Gary R, Gary F., lists,
There seemed some inconsistency here, especially because of the date
"November 1903" appearing with the subindex quote, but date is for the
start of the lecture series and isn't date of the MS itself. EP
Headnotes indicate that CP 2.292-4 (including the hyposemes) is from:
MS 478 [The third and longest section of the 1903 Syllabus, this
text was not printed in the pamphlet for the audience. The
subsection entitled "Speculative Grammar" was published in large
part in CP 2.274-77, 283-84, 292-94, and 309-31.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 20, "Sundry Logical Conceptions",
267 http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#20> ]
The tenfold classification, including the indexical legisign is from
MS 540. [This is the fifth section of 1903 Syllabus, first published
in CP 2.233-72.]
[From the Headnote for EP 2 ch. 21, "Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined", 289
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21
<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/headers/ep2heads.htm#21>
The "dimly remembered passage" that I mentioned was, I now realize, the
very one quoted about Singular Symbols in this thread. I remember years
ago putting the passages together in my mind. Peirce said that
subindexes are not indices, so what are they? I doubted that they could
be icons, so I figured that they must be symbols. And then I found the
passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the "Syllabus" (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a "Syllabus" passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he said that indices are individuals - he had
not embraced the idea of the indexical legisign yet.
[Quote]
_/Subindices/_ or _/hyposemes/_ are signs which are rendered such
principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a
proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or
the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a
real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual.
[1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell
Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:274]
I dimly remember another passage touching on this issue in "Syllabus"
but it's been years and years.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 1:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary F, lists,
Gary wrote that in rereading the Speculative Grammar part of the
Syllabus that this struck him:
GF: that the interpretant of a dicisign or proposition represents
the sign itself as well as its object, and represents it as an
/index/ — which, strictly speaking, lacks the /generality/ which
makes the argument a symbol and thus more genuine.
I think that your rewording /is/ helpful (but then see the CP 2.293-4
quoted below which tends to complicate the matter for me); and,
further, that your notion that the reason that Peirce did so much
self-rewording was "to get through to the real, general, genuine
Thought that was . . . a piece of the Truth" and not a more (mere)
personal expression of it, makes good sense. I'm not sure that his
re-wordings /always/ made his thinking more transparent, but often
enough they did.
You also asked why I thought that Peirce's comment that "A proof or
genuine argument is a mental process which is open to logical criticism"
GR: . . . is in any way incompatible with the notion that the
dicisign might be described as 'degenerate' relative to the argument.
First, would you say that a 'proof' is but a species of genuine
argument? While it makes a kind of sense to me to say that the
dicisign is degenerate relative to the argument, I wonder if this
isn't straining Peirce's terminology a bit. Perhaps I was thinking
that Peirce speaks in places of degenerate symbols /per se/. For
example:
. . . while the complete object of a symbol, that is to say, its
meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual,
and must signify a character. A genuine symbol is a symbol that
has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate symbols,
the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and
which signifies only such characters as that individual may
realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a
character. CP 2.293
I think the meaning here is fairly clear, that there is one kind of
genuine symbol (one having a "general meaning"--but that would seem
to apply to symbols other than the 'proof' would it not?) and two
kinds of degenerate symbols, the Singular (its object being an
individual) and the Abstract (its object being a character). But in
speaking of" the immediate interpretant of an index," Peirce goes on
to say:
Although the immediate Interpretant of an Index must be an Index,
yet since its Object may be the Object of an Individual
[Singular] Symbol, the Index may have such a Symbol for its
indirect Interpretant. Even a genuine Symbol may be an imperfect
Interpretant of it. So an icon may have a degenerate Index, or an
Abstract Symbol, for an indirect Interpretant, and a genuine
Index or Symbol for an imperfect Interpretant. CP 2.294
I'm having considerable difficulty parsing this second paragraph,
especially as to how he's using the terms 'imperfect' and 'indirect'
(as opposed to 'intended'?) But it seems to me that it might be
important--especially in getting at the concept of "genuine"--to try
to grasp Peirce's meaning here.
Best,
Gary R
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
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