition; an index involving an icon” (EP2:310). Hence the name dicisign or dicent sign for a sign that combines these indexical and iconic functions (whether it does so by symbolic means or not). This is the core of Peirce’s doctrine of the Dicisign. This still leaves open the question I posed earlier about “Kaina Stoicheia”, which may be reworded thus: if a genuine dicisign or “indexical proposition” does not have to be symbolic in order to fulfill its function of conveying information, why does Peirce identify the symbol with the genuine sign? To clarify this question, we should note Peirce’s definition of “symbol”, in KS and in the Syllabus, as “a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted” (EP2:307). Now, the icon/index/symbol trichotomy is supposed to be the list of possible relations between sign (representamen) and object. Yet this definition of symbol, on the face of it, seems to be more about the sign’s relation with its interpretant than with its object. No wonder the relation between dicisign and symbol seems so complex. This will probably be my last post for a few days, as I’ll be away from home and fully occupied all weekend. I trust that the seminar will carry on in my absence. gary f.
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
