Thanks very much Ben for the link. (As well as all your wiki stuff) I'll spend some time with #580 to try and understand the problem. Jim W Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500 From: bud...@nyc.rr.com To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list, Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of inference modes don't work any more than my examples with 'John'. As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some examples. Note that 'Z' plays the same role as 'bankrupt'. See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580, see 580 http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm . There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce. Best, Ben On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote: Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry enough information to decide the question. On the other hand, if "John" lacks reference, the statements "John is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals; (or singleton classes). But then, the existent singleton class inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two Johns. Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to exclude this. The square of opposition is always fun to play with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of passage" in terms of graphs. Jim W
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