Hello Ben.
 
Not all of these examples seem to fit the #580 case. The first problem is that 
if 222 is an open variable ("a man commits suicide")
is identical to the other man, which Peirce leaves as an option, then the rule 
of passage itself is questionable. Secondly, the rule of passage for a 
conditional statement from an existentially quantified formula to an open 
formula is a universal quantifier binding both.  Thus, "any man either doesn't 
go bankrupt or he commits suicide."  But I cannot tell why the outer line of 
identity is "null and void." It appears that you cannot connect the line 
through "suicide" if the two men are identical. Thus, back to the first 
problem. Importantly, I am changing quantifiers and not simply adding or 
subtracting the same one. Secondly, I am curious about the previous role of "a 
man." Jim W
 
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural 
Propositions : Chapter 8 -  On the philosophical nature of semiosis?


  
    
  
  
    
      Jim, list,

      Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
        logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
        Peirce's examples of inference modes don't work any more than my
        examples with 'John'.

      

      As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some
        examples. Note that 'Z' plays the same role as
        'bankrupt'.

        

      

      See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580,
        see 580 
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm
        . There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.
        

      

      Best, Ben

      

      On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

    
    
      
      Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do
        not seem to carry enough information to decide the question.

         

        On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements
        "John is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial
        empty) Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals;
        (or singleton classes).  But then, the existent singleton class
        inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of
        contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two
        Johns.  Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to
        exclude this. The square of opposition is always fun to play
        with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so
        it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of
        passage" in terms of graphs.

         

        Jim W 

         

      
    
                                          
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