Gary F., Lists, As we try to interpret the key passages where Peirce tries to spell out what is special about the nature of triadic relations, I think it might be helpful to look at the way Peirce tries to work through three grades of increasing clarity about the nature of such relations (CP 3.457). In this piece on the Logic of Relatives, he makes a distinction at the second grade of clarity between relatives, relations and relationships. How do you apply these different terms to the claim he makes at 2.242 about the character of a genuinely triadic relation?
You've provided the passage: 242. A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. On my reading of the matter, we need to think about how a relative (say a monadic relative that serves as a first correlate) is connected to a triadic relationship. The connection between these two things (never mind what serves as second or third correlate in the triadic relationship) is the relation between this monadic relative and the triadic relationship. A genuinely triadic relation is what we have when the relative itself has the internal character of a triadic relationship, where that relative is connected to a triadic relationship. The relation between these two things (the relative having the internal structure of triad and the triadic relationship) is that of a genuine triad between it is a triad connected to a triad. A diagram or two would help clear matters up, I think. Is this the way you would apply Peirce distinction to that definition of a genuinely triadic relation or, would you explain things differently. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 2:32 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: [biosemiotics:7758] Re: Peirce categories Edwina, speaking of the three “members” of a triadic relation, you say that relations “are NOT composed of 'members' (where do you get that from?)” I get it from CP 2.274, the very passage (quoted by Gary R.) that you claimed to be in agreement with: “The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.” Did you even look at that passage before you posted your “interpretation” of it? or afterwards? If you think your version of semiotics is better than Peirce’s, fine, just say so. But you can’t expect anyone to believe that it’s the same as Peirce’s when you directly contradict Peirce on such a basic matter. The rest of your message requires no comment, but I include it so that others can see for themselves (if they haven’t already). gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Dec-14 3:41 PM To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7750] Re: Peirce categories Ah well, Gary F, I could say that I'm baffled by your inability to understand my analysis but I don't have that nasty streak in me to say that to someone else- and imply that they are intellectually or even psychologically incompetent and as such have an 'inability to see or admit'...etc.. And of course, I disagree that my interpretation is in 'direct contradiction to the statements themselves'. I consider that you don't understand the Relation - and Peirce has written extensively of them. They are NOT composed of 'members' (where do you get that from?). A relation is an interaction between nodal sites (the Dynamic Object is one such site; the Immediate Object is another; the Representament, the three Interpretants...) but they do not exist, per se, in themselves. They are part, the perimeters, of an informational interaction; that interaction is a Relation. ...Peirce deals with these interactions/Relations in, eg, 8.335 where he writes "in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Iconcs, Indices and Symbols...and in "in regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument". (8.337). I always refer to the Sign (capital S) as an irreducible triad. I agree with Peirce's statement that "a sign therefore has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant" (8.343)....BUT, as he does, if you take that triad apart, you can see that the Sign is complex and made up of a dynamic information process of THREE Relations....And the Sign (capital S) does NOT have 'three members', for none of the three parts of the semiosic sign can exist, per se, on its own...while a 'member' certainly implies that it can. As Peirce says, these parts of the Sign '"neither of which is an individual thing" (8.334) I think it best, in the interests of integrity, that you write only for yourself, and not move into argumentum ad populum and speak for 'everybody', as you do in your last sentence. You are free, of course, to think that I am someone unable or unwilling to agree with you - but, that should hardly bother either of us. Edwina
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