Howard, I’ve already complied with your request (last week), but I’ll try once more to explain what it is that Peirce described as “occult and mysterious” in his letter to Marie Noble (who was a student in his correspondence course on logic). Actually a careful reading of the whole letter would probably be more useful to you, but you’ve asked for another explanation, so here it is.
In W6:37, Peirce says that two subjects are “occult and mysterious.” One is “the power of nature that brings about the result of the chemical experiment” – or more generally, causality in the physical universe. This is “mysterious” because it is unobservable in itself, yet we are forced by this “power” to admit that there must be a system of regular relations between (a) the causes and conditions constituting the experiment and (b) the result of it, and we can only guess what that regular relation is in itself. The other subject which is “just as occult and mysterious” is “the power that connects the conditions of the mathematician’s diagram with the relations he observes in it.” Peirce’s point is that like physical causality, that “power” (namely the necessity of mathematical reasoning) is no less compelling than physical causality, even though no physical things or events are involved in it (since mathematical objects are imagined), and no more directly observable than physical causality is, so that both “powers” are equally “occult and mysterious.” As I said before, the upshot is that the mathematician’s experiments with diagrams do not differ in this respect from the chemist’s experiments with his chemicals and laboratory apparatus, because “all reasoning involves observation” (W6:37). Now, I don’t doubt that you can find some way of translating Peirce’s statement into a statement about your “symbol-matter problem” and your “epistemic cut.” But this can only be a very free translation, and there is no need for it, except for those who insist on reducing everything in science to the “symbol-matter problem.” There are other problems, and some have been addressed both in Natural Propositions and on these lists. Gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: May 10, 2015 9:48 Pm To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: 'Peirce-L 1' Subject: [biosemiotics:8623] Re: Natural At 12:09 PM 5/10/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: I don't think Frederik wants to get into an dispute over words any more than I do. HP: Word choice is not the issue. Frederik has explained why Peirce avoided the words "subject-object." GF: Howard, to the extent that you've clarified what you mean by "the subject-object dichotomy" it should be clear that Peircean semiotic has no problem with that distinction, and uses it as much as any philosopher or physicist. HP: Top say there is "no problem with the distinction" is to miss the issue. Peirce did recognize the epistemic problem connecting the mathematics (the symbols) with the experiment (with matter). Peirce: ". . . the power that connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he observes in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." Because mathematical models are symbolic I also call this the symbol-matter problem, and like physicists I recognize the necessity of this distinction (called the epistemic cut) if any experiment is to make sense. (Wigner called this connection "the most fundamental problem of all.") Peirce found something "occult and mysterious." If you don't like my words, then can you, or anyone, please express in your own words the nature of the connection that you think Peirce found "occult and mysterious." Howard
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