Jeff, list, I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any reply is made to what I have to say.
After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments. I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much about this subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with the subject matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here. One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we are talking about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call it) is shown as part of the third triad, then it does not seem like we can have a rheme and a dicent in the other two triads, since neither of those include the I-relation. So some explanation is required to make sense of these bracketed identifications. A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual judgment. There is the percept and then there is the perceptual judgment which judges the percept. If we look to "Telepathy" from the seventh volume of the CP (I googled and got a pdf from commens.org that collects the statements about percipuum), we find such statements as the following: "Perhaps I might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both percept and perceptual judgment." (7.629) "...I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 'percipuum.'" (7.643) It's not clear that the percipuum acts as medium between percept and perceptual judgment, or exactly how the percipuum could be understood as a medium. In the diagram, it is asserted to be a sinsign, but does this really make sense? The percipuum, in its Secondness, serves as medium between the percept and the perceptual judgment? I don't find this intuitive. I'm not saying that I necessarily have a better idea of how to think of percept and perceptual judgment. But it is true that in EP2, "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction," Peirce compares the perceptual judgment to an abductive inference, so that the perceptual judgment would be considered the interpretant of an argument sign, and thus of a legisign, not sinsign. A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation. I could be wrong here, but I thought I should mention it. In general, I'm not sure the diagrams are a fair depiction of the idea in question. I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own. But I'm not convinced that the diagrams really show how this might work. I don't think rhemes typically deal with the immediate object and immediate interpretant while a dicent typically deals with the dynamic object and dynamic interpretant, and so on. Rather each one will have to account for each of the ten trichotomies. I guess that the idea in, for instance, making a rheme nest in a dicent that way, is to suggest that the dynamic object and/or the dynamic interpretant fulfill the role of filling in the blanks (or new bonding sites), while when a proposition or group of propositions is nested into an argument, the (new?) dynamic object and/or the final interpretant fulfills that role of filling in or new bonding. It seems to me that this is probably wrong. But, if something else was meant to be shown, it would be helpful if some further explanation were offered. Otherwise, I'm missing it. Having said all this, I still very much approve of the original idea. It is simply its explication through the proposed diagrams that I find problematic. -- Franklin --------------------------------------------------------- On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Franklin Ransom < [email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, Gary F, Ben, > > I like Jeff's suggestion very much. It seems to me a a more developed > interpretation of the point that Ben had suggested, taking it in the other > direction--instead of showing how propositions and arguments can be turned > into terms through erasure, we assume instead that propositions and > arguments already admit of at least one more blank left to be determined, > and they would be like rhemes in this respect. > > I don't really have time at the moment to get into the deeper analysis > shown in the attachments. I'll say something later if I find the time to > dig into it. > > -- Franklin > > On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:48 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary F., Ben, Franklin, List, >> >> Off the top of my head, I would think that there is a straightforward way >> of interpreting the passage: “every proposition and every argument can be >> regarded as a term”. What is, at one stage of inquiry, a fully formed and >> isolated proposition (i.e., medadic in form), can be, a later stage, a >> term-like part of a larger proposition. It will function as a rheme when >> the medadic proposition gains a new bonding site and is then connected to >> other things in a larger proposition or argument. The same is true for an >> argument. Whole arguments can be embedded as parts in a larger proposition >> and thereby function as rhemes in relation to the other parts of a >> proposition. Doesn't this take place, for instance, when a number of >> perceptual judgments are colligated into a single premiss in a larger >> argument? Each perceptual judgement is initially expressive of a >> proposition. Later, when they are colligated into a single premiss, each >> perceptual judgment is really functioning as a rheme in a larger >> proposition--which is really a premiss in a larger argument. >> >> Or, let's put the point more precisely in the terms of the mature sign >> theory. Every triadic relation that is formed between qualisign, immediate >> object and immediate interpretant is, as a triad, something that can (as a >> token) function as an indexical sinsign in relation to a dynamical object >> and dynamical interpretant. Together, these two connected and nested >> triads compose a perceptual judgment. In turn, a number of these perceptual >> judgments can be colligated together to form the content of the symbolic >> legisign that is brought into relation to the dynamical object and final >> interpretant in an argument. >> >> Putting things in such terms doesn't always help to make the points much >> clearer. As such, I've attached a couple of diagrams that I'm using to >> think about the relations between the signs, objects and interpretants in >> the classification of the 66 different kinds of signs and sign relations. >> My suggestion is that the triad on the left is joined to the triad in the >> middle by serving as the sign term, and the same holds true for the >> relation between the triad in the middle and the triad on the right. I've >> tried to picture this in the second diagram using colored and dashed >> circles to show that the triad one the left is serving as the sign in the >> triad to its right. The process I've sketched by nesting the dashed >> circles is an overly simplified version of the more complex relations that >> must obtain when we consider all the different types of signs and sign >> relations that are needed for the process of interpretation to be possible. >> >> This way of diagramming sign relations is different from the way these >> relations have been represented by other interpreters of the texts (e.g., >> Nadin, Merkle, Johansen and Lizka). As far as I can see, this set of >> diagrams more faithfully represents the kinds of relations Peirce is >> describing in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my >> categories from within," the essays on the nomenclature and division of >> dyadic and triad relations, the discussion of dichotomic and trichotomic >> relations in "The Simplest Mathematics," The Logic of Relations (CP 3.456), >> The Reader is Introduced to Relatives in The Critic of Arguments (CP >> 3.415), etc. >> >> --Jeff >> >> Jeff Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> NAU >> (o) 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> >> >> > On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 2:46 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Franklin, > thank you very much for yor friendly attention! > The three volumes are called: "Semiotische Schriften" (Semiotical > Writings), Koesel / Pape, Suhrkamp 2000, and contain writings and lectures > by Peirce. I think, they exist in English too, but in the English edition, > Pape does not belong to the editors, I think. I do not have them now, as I > had borrowed them from the public library, but I will buy them. Buying the > collected papers is too expensive, I think, they cost about some thousand > euros / dollars. I like very much the online dictionary "Commens" from > Helsinki. and of course, the Guide for the perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. > Secondary literature I have read is eg. by Wilhelm Nöth ("Semiotik", I > think, and Nina Ort "Reflexionslogik"). > I think, the two aspects of a sign that I have suggested, are not the > dynamical and the immediate object. I meant, that a sign has two aspects: > The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is about. But to > be able to do this, the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as > well. Both aspects have both, a dynamical, and an immediate object. I > think, this is quite trivial, there is not much about it. I have only > talked about it to say, that in this respect, an argument also contains a > proposition and a term, because this was the question of the thread. For > example, the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot > fly". The dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like > this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason. The > immediate object is the idea, why it is like this, conveyed by the sign. > Now why does this argument contain a proposition? The proposition is: " > "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly" is an argument". This > proposition is something, the recipient of the sign has to make, in order > to know, that he has to cope with an argument. This proposition is formed > by abduction, induction, and deduction (that was the topic in the other > thread), and has to do with the fact, that there is a string of letters, > interrupted by spaces, and with the word "so", and so on. In this > self-presenting signification of the sign, the dynamical object is the > sign-class this sign belongs to, and the immediate object is the sign > itself. So the sign is self-referring in the way, that it is its own > immediate object. It has to say: "I am an argument", to be understood as > such. It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or > "therefore". So an argument contains a term. This is quite trivial, I have > only mentioned it, as I was thinking of in what manner might an argument > imply a proposition and a term. In the other thread it was about the > question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell > eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without > a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this > consideration is a deduction. Phew- as I said, I donot want to cause a > confusion- but I cant help to do, sorry. > Best, > Helmut > > 14. November 2015 um 19:13 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Helmut, > > I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking > it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to > gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it > original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both? > > I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though > reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your > interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with > in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into > Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture > over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of > interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to > read a lot more before participating. > > I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1, > "Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a > proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself, > this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this, > if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that > matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the > thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a > sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a > triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly > represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from > the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that > there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of > representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it > represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents > its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object > itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would > be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all > then, but simply the thing itself. > > But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements", > p.321, Peirce writes: > > "It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at > least in the only sense in which a thing that has no *real being* but > only *being represented*, and which exists in *replica*, can be said to > be identical with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a > map of itself; that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. > But this does not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example > of a symbol of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is > expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol > whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol > considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; > and in denoting it, it *is* that very thing, or a fragment of it taken > for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the > purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its > whole." > > Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced > than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is > saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the > symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this > case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's > as if we took the symbol "pencil" and then instanced an actual pencil as a > replica of the symbol. I don't think this makes the symbol able to > represent itself though; after all, if the map has a replica that is the > object mapped, how does the object mapped qua replica of the map represent > in turn the map? We could say there is a likeness of the object to the map. > But that would be as an icon, not as the symbol that the map is. > > In the case of "the Truth" or "Universe of Being," I take it that the > symbol in some sense represents itself, but it is not the whole of what it > represents; it is a fragment or part of the whole that is represented. > > For a more developed account of the matter, consider an argument given by > Frederik Stjernfelt in his Natural Propositions, which book was discussed > on the list at length some months ago. I'll finish with this quote from the > text, and only offer it since it seems you are interested in this issue. > NP, p.68 (italics and brackets from the original): > > "The syntax of the proposition is also the starting-point of the > investigation of its interpretant in *Syllabus*. The object of the > Dicisign, of course, is the entity referred to by the subject. The > interpretant is not merely the predicate, but the claim, made possible by > the syntax, that the predicate actually holds about an existing object: > > '...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or > genuine Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's > real object.' (*Syllabus*, 1903, EPII, 276; 2.310) > > This leads Peirce to the surprising conclusion that--since the object of > the interpretant is the same as that of the sign itself--this existential > relation between Dicisign and object forms, *in itself*, part of the > object of the Dicisign. Consequently, the Dicisign has *two* objects; > one, primary, is the object referred to--another, secondary, is the very > reference relation claimed to exist between the Dicisign and that object: > > 'Hence this same existential relation [between Sign and Object] must be > an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real Object. This > represented existential relation, in being an Object of the Dicisign, makes > that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an Object of > the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the *Primary > Object*, the other being termed the *Secondary Object*.' (*Syllabus*, > 1903, EPII 276; 2.310) > > What is here called Primary/Secondary object is what is later developed > into the doctrine of Dynamic/Immediate Object, cf. below. Correspondingly, > the predicate part describes some character of the Primary Object--at the > same time as it depicts the indexical relation which the Dicisign claims to > hold between itself and its object. This is, in short, the truth claim of > the proposition--which can be analyzed as the Dicisign saying there exists > indeed an indexical relation between itself and its object. This is why the > Dicisign, in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one > referring to the object, and the other--the predicate--referring to the > relation between the sign itself and the object." > > So perhaps, Helmut, you might be looking for the concept of the Immediate > Object, which, in being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the > Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the > Immediate Object is internal to the sign. > > I hope this helps. > > -- Franklin > > --------------------------------------- > > > > On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> Franklin, >> I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens >> dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more >> before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by >> this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign >> belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, >> objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like >> self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a >> proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took >> "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the >> talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a >> special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have >> read much more by Peirce. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 14. November 2015 um 04:10 Uhr >> "Franklin Ransom" <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Helmut, >> >> I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is >> partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the >> dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical >> object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, >> externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the >> sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an >> object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object >> is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd >> almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, >> but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested >> in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in >> discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how >> acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, >> starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common >> ground for discussing these ideas. >> >> -- Franklin >> >> ------------------------------------------------- >> >> On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Franklin, Gary, list, >>> I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object >>> concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what >>> kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there >>> is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / >>> objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument >>> transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the >>> inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written >>> such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, >>> just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont >>> know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody. >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> 13. November 2015 um 21:01 Uhr >>> "Franklin Ransom" <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Gary F, list, >>> >>> Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on >>> Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, >>> of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. >>> >>> I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word >>> "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think >>> that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply >>> propositions. >>> >>> But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain >>> the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be >>> somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where >>> Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, >>> and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. >>> Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments >>> may be regarded as propositions. >>> >>> In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign >>> cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to >>> form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). >>> >>> In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear >>> that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" >>> have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is >>> true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no >>> meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the >>> information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic >>> propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;* >>> its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not >>> used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the >>> case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the >>> case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term >>> appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the >>> term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of >>> the proposition as its subject. >>> >>> Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount >>> to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth >>> given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are >>> such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that >>> are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very >>> practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies >>> what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with >>> respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. >>> >>> That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be >>> regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are >>> relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. >>> Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main >>> subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple >>> of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to >>> explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and >>> then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. >>> And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be >>> regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused >>> around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has >>> consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms >>> and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the >>> structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very >>> universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to >>> express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly >>> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect >>> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" >>> (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the >>> proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all >>> signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of >>> whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign. >>> >>> Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, >>> we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so >>> far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is >>> the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the >>> judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the >>> judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely >>> to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but >>> we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the >>> judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant >>> the judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the >>> man-symbol to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in >>> the same way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition >>> in communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the >>> interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a >>> term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it >>> expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does. >>> >>> --Franklin >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you >>>> ask, >>>> >>>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions >>>> and not signs? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New >>>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his >>>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the >>>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), >>>> and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the >>>> proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. >>>> predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term >>>> which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and >>>> depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the >>>> proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can >>>> *be* a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a >>>> proposition), but it can’t *have* a predicate. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential* >>>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only >>>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a >>>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never >>>> used alone, and would have no meaning by itself.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary f. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. >>>> Bateson] { >>>> >>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:[email protected]] >>>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27 >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary F, list, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage >>>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them >>>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either, >>>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something >>>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and >>>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth >>>> of propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the >>>> way depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real >>>> objects is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If >>>> Peirce still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions >>>> had to do with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of >>>> things to which it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of >>>> things in which it is true", respectively, that is certainly very different >>>> from what is being explained in KS. Did he change his views here? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, >>>> in the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same >>>> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a >>>> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, >>>> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a >>>> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, >>>> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is >>>> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an >>>> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to >>>> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly >>>> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect >>>> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this >>>> language) would be the very Universe." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of >>>> the same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in >>>> fact have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and >>>> signs in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying >>>> characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it >>>> seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign >>>> whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there >>>> would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about >>>> the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every >>>> sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to >>>> propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Franklin >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >>> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >>> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >> go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >> in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
