Thanks Gary R. for pointing out that our author will shortly address the trifurcation of icons into images/diagrams/metaphors beginning on p. 207 of section 8.2. I look forward to our forthcoming conversation of operational iconicity.
7.4 Extended Dicisigns Given the human (psychological vs. intellectual?) limitation for processing complex diagrams, externally stored representations, or extended Dicisigns, serve as “supplements to the complexity of controllable, imagined imagery in individuals” (NP, 191) providing externally stored information as well as various forms of external processing. Examples abound. Stjernfelt suggests that extended Dicisigns make possible communal diagrammatic reasoning, which I cannot but help relate to Peirce's notion of Community of Inquiry. This section goes on to make a compelling case—not only that we might we call Peirce an externalist philosopher of mind *avant la lettre—*but further that a cross-pollination of Peirce's semeiotic and philosophy of mind with Clark's Extended Mind Hypothesis might yield an even more radicalized version of the latter. Reading the apt quotations on top of page 192, few would doubt that for both Peirce and Clark: cognitive processes “ain't (all) in the head.” Apart from work directly concerned with manipulation of external diagrams, Clark's notion of 'active sensing', his recognition that perception's generalizing tendency makes it 'systematically insensitive' to detail, and the Principle of Ecology Assembly emphasizing “a mixed-media approach to reasoning with little regard to the internal-external boundary” (NP, 193) all exhibit obvious similarities to implications of the Dicisign doctrine so far discussed. The blurring of the internal/external distinction resulting from the variability of interrelationships between perception/cognition/action in both thinkers favors a cognitive ecumenicism which naturally leads to their shared cognitive eclecticism. The multiple realizability of propositions does appear aligned with the multiple realizability of the same cognitive task. Those who favor an embodied mind hypothesis run up against the criticism that they mistakenly restrict human thought and reason “inextricably and nontrivially” (Clark, 204) to the details of human form. Epistemological commitments to embodied minds, or overly sharp bifurcations between mind and environment, draw us dangerously close to a forms of psychologism/nominalism, whereas the multiple realizability of cognitive forms evades being a vicious form of relativism given the pluralistic, self-correcting, adaptive nature of inquiry. Peirce's pregnant remark from the *Prolegomena *that “there can be no isolated sign” suggests his theory of unlimited semiosis might eventually serve cosmological, metaphysical, and theological speculations given that Dicisigns and Arguments could not exist without a dialogical Quasi-Mind whose plasticity, multiplicity, and inherent potentiality make sharp delimitations of regions of mental activity a misguided endeavor. The author briefly mentions the parallelism between Hypostatic Abstraction (“making second-order objects out of properties, relations, facts, etc—making it possible to address, analyze, control, and criticize them as if they were ordinary first order objects” (NP, 194/ c.f. Section 6.12) and Clark's recognition that 'thinking about thinking' might be a distinctly human activity. Peirce's contention that self-control originating in the very capacity of (aesthestic?) hypostatic abstraction can also be neatly grafted onto Clark's remarks on the 'ability to associate concrete tokens with abstract relations', while we will find in section 7.5 that Peirce sees more clearly than Clark how these processes of second-order cognitive dynamics are far from *arbitrary* maneuvers. Please allow me a few unrelated questions. If anyone can elaborate on how Peirce used the terms “subjective” and “objective” differently from the 'varieties of German senses', I am confused about how the quotation from the letter to Lady Welby on p. 194 makes his approach an original one. Are non-human animals not capable of second-order logic? How is Quasi-Mind different from Mind? Finally, I wonder if anyone sees possible connections between this section and Hilary Putnam's blurring of the fact/value dichotomy. I have one more posting to close out Chapter 7 which I will hopefully send out tomorrow. Yours, Doug On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 7:46 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Douglas, lists, > > You ask some very good questions which I do wish Frederik would sound in > on. For example, I too "would like to know if he has changed his mind > since he wrote in 2007 “that the category of pure diagrams is coextensive > with mathematics as such. This implies that the question of pure diagram > taxonomies is inevitably entangled in the large questions of the > foundations of mathematics" (*Diagrammatology*, 111)." > > However, the discussion of diagrams does continue into the next chapter > which discussion thread I'll be leading; so I hope we can get into > diagrammatology more deeply in a discussion around Chapter 8. > > You ask: "I'm also curious why Stjernfelt does not discuss Peirce's late > theory of hypoicons (images/diagrams/metaphors) at this point or mention > his late realization of the importance of general icons." > > Frederik discusses images/diagrams/metaphors briefly in Chapter 8. This > chapter is really a revision of a paper he delivered in 2007 at ICCS in > Aalborg, Denmark; he doesn't seem to have changed his mind on anything > written then and there (but that point will have to wait elucidation until > after I've begun the Chapter 8). > > Caught up in preparing my posts to introduce that chapter (and a host of > other pressing matters), I'll have to postpone further comments until that > discussion begins. > > Meanwhile, I find found your posts of the greatest interest and hope we > can continue this discussion of diagrams into the next chapter. Chapter 8 > will, I hope, allow us to return full force to logic and philosophy after > our venture into the life of the dicisign, including in biosemiotics. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Douglas Hare <ddh...@mail.harvard.edu> > wrote: >> >> Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7: 7.2-7.3 >> >> How should we classify the various different types of diagrams which can >> serve as predicates? According to our author, “Linguistic predicates seem >> to form one end of a range with very detailed, essentially continuous >> predicates like Myers' 4-D computer model or topographical maps in the >> other end” (NP, 188). It remains unclear to me why we should accept this >> linear description. I'm also curious why Stjernfelt does not discuss >> Peirce's late theory of hypoicons (images/diagrams/metaphors) at this point >> or mention his late realization of the importance of general icons. >> >> Perhaps the author feels as if he has already covered this technical >> material in Chapter 4 of *Diagrammatology, *but I would like to know if >> he has changed his mind since he wrote in 2007 “that the category of >> pure diagrams is coextensive with mathematics as such. This implies that >> the question of pure diagram taxonomies is inevitably entangled in the >> large questions of the foundations of mathematics" (*Diagrammatology*, >> 111). >> >> What is clear is that the author defines a continuous diagram as one in >> which “every connected part of the same dimension is, in itself, a diagram” >> (NP, 188). Of course, this quality often comes up against the limitation of >> granularity, usually the fact that sometimes we cannot “zoom-in” any more >> based on observatory or technical limitations when viewing images. An >> interesting relation seems to hold between Dicisigns with continuous >> predicates and linguistically-stated or algebraic-expressed >> propositions. For example, a computer model like that of Myers can be >> conceived as one Large Dicisign given “the continuity of its predicate and >> the unambiguousness of its object reference to a duration of space-time >> embedding the assassination event. Such a Dicisign directly refers to a >> whole continuum of objects present in the 4-D space-time slice which is >> depicted” (NP,188). >> >> Although the Myers' model allows for Euclidean translations of objects >> across diagram space, it apparently does not allow us to vary object shapes >> within the experiment. As example of diagram types which do admit >> variation, the author points to both pure and empirical examples: the >> triangle, the elephant species *Loxodonta africanus*, the structure of >> Congress and makes a brief comparison to Husserl's notion of eidetic >> variation. But given that a taxonomy of subtypes of diagrams is a >> desideratum of future research, in 7.2 we are not treated to an exhaustive >> outline but rather a “sketch” of vistas for more clearly elucidating >> structures, objects of, and purposes of diagram predicates given a Peircean >> reading of modern cognitive fields. >> >> In Section 7.3: Propositions in the Wild—Combining Available Signs into >> Dicisigns, we find that subject-predicate Dicisign structure does not map >> isomorphically onto word-image conglomerates in mixed-media, but rather >> offers different possibilities for fulfilling the truth-bearing role of the >> functional doubleness of Dicisigns (NP, 190). Beyond the permutations of >> subject/predicate coupling already discussed, we also find various S-P >> combinations in which gestures play both roles (c.f. the typology on NP, >> 190). >> >> As suggestions for further taxonomical advances, the author suggests >> more nuanced distinctions between diagrams and pictures, the introduction >> of sense-modalities on top of vision, a finer distinction between diagrams >> depicting the passage of time, and a distinction between purely mentally >> represented Dicisigns and those Dicisigns dependent upon external support >> (Extended Dicisigns). I suspect we will return to an important >> discussion of hypostatic abstraction from the end of Chapter 6 shortly, but >> I will resume discussion of Extended Dicisigns and Clarke's Extended Mind >> hypothesis tomorrow. >> >> Best regards, >> >> Doug >> >> On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 2:14 PM, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Thanks for this summary, Doug! (I’m including your whole post below, so >>> the biosemiotics list can see it as well as the Peirce list.) >>> >>> >>> >>> About the case of the Danish TV journalist — as Frederik points out, it >>> wasn’t really “fraudulent reporting”, in a sense that what the reporter >>> said was actually true: the troops really were leaving Iraq at the time, >>> although the accompanying footage showed them entering a Danish military >>> camp rather than leaving it. But the example shows how it is *possible* >>> for a combination of film and voice-over narrative to lie, and we can >>> probably all think of examples where this has been done on TV news. >>> >>> >>> >>> Another example occurred to me which shows that a film sequence can lie >>> even without the voice-over narrative. Some years ago, in one of the BBC >>> documentaries narrated by David Attenborough, there was a sequence where we >>> see a polar bear entering her den, and then a polar bear giving birth. >>> There was a voice-over narrative referring to the bear as “she”, but even >>> without that, a viewer would make the unconscious inference that it was the >>> same mother bear both inside and outside the den (especially when we later >>> see bear and cub emerging from the den in spring; Frederik’s footnote on p. >>> 187 explains this unconscious inference process that film sequences are >>> designed to prompt in the viewer.) But actually the birthing sequence was >>> shot in a zoo, and of course it was not the same bear we see in the wild. >>> >>> >>> >>> Again, I see nothing “fraudulent” here, because the accuracy of the >>> film’s depiction of the life of a generic polar bear was not undermined by >>> the implicit assumption that the two juxtaposed sequences showed a single >>> individual bear. But it does show that film viewing involves an inference >>> process which *can be used* to lie; and this is important because only >>> a sign capable of lying is capable of telling the truth, as dicisigns can >>> do. >>> >>> >>> >>> gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Douglas Hare [mailto:ddh...@mail.harvard.edu] >>> *Sent:* 7-Dec-14 5:42 PM >>> *To:* PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu >>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7, Dicisigns Beyond >>> Language ~ 7.1 >>> >>> >>> >>> List, >>> >>> Chapter 7 of *Natural Propositions* (NP) generalizes the doctrine of >>> Dicisigns over a broad range of human expressions, many of which are not >>> usually recognized as propositions by the Frege/Russell tradition(s) in >>> philosophy of language/logic. Stjernfelt argues one implication of Peirce's >>> Dicisign doctrine is that pictures and diagrams can serve as predicates in >>> truth claims. Diagrams themselves may also play a role in reasoning itself >>> because spatial structures are capable of general representation and so >>> furnish the possibility of further reasoning by means of experimental >>> manipulation (c.f. *Diagrammatology* 2007). >>> >>> Recall that for Peirce, the notion of diagrams includes not only >>> stylized figures on paper, but that algebras, images, maps, graphs, aspects >>> of linguistic grammar, logic representations, etc. also constitute subsets >>> of diagrams proper (NP, 4). Given the functional definition that Dicisigns >>> are signs which make truth claims due to their denotative and descriptive >>> involvement, (or indexical and iconic elements, or their simultaneous acts >>> of reference and description) with the same object, we can look for cases >>> in which non-linguistic elements form parts of or whole propositions in >>> themselves. This extension covers not only a wide range of biological signs >>> (c.f. Chapter 6) but it also deflates the notion of human propositions by >>> expanding it to include diagrams (extremely) broadly construed. In the >>> resulting naturalized framework, we find that sentences (linguistic >>> propositions) form only a special subset of signs which can be used to lie. >>> >>> Given the criterion that Dicisigns refer to signs which can be >>> considered true or false, Stjernfelt first offers an example of a diagram >>> performing the (misleading) role of a visual predicate in a Dicisign. The >>> image of the rat's brain tissue indexically connects to the experiments >>> described and predicatively connects the graphic content as describing the >>> results of those particular experiments. The second example of 7.1 offers >>> of a case of journalism in which the footage displayed of Danish troops not >>> entering but leaving Iraq counted as a case of fraudulent reporting given >>> that the video (images) did not match up to the text being read to the >>> viewers. So both examples are similar in that a mixed-media Dicisign >>> acquires a truth-bearing role from the co-localization of subject-predicate >>> coupling. The first two examples offer specific cases of how text-image >>> Dicisigns can be used to deceive when a diagram (image/video) serves the >>> predicative role of the Dicisign coupled with linguistic assertions. >>> >>> The third example of 7.1 discusses a film of and 4-D diagrammatic >>> representation of the Kennedy assassination. This wholly non-linguistic >>> example demonstrates how a diagram may play the role of the full >>> propositional sign (without any linguistic element whatsoever) and also how >>> diagrammatical reasoning in a more technical sense can be used to form >>> valid inferences and an indefinite amount of new Dicisigns, using both >>> theorematic and corollarial reasoning. The spatio-temporal origin of the >>> film connects it indexically to the controversial event, forming a “vast, >>> essentially continuous predicate” (NP, 187) from which new Dicisigns may be >>> inferred by means of diagrammatic reasoning. I will postpone my discussion >>> of the notion of a continuous predicate until my next posting on 7.2. >>> >>> I assume there will be specific questions and comments about the >>> preceding three examples: the Penkowa case, the journalism of Nybroe, and >>> the Myers 4-D model. I will await these responses before discussing 7.2 and >>> a second implication of the Dicisign doctrine: that differences which are >>> usually believed to be rely upon sharp bifurcations between >>> perception/reason or image/language should be analyzed as differences >>> within a more nuanced field of propositions requiring a typology detailing >>> various differences in the types of possible predicates and a new taxonomy >>> of subtypes of predicates. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Doug >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >>
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