Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Thanks for the reminder, Gary R. about renaming tangential threads. I
should have done that a while ago with some threads that I've been on.
Regarding conservation of energy: My understanding is that, in general
relativity it's considered not to be conserved in an expanding or
contracting universe, although it's still regardable as conserved in
normal situations with some assumptions beyond those in special relativity.
Just about anybody's guess is probably better than mine as to how that
relates to what Peirce said about energy conservation and tychism.
There is a left-right asymmetry in fundamental forces and particles,
which I had thought seems 'less' of an asymmetry if one takes
anti-matter into account, but I'm no expert. (And then there is the
observed matter-antimatter asymmetry itself.) Anyway, some people think
that the chiral asymmetry in fundamental particles and forces may give
rise to observed chiral asymmetry in organic molecules in biochemistry.
But who knows.
Best, Ben
On 9/30/2014 2:44 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Gary F., Lists,
Although I found came upon the quotation below in searching for texts
on "genuineness" in Peirce, I've decided to give this post a new
subject line as it seems only tangentially related to dicisigns.
The passage (copied below) has interested me for years, so much so
that at one point I made extensive notes on it and some related
passages in preparation for writing a paper having the working title,
"Peirce and Chirality," but I got distracted by life and never
finished it. Yet I remain as interested in "handedness" as ever and,
in truth, have been ever since, in my twenties I believe, I read a
marvelous piece of popular science by Martin Gardner titled /The
Ambidextrous Universe,/ which in it latest updated version has been
re-titled /The/ New /Ambidextrous Universe: Symmetry and Assymmetry
from Mirror Reflections to Superstrings. / I would like to get into
Peirce and chirality at some point after the NP seminar if there's
interest in that topic and will then refer to some of the sources the
Gardner book took me to.
The Peirce passage, a long paragraph which I've broken up into several
smaller ones, is of some interest in relation not only to chirality
but to several topics which have recently been discussed on these
lists,and especially to the problem of the origin of life.
In segment (a). Peirce writes that he has not found a single "genuine
triadic relation" which is not "an intellectual relation" or one
concerned with the "phenomena of life." This would seem to argue
against a pre-biological semiosis /if/ genuine triadic relations are
considered sine qua non for semiosis (but are they?)
But then he offers by way of "brute, inorganic" example, chirality,
and argues that L- R-handedness (d) "could not be caused by the
inorganic action of dynamical law":
(e) . . . the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve
triadic relations is by their reference to second differentials of
positions. But though a second differential generally involves a
triadic relation, yet owing to the law of the conservation of
energy [. . .] which has been sufficiently proved for purely
inorganic phenomena, the dynamic laws for such phenomena are
expressible in terms of first differentials. It is, therefore, a
non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a "degenerate" form of triadic
relationship.
So, given that the pervasive holochirality in the universe seems
inexplicable unless 'chance' be offered as its explanation, while (d)
"it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not
to be regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life," Peirce
concludes that in consideration of "the problem of how life first came
about" that
(e). . the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first
arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation
of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation
has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must
suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure
chance may itself be a vital phenomenon.
Of course since his time there have been other explanations offered.
What interests me for now is that in that earlier comment in (d) as to
whether absolute chance "ought not to be regarded as a product of
freedom, and therefore of life" Peirce adds a remarkable phrase
modifying 'life', namely, "not necessarily physiological." Thus, the
complete snippet reads:
. . . it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism --
ought not to be regarded as /a product of freedom, and therefore
of life, not necessarily physiological/ . (emphasis added)
But what can that phrase "not necessarily physiological" be pointing
to? Still, and mainly, Peirce offers "the problem of how genuine
triadic relationships first arose in the world" as being "a better,
because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first
came about."
It would appear that this matter of "genuineness" really might be a
key to resolving a number of issues currently under discussion, and
I'm glad you brought it up Gary.
Here's the complete passage referred to:
a. For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I
have been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation
-- that is, one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic
relations [. . . ] which is not either an intellectual relation or a
relation concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I
have not met with one which could not reasonably be supposed to belong
to one or other of these two classes.
b. As a case as nearly brute and inorganic as any, I may mention the
form of relationship involved in any screw-form which is definitely of
the right-hand, or occidental, mode, or is definitely of the Japanese,
or left-handed, mode. Such a relation exists in every carbon-atom
whose four valencies are saturated by combination with four atoms of
as many different kinds. But where the action of chance determines
whether the screw be a right-handed or a left-handed one, the two
forms will, in the long run, be produced in equal proportions, and the
general result will not be definitely, or decisively, of either kind.
c. We know no case of a definitely right-handed or left-handed
screw-phenomenon, where the decision is not certainly due to the
intervention of a definitely one-sided screw in the conditions of that
decision, except in cases where the choice of a living being
determines it; as when Pasteur picked out under the microscope the two
kinds of crystals of a tartrate, and shoved those of one kind to the
right and those of the other kind to the left.
d. We do not know the mechanism of such choice, and cannot say whether
it be determined by an antecedent separation of left-handed screws
from right-handed screws or not. No doubt, all that chance is
competent to destroy, it may, once in a long, long time, produce; but
it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not
to be regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not
necessarily physiological. It could not be caused, apparently, by the
inorganic action of dynamical law.
e. For the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve triadic
relations is by their reference to second differentials of
positions. But though a second differential generally involves a
triadic relation, yet owing to the law of the conservation of energy,
which has been sufficiently proved for purely inorganic phenomena, the
dynamic laws for such phenomena are expressible in terms of first
differentials. It is, therefore, a non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a
"degenerate" form of triadic relationship which is involved in such
case. In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first
arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation of
the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation has ever
been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be
no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be
a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense
would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. . . . CP 6.322
Best,
Gary R.
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