Jerry, unfortunately you are making some false assumptions that obscure your 
understanding.



-----Original Message-----
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: March 22, 2015 2:34 PM
To: Peirce List
Cc: John Collier; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Søren Brier
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A System Of Analytic Mechanics



List, John:





On Mar 20, 2015, at 12:25 PM, John Collier wrote:



> There are two senses of 'before' that are relevant here.



The meaning of a noun stands in a definition, not a preposition.

[John Collier]

No. Nouns only have meaning because of the way they are used to satisfy 
predicates. Otherwise they are just place holders. We refer to a dog meaning 
that we refer to something that is a dog. More complex predicates including 
prepositions, etc are possible.



> There is before in time and there is 'before' in cause. On my understanding 
> of the standard view of cosmology in contemporary physics (there are many 
> alternatives, but this is the main one today), there is no before in time, 
> since time began with the universe.



Geometry supposes that a line extends to infinity in both negative and positive 
directions.

[John Collier]

No. There are geometries for which this is not true. One was given for space by 
Poincaré in his discussion of the conventionality of the metric, for example.



This view of "no before in time" necessary requires abandoning the widely 
supposed view of the intimate correspondence relations between time and 
geometry.

[John Collier]

No. I would explicitly include geometry in the claim.



  Obviously, abandoning the relation between physics of time and geometry has 
many ramifications for the universality of physical theories.

(BTW, the initial conditions for the differential equations of analytical 
mechanics, by convention, usually start at "zero".)

[John Collier]

No abandonment required. Convention is irrelevant here.



> On the causal sense of before, I don't think that physics has dealt

> with it. Aristotle (and St Thomas after him) argued that there must be

> a Prime Mover (that is sometimes identified with God). Bertrand

> Russell argued that this was no explanation at all, since if we need a

> cause for the universe, than we should be able to ask what that

> cause's cause is -- what caused God, or what caused the Prime Mover. I

> won't be drawn into making any conclusions or hypotheses here, but the

> distinction is important, since the temporal question has an answer in

> current cosmology



> -- nothing was before because there was no before.



This conclusion contradicts the first sentence of the paragraph which states:



> On the causal sense of before, I don't think that physics has dealt with it.

[John Collier]

Only if you assume that causation has to be temporally ordered only. Aristotle 
and St Thomas did not make this assumption.



My original request was:

> If you can afford the efforts, play with these assertions in terms of the 
> small set of  "connectives" of propositional logics.

> Your conclusions, if logically sound and complete, would be keenly evaluated 
> by the scientific community.





Despite the contradictory nature of your rhetoric, your response was 
interesting. But, the ur-ground of my interest was simply:

Is the concept of time beyond the expressive power of sentential calculus with 
it's set of associative connectives?

[John Collier]

[John Collier] Your question was not well-posed, as it had presuppositions that 
are false.



And, as an after thought, your phrase:

> than we should be able to ask what that cause's cause is --



is a basic question, central to the concept of  emergence of an individual from 
a seed of its father and, more broadly, the nature of any individual organism 
as an extension of relations among members of the table of chemical elements.



To these two issues, I repeat my request, now in the context of the question of 
"what causes cause":



> If you can afford the efforts, play with these assertions in terms of the 
> small set of  "connectives" of propositional logics.

> Your conclusions, if logically sound and complete, would be keenly evaluated 
> by the scientific community.



Is anyone up to the challenge?

[John Collier]

I think not, since your question is not well-posed. The restriction to 
propositional logic is ludicrous. The simplest answer is "Nothing causes 
cause", but that is a proposition that is a simple statement in propositional 
logic, but hides a quantification ranging at least over causes, and perhaps 
cahuse as a property as well (2nd order logic). The question is not a useful 
one in propositional logic as it has only trivial answers.





John







>

> John

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]

> Sent: March 20, 2015 1:36 PM

> To: Peirce List

> Cc: Søren Brier; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Jon Awbrey

> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A System Of Analytic Mechanics

>

> List, Jon, Soren, Steven:

>

> Let's go a full step deeper into the inquiry of time.

>

> Start with the presumption that an event initiated the becoming into 
> existence of concept of matter.

> (Alternatively, one can start with the Eastern view of the universe

> cycling and re-cycling itself which forces even more difficult

> conundrums into metaphysical discourse.)

>

> What existed before matter?

> Mind?  If so, what sort of mind?

> Time?  If so, when was time initiated?  And what were its origins?

> Mathematics? If so, when was mathematics initiated?  Did mathematics initiate 
> time?   Matter? If so, how?

>

> Intertwined with these conundrums are the questions on the nature of 
> mathematics itself.

>

> Was mathematics initiated by the mind of man?   (as a part of the emergence 
> of man's mind?)

> Or, does mathematics pre-exist the existence of humans?

> If mathematics pre-exists human constructionism, when was it initiated?

> Or, is mathematics a consequence of natural events, such as the atomic 
> numbers?

> Or, did the ordinals exist before the cardinal?

> Or, did the cardinals exist before the ordinals?

> And, what motivated the (illicit?) constructions of the complex numbers?  
> Electricity?

>

> Just a few of the conundrums that come to mind when thinking of the physical 
> representation of time.

>

> Whatever one decides about physical time, both chemical time and biological 
> time and mental time are far more difficult problems BECAUSE the unbounded 
> irregularities of time "flow" (that is, change) in these disciplines.

>

> A simple example of these irregularities are the concatenation of

> enzyme-catalysed reactions in creating the feedback and feed forward

> "flows" of time in living systems. (Origin of logic of Biosemiotics?)

>

> If you can afford the efforts, play with these assertions in terms of the 
> small set of  "connectives" of propositional logics.

> Your conclusions, if logically sound and complete, would be keenly evaluated 
> by the scientific community.

>

> Cheers

>

> Jerry

>

>

>

>

>

> On Mar 20, 2015, at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

>

>> Thread:

>> SB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15878

>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15879

>> SB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15880

>>

>> Søren, List,

>>

>> Oh, of course, it was nice to be reminded, and that inspired me to

>> scan through a sample of what had been said before, plus I'm really

>> fond of that particular quote I featured on my blog, and I thought

>> the glancing review from NPR was kind of interesting:

>>

>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/06/01/wherefore-aught/

>> http://www.npr.org/blogs/13.7/2013/05/02/180037757/is-time-real

>>

>> To my way of thinking, the whole thing is really a pseudo-issue.

>> Saying that "the laws of physics evolve" means nothing more than "the

>> laws of physics are not what we used to think they were", which

>> historically speaking is just the usual case.

>>

>> To say that "the laws of physics evolve" is just to say that the laws

>> of physics we know contain parameters that we used to believe were

>> constants but now we believe are variables, and all that does is

>> initiate an inquiry into the laws that rule the time evolution of

>> those variables.

>> Which is again just another variation on the usual theme.

>> The form of inquiry itself persists.

>>

>> Regards,

>>

>> Jon

>>

>> On 3/20/2015 5:46 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

>>> Jon

>>>

>>> Thanks. I just wanted to remind  Steven that an eminent modern physicist 
>>> found it possible to uphold his position while having a view close to 
>>> Peirce's.

>>>

>>>                      Søren

>>>

>>> -----Oprindelig meddelelse-----

>>> Fra: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]

>>> Sendt: 19. marts 2015 15:32

>>> Til: Søren Brier; Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky

>>> Cc: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List

>>> Emne: Re: A System Of Analytic Mechanics

>>>

>>> Re: Søren Brier

>>> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15878

>>>

>>> Søren, List,

>>>

>>> Smolin's 'Time Reborn' was the subject, or at least the instigation, of 
>>> much discussion here and there around the web a couple years ago.

>>> From a cursory search, I think it was Michael Shapiro who broached the 
>>> topic on the Peirce List, inciting discussions that went on for the rest of 
>>> the summer:

>>>

>>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2013-05/msg00028.html

>>>

>>> I recall blogging on it and adding a quote from Peirce in connection with a 
>>> discussion on a blog devoted to computational complexity and the theory of 
>>> computation:

>>>

>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/06/01/wherefore-aught/

>>>

>>> Regards,

>>>

>>> Jon

>>>

>>> On 3/19/2015 2:13 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

>>>> Dear Steven

>>>>

>>>> Are you aware of the work of Unger and Smolin where they argue for the 
>>>> evolution of laws?

>>>> The Singular Universe..THE SINGULAR UNIVERSE AND THE REALITY OF

>>>> TIME Cambridge University Press, November 30, 2014.

>>>> Synopsis

>>>> This is a book on the nature of time  and the basic laws of nature. We 
>>>> argue for the inclusive reality of time as well as for the mutability of 
>>>> the laws of nature.  We seek to breathe new life and meaning into natural 
>>>> philosophy -- a form of reasoning that crosses the boundaries between 
>>>> science and philosophy.

>>>> The work should appeal to a broad educated readership as well as to 
>>>> scientists and philosophers. It is not a popularization, but neither does 
>>>> it use a technical vocabulary that would restrict it to specialized 
>>>> readers. The subjects that it addresses are of paramount interest to 
>>>> people in many disciplines outside cosmology and physics.

>>>> In the twentieth century, physics and cosmology overturned the idea of an 
>>>> unchanging background of time and space. In so doing, however, they 
>>>> maintained the idea of an immutable framework of laws of nature. This 
>>>> second idea must now also be attacked and replaced. What results is a new 
>>>> picture of the agenda of physics and cosmology as well as of the methods 
>>>> of fundamental science.

>>>> The book develops four inter-related themes:

>>>> 1) There is only one universe at a time. Our universe is not one of many 
>>>> worlds. It has no copy or complete model, even in mathematics. The current 
>>>> interest in multiverse cosmologies is based on fallacious reasoning.

>>>> 2) Time is real, and indeed the only aspect of our description of nature 
>>>> which is not emergent or approximate. The inclusive reality of time has 
>>>> revolutionary implications for many of our conventional beliefs.

>>>> 3) Everything evolves in this real time including laws of nature.  There 
>>>> is only a relative distinction between laws and the states of affairs that 
>>>> they govern..

>>>> 4)  Mathematics deals with the one real world. We need not imagine it to 
>>>> be a shortcut to timeless truth about an immaterial reality (Platonism) in 
>>>> order to make sense of its "unreasonable effectiveness" in science.

>>>> We argue by systematic philosophical and scientific reasoning , as well as 
>>>> by detailed examples, that these principles are the only way theoretical 
>>>> cosmology can break out of its current crisis in a manner that is 
>>>> scientific, i.e. results in falsifiable predictions for doable experiments.

>>>>

>>>> And Smolin's Time Reborn

>>>> "What is time?

>>>>

>>>> It's the sort of question we rarely ask because it seems so obvious. And 
>>>> yet, to a physicist, time is simply a human construct and an illusion. If 
>>>> you could somehow get outside the universe and observe it from there, you 
>>>> would see that every moment has always existed and always will. Lee Smolin 
>>>> disagrees, and in Time Reborn he lays out the case why.

>>>>

>>>> Recent developments in physics and cosmology point toward the reality of 
>>>> time and the openness of the future. Smolin's groundbreaking theory 
>>>> postulates that physical laws can evolve over time and the future is not 
>>>> yet determined. Newton's fundamental laws may not remain so fundamental."

>>>> Smolin quotes Peirce several times in this book for the view that 
>>>> different laws emerging in the course of the development of the universe 
>>>> over time.

>>>>

>>>>                                            Søren

>>>>

>>>

>>

>> --

>>

>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey

>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:

>> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/

>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA

>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey

>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

>>

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