Re: Gary Fuhrman At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405
But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences. Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Jan 16, 2015, at 9:16 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > Howard, > > There has historically been a lot of confusion about this issue. The lion's > share of it comes I think from two different ways of viewing logic in general > and conditionals in particular. For lack of better names I'll refer to them > as the Mathematical and the Linguistic views. > > Mathematics is about possible existence. What exists in mathematics is what > is possible, what is not inconsistent in the properties predicated of it. > Real possibles are simply part of the territory. > > As a mathematician Peirce was a realist of this stripe from beginning to end. > > Hope that clears a few things up. > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > >> On Jan 16, 2015, at 8:26 PM, Howard Pattee <hpat...@roadrunner.com> wrote: >> >> At 11:07 AM 1/16/2015, Frederik wrote: >> >> It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced "real possibilities" >> around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as yet another step in the >> development of Peirce's realism and even calls it the "most decisive single >> step" in that development. "Would-bes" is another term for "real >> possibilities". >> >> At 12:37 PM 1/16/2015, Gary R wrote: >> >>> I also believe that Peirce's moving more and more to an extreme realism has >>> a decided impact on all aspects of his work in the final decades of his >>> life, including his semiotics and especially his pragmatism. >> >> HP: "Extreme realism" is a mystery to me without a clear description of what >> it entails and excludes. As I have asked before, what reason or pragmatic >> justification can you give for believing in just one of many irrefutable and >> undemonstrable ideological metaphysics? >> >> From SEP Realism: "Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) >> realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be >> selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be >> perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic >> objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral >> value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a >> straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a >> non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that >> one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, >> there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take." >> >> HP: Can someone briefly state Peirce's limits on "would bes" and "real >> possibilities"? Or at least can you give some explicit examples? >> >> Howard >>
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