Edwina, lists,
I haven't read the whole thread, but...
I think that it's true that many of us have discussed the sign relations
quasi- or pseudo-dyadically for convenience, for example, in the
_trikonic_ (2004) PowerPoint presentation, slide 42, discussing the
9-adic Sign Relations:
*as to the sign itself:*
qualisign (tone)
▷ legisign (type)
sinsign (token)
*as to the interpretant:*
rheme ([e.g.,] propositional function)
*▷* ▷ argument
dicisign ([e.g.,] proposition)
* as to the object: *
icon
▷ symbol
index
In each case one is really discussing a triad with something as a sign
for something as an object to something as an interpretant, but there
are three places in there where we trichotomize, playing down some
aspects of the triadic relation in order to focus on others:
How *something stands as a sign* (for an object to an interpretant):
qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
How (something as) *a sign stands for an object* (to an interpretant):
icon, index, symbol.
How (something as) *a sign* (for an object) *stands to an interpretant*:
rheme, dicisign, index.
This playing down has its limits. In particular, the third trichotomy
(rheme, dicisign, argument) depends on how the sign is represented, in
its signified interpretant, as, or as if, character, indexical, or sign
of intepretant) of the object. E.g., a rheme is a sign whose signified
interpretant represents it as (or as if it were) a character attributed
or imputed to an object.
So, one could as well say that, among the trichotomies:
The first trichotomy (qualisign, sinsign, legisign)
depends on how *a sign stands* (or how something stands as a sign).
The second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object*.
The third trichotomy (rheme, dicisign, argument)
depends on how *a sign stands for an object to an interpretant*.
But we wouldn't actually think that the first trichotomy involves a trio
of monadic characters, the second involves a trio of two-correlate
relations, and the third a trio of three-correlate relations.
On the other hand, I see nothing objectionable about it if the relations
that you discuss, and the variant formulations that I've just discussed,
are considered merely as abstractions from the triadic relation for the
sake of focus.
Your generally calling relatives or correlates themselves "relations",
on the other hand, makes it difficult for me to read you; I mean I
sometimes have trouble following what you say.
You object that to speak of the correlates as correlated things rather
than as relations implies that they would exist without the relations.
Yet in particular cases they often do exist without the relations. Is
Jack the father of Jackson? Jack may not be a father at all, yet still
exist. Then Jackson may not be an index of Jack at all, yet still exist.
Jackson will surely be an index of other people and things, of course.
Generally of course it is hard to conceive of things in general without
conceiving of representational relation in general.
The distinction between correlates and relations helps us focus flexibly
on various aspects of the phenomenon, including when the correlates are
real but not individually existent, and even when a correlate is a
figment. Now, flexibility of focus thanks to potential precision
justifies speaking of the 'relations' and the 'relation', which you like
to be able to do. It also justifies and, I'd say, requires,
distinguishing relative (or correlate) from relation, even if the
relative were called into being entirely by the relation.
As regards speaking of the semiotic triad as the capital-S 'Sign', I
seem to disagree with an increasing number of people about this. Not
only do I see nowhere Peirce doing this, it seems like a bad move
terminologically - it is at odds with everyday-English word 'sign'; I
think that such an everyday-English word should not be pressed into
service as term of art for a technical conception that has no
everyday-English word approximating to it.
I would suggest that the semiotic triad, a.k.a. genuine triad, be called
a 'eutriad.'
The eutriad would 'consist' or however one wants to put it, of the three
correlates, their triadic relation, and the relations abstracted from
the triadic relation. The genuine triadic relation itself could be
called a 'trilation', and the 'members' or relatives having the
trilation could be called the 'trilates' or 'trilatives'. On the other
hand, I'm not sure how this would gibe with finer-grained
classifications in which a sign could be classified by relations to
dynamic object, immediate object, etc.
And that's my three cents worth.
Best, Ben
On 12/17/2014 8:20 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I think that bringing in other words in place of other words...doesn't
change the analysis.
Jon wrote, of his diagramme, which is quite clear,
The "R" brings to mind a triadic relation R, which collateral
knowledge tells me
is a set of 3-tuples.
BUT - calling the triad Sign (capital S) as an 'R' (Representamen)
doesn't change the format. And calling the three Relations within that
triad as '3-tuples' doesn't change the format.
We agree (I think) that the semiosic sign is irreducibly triadic. The
quibble seems to be, in my view, trivial, over whether to consider
this irreducible triad as A Relation or, as I do, as an irreducible
set of 3 Relations. And I consider that my conclusion is readily
supported within the Peircean analysis - as I've provided quotations
from his own analysis of each one of these 3 Relations, (and he uses
the term 'relation' in his discussion, not 'interaction' as does John
D) and his pointing out how they function differently. It is the FACT
of their different function that leads me to use the plural of the
noun 'Relations'. Yet again, no-one is arguing that any one of these 3
can function alone; they exist only within that 'irreducible triad'.
But, so far, no-one seems to be focusing on the differences within
these three - and why one must acknowledge their differences; the
focus seems only to be one whether to call them: a Relation or an
irreducible set of 3 Relations.
And moving into the fallacies of ad hominem (you are unable or
unwilling to..) or ad populum (everyone else thinks like me...)
doesn't deal with this issue.
The question, I think, isn't so much on Relation vs Relations, but on
the nature of the Relation. And I'll continue to use this term as used
by Peirce, rather than 'tuple'. Is it a dyad? I'm saying' no', first,
because the perimeters of the interaction are not between existential
individual entities and second, because the semiosic process is
triadic and the single Relations do not exist on their own. Is a
single Relation a dyad? No, again, because the perimeters of each
Relation are part of the whole triadic interaction.
Certainly, semiosis takes place, as a triadic whole, between two
existential units - whether it be one cell and another cell. What
makes this interaction between, eg, an external Dynamic Object or even
an Internal Object ..and the habits of the Representamen...a Relation?
The fact that it can be in any of the three categorical modes; that
moves it from a mere mechanical interaction to a Relation. Same with
the other two processes of the semiosic triad. 'Something' is going on
- and that something is the transformative action of the categories.
Now, of course, some of you may disagree. But that's how I 'imagize'
the semiosic process and I don't see how my use of the plural of
Relations or my focus on the individual nature of each ofo the three
Relations (and I recall Peirce's focus on their individual nature) is
'offensive' to some.
Edwina
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