Gary F., Lists,

Although I found came upon the quotation below in searching for texts on
"genuineness" in Peirce, I've decided to give this post a new subject line
as it seems only tangentially related to dicisigns.

The passage (copied below) has interested me for years, so much so that at
one point I made extensive notes on it and some related passages in
preparation for writing a paper having the working title, "Peirce and
Chirality," but I got distracted by life and never finished it. Yet I
remain as interested in "handedness" as ever and, in truth, have been ever
since, in my twenties I believe, I read a marvelous piece of popular
science by Martin Gardner titled *The Ambidextrous Universe,* which in it
latest updated version has been re-titled *The *New* Ambidextrous Universe:
Symmetry and Assymmetry from Mirror Reflections to Superstrings. *I would
like to get into Peirce and chirality at some point after the NP seminar if
there's interest in that topic and will then refer to some of the sources
the Gardner book took me to.

The Peirce passage, a long paragraph which I've broken up into several
smaller ones, is of some interest in relation not only to chirality but to
several topics which have recently been discussed on these lists,and
especially to the problem of the origin of life.

In segment (a). Peirce writes that he has not found a single "genuine
triadic relation" which is not "an intellectual relation" or one concerned
with the "phenomena of life." This would seem to argue against a
pre-biological semiosis *if* genuine triadic relations are considered sine
qua non for semiosis (but are they?)

But then he offers by way of "brute, inorganic" example, chirality, and
argues that L- R-handedness (d) "could not be caused by the inorganic
action of dynamical law":

(e) . . . the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve triadic
relations is by their reference to second differentials of positions. But
though a second differential generally involves a triadic relation, yet
owing to the law of the conservation of energy [. . .] which has been
sufficiently proved for purely inorganic phenomena, the dynamic laws for
such phenomena are expressible in terms of first differentials. It is,
therefore, a non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a "degenerate" form of
triadic relationship.


So, given that the pervasive holochirality in the universe seems
inexplicable unless 'chance' be offered as its explanation, while (d) "it
is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not to be
regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life," Peirce concludes
that in consideration of "the problem of how life first came about" that

(e). . the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the
world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how
life first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that
of pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the
suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon.

Of course since his time there have been other explanations offered. What
interests me for now is that in that earlier comment in (d) as to whether
absolute chance "ought not to be regarded as a product of freedom, and
therefore of life" Peirce adds a remarkable phrase modifying 'life',
namely, "not necessarily physiological." Thus, the complete snippet reads:

 . . . it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought
not to be regarded as *a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not
necessarily physiological*. (emphasis added)


But what can that phrase "not necessarily physiological" be pointing
to? Still, and mainly, Peirce offers "the problem of how genuine triadic
relationships first arose in the world" as being "a better, because more
definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about."

It would appear that this matter of "genuineness" really might be a key to
resolving a number of issues currently under discussion, and I'm glad you
brought it up Gary.

Here's the complete passage referred to:


a. For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have
been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation -- that is,
one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relations [. . .
] which is not either an intellectual relation or a relation concerned with
the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I have not met with one which
could not reasonably be supposed to belong to one or other of these two
classes.

b. As a case as nearly brute and inorganic as any, I may mention the form
of relationship involved in any screw-form which is definitely of the
right-hand, or occidental, mode, or is definitely of the Japanese, or
left-handed, mode. Such a relation exists in every carbon-atom whose four
valencies are saturated by combination with four atoms of as many different
kinds. But where the action of chance determines whether the screw be a
right-handed or a left-handed one, the two forms will, in the long run, be
produced in equal proportions, and the general result will not be
definitely, or decisively, of either kind.

c. We know no case of a definitely right-handed or left-handed
screw-phenomenon, where the decision is not certainly due to the
intervention of a definitely one-sided screw in the conditions of that
decision, except in cases where the choice of a living being determines it;
as when Pasteur picked out under the microscope the two kinds of crystals
of a tartrate, and shoved those of one kind to the right and those of the
other kind to the left.

d. We do not know the mechanism of such choice, and cannot say whether it
be determined by an antecedent separation of left-handed screws from
right-handed screws or not. No doubt, all that chance is competent to
destroy, it may, once in a long, long time, produce; but it is a question
whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not to be regarded as a
product of freedom, and therefore of life, not necessarily physiological.
It could not be caused, apparently, by the inorganic action of dynamical
law.

e. For the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve triadic relations
is by their reference to second differentials of positions. But though a
second differential generally involves a triadic relation, yet owing to the
law of the conservation of energy, which has been sufficiently proved for
purely inorganic phenomena, the dynamic laws for such phenomena are
expressible in terms of first differentials. It is, therefore, a
non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a "degenerate" form of triadic
relationship which is involved in such case. In short, the problem of how
genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, because
more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and
no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we
must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance
may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological
sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. . . . CP 6.322

Best,

Gary R.
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