Thinking with due rigor and from the perspective of an axiomatic framework is integral to the scientific method. Absent of the aforementioned, there is no science worthy of the name. sj
From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 7:17 PM Cc: PEIRCE-L Subject: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality) My analysis of this list. Edwina is the only person who lately suggests knowledge about or even interest in Peirce. Others are interested in their ideas and areas of expertise. Clark excepted. But he is generally reacting to this or that. People like me have learned to be quiet. Some are busy. Moderators will intervene when there is a note like this. I sense the Forum is in a parlous state as Edwina is nearly a moderator and yet is also a disputant, generally correct. I do not think the Moderators alone can create momentum. Were I coming to the list now I would not remain. Having once seen this as a fountain of expert access to Peirce and his ideas I remain in a fading home it might be such in the future. My own experience does not encourage me. Books <http://buff.ly/15GfdqU> http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: <http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl> http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: <http://buff.ly/1wXADj3> http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 1:07 PM, Ozzie <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote: Clark ~ It doesn't seem to me that you've followed the thread of my argument. If you have, then I'll simply say that I disagree with each of your major points. Regarding physics and gravitons: I asserted they are hypothetical. That is widely known, and you didn't dispute it. People do not use hypotheticals when they can instead rely on facts and reality. So physicists really do not know what causes gravity; they have an unverified theory. I asserted that physicists were stalled -- unable to explain gravity in a satisfactory way without resorting to hypothetical particles. Your response: "It makes sense by symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things." Yes, it makes sense, if the prior unverified logic is correct, and if symmetry applies. That's two "ifs," each with a probability of less than one, multiplied together. That is the analytical black box I described, with an admixture of contents both real and imagined. That black box with gravitons inside also gets a lot of strings, particles and extra dimensions gratuitously thrown into it by each Nobel-hopeful, which explains your lament: "Sadly physics went down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion." Yet, you seem to like that black box, as long as you first approve of its unverified contents. Maybe some day physicists will have the empirical data they require to answer these questions. They're certainly working on it, so I consider their black box exercises as hypotheticals to eventually be tested/verified. However, those working on empirical issues regarding the physical mechanisms of cognitive logic are brain researchers, not philosophers. Each successful test of their theories moves purely philosophical (non-empirical) theories of logic toward the margin. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Oct 20, 2015, at 9:44 PM, CLARK GOBLE <clarkgoble84...@gmail.com> wrote: On Oct 20, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Ozzie <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote: I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown. That leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the mechanism, and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they happen to agree. This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on gravity, then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by atoms to explain it. They've never seen a graviton, but "it must be there." (They stay busy exploring the inside of their black box by smashing atoms in rarefied/unrealistic environments.) Not to get pedantic (and of course as soon as I say that I know I’m doomed). However I think the reason physics like the idea of graviton “particles” is because when you reformulate quantum mechanics in more of a lagrangian form rather than the hamiltonian you get virtual particles being exchanged. This is why Feynman was so famous with QED. He basically shifted how we do quantum and then gave it a more traditional pseudo-Newtonian interpretation in terms of particles being exchanged. Once you are able to do that with electro-magnetism it makes sense to at least discuss it with everything else. QCD soon followed for the weak and strong forces. It makes sense by symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things. So I don’t think this came from physicists stalling out. I think the stalling out came more due to a lack of interesting empirical data that could lead them to good theories. We have dark matter with not enough empirical data to say much about it. Ditto dark energy. Then pushing symmetries gave supersymmetry and then string theory. Sadly physics went down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion. I’m not sure gravitons are because it’s stuck though. Those came from the very productive period from the rise of QED through to the beginnings of string theory. Largely we’re stuck because there’s just not enough data. At least Einstein had the results of the falsification of the aether to work with. The larger issue of speculation and abduction is a good one. The line between where we use our term “speculation” and what Peirce would be comfortable with using abduction for is a good one. There’s a certain mystery and ambiguity to the term. It’s that logic where we’re apt to guess right. Which separates it from mere guessing of course. Whether that relates to interpretants and nominalistic black boxes is an interesting one. I’m not really a fan of Dewey’s move towards instrumentalism for various reasons. While I’ve no idea if he ever read Dewey, Feynman’s famous approach to physics definitely is a very instrumentalist one. Now is “instrumentalism as received” in philosophy of science (especially the hard sciences) really what Dewey meant? I confess I’m not enough of a Dewy expert to know. It’s one of those things I’ve been meaning to read up more on for years. I’m curious what others think a Peircean critique of Dewey would be on this point. If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other, we would expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that story -- the physical components of plants that permits them to broadcast and receive signals, the nature of the electrochemical signals, factors in the environment that affect signaling, etc. If logic occurs in plants, we would insist, show us exactly how it operates. While that would be desirable I’m not sure it’s necessary to establish that they do communication. Often we known “that” something happens long before we know “how.” (Not always of course - sometimes we learn the mechanism and then look at implications of how it functions) Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first Pragmatic question about semiotic logic: If an object has interpretants, WHERE do those (object+interpretants) reside in the brain, and WHAT links them together? Why do they have to reside in the brain? A great example of this objection would be Christopher Nolan’s film Memento where the interpretants exist as traces on the protagonists skin as tatoos. The notion of interpretants as traces (which arises out of the analysis of the creation of matter in Plato’s Timaeus although it’s also key in Derrida’s take on semiotics) is very useful to my eyes. We often want semiotics to entail a certain bias of how texts functions whereas I think Peirce in particular is far more sophisticated in his notion signs. No doubt in part due to that appreciate of the Timaeus but also various writers on signs from late antiquity and the medieval era. We should of course also distinguish between kinds of interpretants. Between the final interpretant, the immediate interpretant and dynamic interpretant. To ask where the interpretant is first requires the context of asking what sign we are analyzing. I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but belief without an operational mechanism means that our views belong in the nominalist, black-box category. It is inconsistent to believe that a physical brain evolved/optimized to carry out Pragmatic logic does so in a way divorced from physical reality. I think this confuses things somewhat. In terms of analyzing signs we can always break them up into sub-signs. (And given Peirce’s theory of continuity presumably indefinitely) At some point as a practical matter we’ll always reach a point of ignorance. I’m not sure how we can say that is nominalistic though. Peirce’s conception of scholastic realism seems to allow for real structures to be real. So a black box analysis if it is a real regularity is the exact opposite of nominalistic. It’s nominalistic to require that knowledge is only knowledge if we know all the material parts. So I think you’ve made an unfortunate inversion here. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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