Ben, Gary F, lists, So, putting your posts together, Ben, I think that you're saying that the *Singular Symbol* is better understood as the "Subindex" (you earlier remarked that Peirce didn't stick with the Singular Symbol notion)? Or are they equivalent terms?
And what do you make of the "Abstract Symbol" in the same sentence in which the "Singular Symbol" occurs? Here are the Subindices quote followed by the Singular/Abstract Symbol quote again for ready reference for whomever may be interested in this analysis. Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual. CP 2.284 There are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. CP 2.293 Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Gary R., Gary F., lists, > > I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP > 2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP editors). > In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a. hyposemes, dated > 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had not embraced the idea > of the indexical legisign yet. > > [Quote] > _*Subindices*_ or _*hyposemes*_ are signs which are rendered such > principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, > [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a > diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object > but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual. > [1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute > beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274] > > I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus" but > it's been years and years. > > Best, Ben > > On 10/1/2014 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Gary F, lists, > > Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the Syllabus > that this struck him: > > GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents the sign > itself as well as its object, and represents it as an *index* -- which, > strictly speaking, lacks the *generality* which makes the argument a > symbol and thus more genuine. > > I think that your rewording *is* helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4 > quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and, further, > that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much self-rewording was > "to get through to the real, general, genuine Thought that was . . . a > piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere) personal expression of it, makes > good sense. I'm not sure that his re-wordings *always* made his thinking > more transparent, but often enough they did. > > You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or > genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism" > > GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the dicisign > might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument. > > First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine argument? > While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the dicisign is degenerate > relative to the argument, I wonder if this isn't straining Peirce's > terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking that Peirce speaks in places of > degenerate symbols *per se*. For example: > > . . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its meaning, > is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a > character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that has a general meaning. There > are two kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an > existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that > individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a > character. CP 2.293 > > I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of > genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem to > apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two kinds of > degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an individual) and the > Abstract (its object being a character). But in speaking of" the immediate > interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on to say: > > Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index, yet > since its Object may be the Object of an Individual [Singular] Symbol, the > Index may have such a Symbol for its indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine > Symbol may be an imperfect Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a > degenerate Index, or an Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and > a genuine Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294 > > I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph, > especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect' (as > opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be > important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try to > grasp Peirce's meaning here. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 > <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > >
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