Jon, Jim, Lists, I thought I'd respond to both of your short, but quite interesting messages in a single post.
Jon wrote: Just off-hand I would have to say that the most important criterion in regard to iconicity is "relevant iconicity". The analogy, the icon, and the morphism are of imagination all compact. The analogy will break at some point, the icon and its object will each have features the other does not share, there are morphisms natural and otherwise. In every case we need the wisdom to tell them apart. I agree that distinguishing the icon from *that which it is like*, and not confusing the two should be an important consideration here. I do think, however, that it might prove especially difficult to map natural morphisms, although this is a question best suited to, perhaps, biologists and biosemioticians. Meanwhile, can you comment further on what you mean by "relevant" (as opposed to, I suppose, "irrelevant") iconicity, Jon? The concept, while intriguing, appears rather vague to me. And would you give an example of what might count as "irrelevant" iconicity in logic (or any part of science) which irrelevance might hide itself from less discerning minds? Continuing: JA: As far as the reality of possibilities and would-bees goes, I don't think they add anything to the pragmatic maxim that wasn't already implied by the invocation of conceivabilities. I might tend to agree with you except that Peirce does seem to invoke would-bes (as conditionals) into his revisions of the pragmatic maxim in this 1903 version: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indicative_mood> is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_sentence> having its apodosis in the imperative mood <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperative_mood>. (Peirce, 1903, from the lectures on Pragmatism, CP 5.18 also in *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard 'Lectures on Pragmatism',* p. 110, and in *Essential Peirce* v. 2, pp. 134-5.) And the* conditional* and *possible* seem even more forcefully stressed in this 1905 version of the maxim, one which does seem to lend some credence to Frederik assertion that the thinking which led to a reconsideration of the diamond example in the light of his increasingly "extreme realism" did, in fact, effect both the maxim and Peirce's pragmatism more generally. After rehearsing the original statement of the PM Peirce writes: I will restate [the original version of the PM] in other words, since ofttimes one can thus eliminate some unsuspected source of perplexity to the reader. This time it shall be in the indicative mood, as follows: The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol. (Peirce, 1905, from "Issues of Pragmaticism" in *The Monist* v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481-499, see p. 481 via Google Books, and via Internet Archive Reprinted in CP 5.438.).[Both these versions are taken from "Seven ways of thinking about the pragmatic maxim" See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_maxim Whatever the case may be as regards the PM, I too could say with Jim: "I have some trouble understanding why the question of "extreme realism" must ride with strong iconicity" Perhaps I'll get clearer on this as I tackle the final segment of Chapter 8 on the PM (should I get to it). Jim's other point is also of interest. He asks: Can you combine elements of both heuristic efficiency and strong iconicity through parenthesis and dotted lines? v(........F.........) The parenthesis place a limitation on the thought of the operation. The dotted line suggests the identity of the operation throughout that limitation. I realize that math notation desires substitution and the power of generality over analytical detail. Yet the thought is filled in by imagination. This appears reasonable enough to me, although I don't feel fully qualified to comment on it, and I don't quite see how it might be employed as a logical model or, rather, system such as EGs. So, I hope others will jump into this discussion. Again, I have some reservations about continuing a discussion of EGs if no one is interested. If there is no apparent interest in EGS then I may just say a few things about "the very long quotation" as offering a logical position which moves beyond material implication, and then conclude my summary reflections on Chapter 8 by looking at the two short sections which conclude it. (I was selected for a jury today on a criminal case which begins tomorrow and may run as long as three weeks, so I won't make any promises as to what I'll be able to accomplish in the time before Chapter 9 is scheduled. to begin). Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 10:20 AM, Jim Willgoose <jimwillgo...@msn.com> wrote: > Gary, > > Can you combine elements of both heuristic efficiency and strong > iconicity through parenthesis and dotted lines? > > v(........F.........) > > > The parenthesis place a limitation on the thought of the operation. The > dotted line suggests the identity of the operation throughout that > limitation. I realize that math notation desires substitution and the power > of generality over analytical detail. > Yet the thought is filled in by imagination. I have some trouble > understanding why the question of "extreme realism" must ride with strong > iconicity. > > Jim W > > ------------------------------ > Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 16:32:20 -0500 > From: gary.richm...@gmail.com > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > CC: Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7869] Re: Natural Propositions: > Chapter 8 > > > Lists, > > I'd like to continue this reflection on Frederik's discussion of iconicity > in existential graphs by considering a passage quoted by him, one which > succinctly states the purpose of EGs (NP, 271-18): > > . . [The] purpose of the System of Existential Graphs, as it is stated in > the Prolegomena [4.533], [is] to afford a method (1) as simple as possible > (that is to say, with as small a number of arbitrary conventions as > possible), for representing propositions (2) as iconically, or > diagrammatically and (3) as analytically as possible. . .These three > essential aims of the system are, every one of them, missed by Selectives. > ("The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism" [2], 1906, 4.561, note 1) > > > So, in a word, Peirce wants to make his graph system "as simple as > possible" in having a minimum of arbitrary conventions, and to represent > propositions as iconically and analytically as possible. This involves, > firstly, preferring the line of identity to selectives. But in > consideration of his Beta graphs Peirce finds that it not always possible > or, rather,* it is not always desirable* to do so in very complex graphs > (for essentially visual and psychological reasons). So, somewhat > reluctantly, he substitutes selectives for identity lines in such complex > graphs. Frederik gives the reason for this reluctance: > > The substitution of selectives for the line of identity is less iconic > because it requires the symbolic convention of identifying different line > segments by means of attached identical symbols. The line of identity, on > the other hand, is immediately an icon of identity because it makes use of > the continuity of the line. . . [and is also] a natural iconical > representation of a general concept [NP, 218]. > > > Yet Peirce introduces selectives because in such complicated graphs > "involving many variables taking many predicates," the complex network of > lines of identity becomes visibly hard for the vision system of a human to > handle (Frederik considers the possibility of a kind of mind which could > comfortably observe such a complicated network, and such a *mind* may > perhaps be suggested by the machine reading of even exceedingly complex > conceptual graphs as has been made possible with Sowa's CGs). Frederik > concludes: > > [T]he important issue here is Peirce's very motivation for preferring > identity lines to Selectives in the first place: they are *more iconical*, > because they represent in one icon entity what is also, in the object, one > entity. This thus forms *an additional, stronger iconicity criterion in > addition to the operational iconicity criterion* (NP, 218-19, emphasis > added). > > > Here Frederik reminds us that Peirce's arguments against the use of > selectives is in particular directed towards his own, earlier algebraic > formalization which, it should be noted, is the very first version of > modern symbolic logic. Thus, while in some cases Beta graphs *with* selectives > are deemed heuristically superior to graphs without selectives, and while > the two versions are logically equivalent, Peirce yet clearly preferred the > more iconical version *all things being equal*. > > So we arrive at the second important reason to prefer "more iconic" graph > representations, an *ontological *one, that "Beta graphs more > appropriately depict logical relations *like they really are*, thus > adding to the pragmatic operational criterion of iconicity an ontologically > motivated extra criterion" (NP, 219). This connects the optimal iconicity > notion to Peirce's realism, which, while realism is there from the get go > (as Max Fisch and, later, Robert Lane have convincingly argued), his > realism became more and more extreme over the course of his philosophical > career (Frederik rehearses the famous diamond example contrasting Peirce's > earlier "more nominalistic" version of 1878 in "How To Make Our Ideas > Clear" with the "extreme realism" of 1905 in "Issues of Pragmatism," which > essay allows for "real possibles" such that *were *the diamond *to be > tested*, say at some future time, that it *would be *found to be hard). > > Frederik holds that Peirce's admitting would-bes into his philosophy, > "considerably changes and enriches" not only his conception of Thirdness, > but also the pragmatic maxim, it finally allowing for *real possibilities* > . > > Perhaps this is a good place to stop for now since at this point in the > chapter Frederik quotes the important long passage I mentioned in my first > post in this thread and analyzes it in terms of how Peirce "relativized" > material implication to go beyond it in revising parts of his Beta and > Gamma graphs. However, that is a somewhat technical discussion and I'm am > not sure that there is enough interest here in EGs to continue it. > > At this point I would like to ask the following questions: Do list members > find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of interest and value? If > so, what is that value? Also, what does one make of Frederik's notion that > the introduction of would-bes greatly modifies Peirce's conception of > Thirdness and that it enriches the pragmatic maxim in now involving real > possibilities? And finally, is there any interest in discussing the long > passage on EGs on how Peirce relativizes and goes beyond material > implication? > > > Best, > > Gary R >
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