Ben, yes, that’s exactly how I read the Peirce quote. The signs “soldier” and “George Washington” are both general in themselves (i.e. legisigns) and thus subjectively general because they exist only in replica, as he puts it in Kaina Stoicheia. But “soldier,” like the statue, is objectively general because its object is general, i.e. there are many soldiers (but only one George Washington). – Who, we might say, was an individual General, but in another sense of “General” not relevant here!
I’m not sure what to make of your “universal ambassador,” but anyway Peirce’s usage of “subject” and “subjective” goes back to the usage of the Latins such as Duns Scotus, which Peirce had great respect for, and that’s why he avoided the modern Kantian usage of “subject” which obscured that fact that dynamic objects can also be subjects “in themselves” regardless of whether they are sentient or alive. That modern usage is a more anthropomorphized usage of “subject, ” another reason why Peirce avoided it when he could. Gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: May 10, 2015 1:10 PM To: [email protected]; 'Peirce-L 1' Subject: [biosemiotics:8615] Re: Natural Gary F., Howard, lists, Gary F., regarding this excerpt from your quote of Peirce in "What Pragmaticism Is", [....] That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is _objectively_ general. The word “soldier,” whether spoken or written, is general in the same way; while the name “George Washington” is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existent thing: it is a _type_, or _form_, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may conform, but which none of them can exactly be. This is subjective generality. [....] [End quote] It sounds like Peirce is considering the sign as subject and its semiotic object as object. Do you think that that's what Peirce is doing? In that case it makes pretty simple sense that the sign's 'subjective generality' means the sign's generality in the sign's own being, while the sign's 'objective generality' is the sign's referring to some object(s) generally. I can think of a third kind of general, which could be both 'subjectively' and 'objectively' individual, yet is general in another way, such as a _universal ambassador_ an (existent country's existent) ambassador _to_ every country in general, addressed to a full range of interpretants or interpreting minds in the sphere of international relations. (On the other hand Peirce came to express doubts about casting that which we call a legal representative as simply a sign or representamen of the client or employer or voters, etc., since such a representative may significantly affect its supposedly represented object). Best, Ben
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