Thanks very much Ben for the link. (As well as all your wiki stuff) I'll spend
some time with #580 to try and understand the problem.
Jim W
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list,
Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
Peirce's examples of inference modes don't work any more than my
examples with 'John'.
As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some
examples. Note that 'Z' plays the same role as
'bankrupt'.
See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580,
see 580
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm
. There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.
Best, Ben
On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:
Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do
not seem to carry enough information to decide the question.
On the other hand, if "John" lacks reference, the statements
"John is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial
empty) Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals;
(or singleton classes). But then, the existent singleton class
inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of
contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two
Johns. Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to
exclude this. The square of opposition is always fun to play
with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so
it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of
passage" in terms of graphs.
Jim W
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