Clark, List ~ I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown. That leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the mechanism, and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they happen to agree.
This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on gravity, then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by atoms to explain it. They've never seen a graviton, but "it must be there." (They stay busy exploring the inside of their black box by smashing atoms in rarefied/unrealistic environments.) Back to logic. Like other humans, I simultaneously carry on logic at various levels: I walk down the street, look at the scenery, talk with a friend, worry about an argument I had with a family member and mull over a project I'm working on -- while carrying on numerous autonomous activities such as digestion, breathing, etc. Each of these is a logical activity. Some logic concerns our survival, some concerns our emotions, and most focuses on practical matters of lesser importance/urgency. Some logic is hard-wired into our DNA (instincts), other logic is based on experience/habit, and some is the product of on-the-fly cognition in the face of new circumstances. All logic requires energy to carry out, and all logic that concludes with a decision to act requires energy, too. Therefore, optimizing behavior requires an even higher form of logic to mediate/coordinate the competing demands for energy ordered up by the various logical mechanisms. Our colleague Edwina has written about this mediating function before. If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other, we would expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that story -- the physical components of plants that permits them to broadcast and receive signals, the nature of the electrochemical signals, factors in the environment that affect signaling, etc. If logic occurs in plants, we would insist, show us exactly how it operates. Yet, when we speak of human abduction, induction, deduction, interpretants, signs, etc ... well, that black-box discussion contains no actual body parts, there are no alternative types of logic taking place at the same time, data/information is costless, the product of one logical exercise is of the same nature and value as all others, etc. In short, our logical black box is chiefly filled with definitions and unrealistic/simplifying assumptions. When those clash from one discussant to the next, each argues to the reasonableness of his/her definitions and assumptions -- but (genuine) empirical evidence is seldom offered. Therefore, the debates are seldom/never resolved. Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first Pragmatic question about semiotic logic: If an object has interpretants, WHERE do those (object+interpretants) reside in the brain, and WHAT links them together? Pick any object at all. If we can't conceive of the way that even one object and its interpretants exist in physical reality, then we cannot demonstrate empirically that human cognition (the physical brain) actually employs semiotic logic. This is an empirical matter; we have already asserted/predicted that the physical brain (cognition) makes use of objects and interpretants. That is only the first step. Every other aspect of semiotic logic must have some physical/empirical counterpart, too, where logic is carried out, mediated and used to direct activity. I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but belief without an operational mechanism means that our views belong in the nominalist, black-box category. It is inconsistent to believe that a physical brain evolved/optimized to carry out Pragmatic logic does so in a way divorced from physical reality. Once the physical nature of logic is addressed, other debates/discussions associated with black-box thinking will either fall by the wayside (empirical rejection) or be resolved through clarification. Among these, I include the recent discussion of knowing-how-to-be vs. DNA, language as constructed vs. instinct, different types of abduction, circumstances conducive to induction, etc. Those earlier views are not wrong, so much as they do not lead to a deeper understanding. I hope this illuminates my first paragraph above, and explains why I believe a new paradigm is required to proceed. I have learned a few things about brain research by watching TED Talks at TED.com. Regards, Tom Wyrick > On Oct 20, 2015, at 12:09 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > >> On Oct 19, 2015, at 4:09 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> i) Environment (also called the physical), >> >> ii) Mind (also called the mental), and >> >> iii) Structure (also called the world of structures). > > It seems to me that the categories are problematic precisely because they > really aren’t separate. For instance the environment includes structures as > does mind. I think a big problem with how mind is discussed is precisely the > language that people use. It’s here that Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is helpful. > (I’d add that even within Peirce I find some discussion language problematic > such as consciousness) > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . 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