"Franklin Ransom" <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
Franklin,thank you very much for yor friendly attention!The three volumes are called: "Semiotische Schriften" (Semiotical Writings), Koesel / Pape, Suhrkamp 2000, and contain writings and lectures by Peirce. I think, they exist in English too, but in the English edition, Pape does not belong to the editors, I think. I do not have them now, as I had borrowed them from the public library, but I will buy them. Buying the collected papers is too expensive, I think, they cost about some thousand euros / dollars. I like very much the online dictionary "Commens" from Helsinki. and of course, the Guide for the perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. Secondary literature I have read is eg. by Wilhelm Nöth ("Semiotik", I think, and Nina Ort "Reflexionslogik").I think, the two aspects of a sign that I have suggested, are not the dynamical and the immediate object. I meant, that a sign has two aspects: The first is the meaning of the sign, that what the sign is about. But to be able to do this, the sign has to present itself, so, be about itself as well. Both aspects have both, a dynamical, and an immediate object. I think, this is quite trivial, there is not much about it. I have only talked about it to say, that in this respect, an argument also contains a proposition and a term, because this was the question of the thread. For example, the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly". The dynamical object of this argument is the reason why it is like this, in nature, and also the common knowledge about this reason. The immediate object is the idea, why it is like this, conveyed by the sign. Now why does this argument contain a proposition? The proposition is: " "Penguins have very small wings, so they cannot fly" is an argument". This proposition is something, the recipient of the sign has to make, in order to know, that he has to cope with an argument. This proposition is formed by abduction, induction, and deduction (that was the topic in the other thread), and has to do with the fact, that there is a string of letters, interrupted by spaces, and with the word "so", and so on. In this self-presenting signification of the sign, the dynamical object is the sign-class this sign belongs to, and the immediate object is the sign itself. So the sign is self-referring in the way, that it is its own immediate object. It has to say: "I am an argument", to be understood as such. It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or "therefore". So an argument contains a term. This is quite trivial, I have only mentioned it, as I was thinking of in what manner might an argument imply a proposition and a term. In the other thread it was about the question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this consideration is a deduction. Phew- as I said, I donot want to cause a confusion- but I cant help to do, sorry.Best,HelmutHelmut,I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both?I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to read a lot more before participating.I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1, "Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself, this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this, if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all then, but simply the thing itself.But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements", p.321, Peirce writes:"It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at least in the only sense in which a thing that has no real being but only being represented, and which exists in replica, can be said to be identical with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a map of itself; that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. But this does not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example of a symbol of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; and in denoting it, it is that very thing, or a fragment of it taken for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its whole."Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this case the replica is not itself a sign; at least, not a sign of itself. It's as if we took the symbol "pencil" and then instanced an actual pencil as a replica of the symbol. I don't think this makes the symbol able to represent itself though; after all, if the map has a replica that is the object mapped, how does the object mapped qua replica of the map represent in turn the map? We could say there is a likeness of the object to the map. But that would be as an icon, not as the symbol that the map is.In the case of "the Truth" or "Universe of Being," I take it that the symbol in some sense represents itself, but it is not the whole of what it represents; it is a fragment or part of the whole that is represented.For a more developed account of the matter, consider an argument given by Frederik Stjernfelt in his Natural Propositions, which book was discussed on the list at length some months ago. I'll finish with this quote from the text, and only offer it since it seems you are interested in this issue. NP, p.68 (italics and brackets from the original):"The syntax of the proposition is also the starting-point of the investigation of its interpretant in Syllabus. The object of the Dicisign, of course, is the entity referred to by the subject. The interpretant is not merely the predicate, but the claim, made possible by the syntax, that the predicate actually holds about an existing object:'...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object.' (Syllabus, 1903, EPII, 276; 2.310)This leads Peirce to the surprising conclusion that--since the object of the interpretant is the same as that of the sign itself--this existential relation between Dicisign and object forms, in itself, part of the object of the Dicisign. Consequently, the Dicisign has two objects; one, primary, is the object referred to--another, secondary, is the very reference relation claimed to exist between the Dicisign and that object:'Hence this same existential relation [between Sign and Object] must be an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real Object. This represented existential relation, in being an Object of the Dicisign, makes that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an Object of the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary Object, the other being termed the Secondary Object.' (Syllabus, 1903, EPII 276; 2.310)What is here called Primary/Secondary object is what is later developed into the doctrine of Dynamic/Immediate Object, cf. below. Correspondingly, the predicate part describes some character of the Primary Object--at the same time as it depicts the indexical relation which the Dicisign claims to hold between itself and its object. This is, in short, the truth claim of the proposition--which can be analyzed as the Dicisign saying there exists indeed an indexical relation between itself and its object. This is why the Dicisign, in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring to the object, and the other--the predicate--referring to the relation between the sign itself and the object."So perhaps, Helmut, you might be looking for the concept of the Immediate Object, which, in being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the Immediate Object is internal to the sign.I hope this helps.-- Franklin-------------------------------------------------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin,I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have read much more by Peirce.Best,HelmutHelmut,I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for discussing these ideas.-- Franklin------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Franklin, Gary, list,I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody.Best,HelmutGary F, list,----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague.I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions.But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions.In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to form such an argument" (EP2, p.308).In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject; its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions. In the case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the proposition as its subject.Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general.That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign.Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does.--Franklin-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and not signs?
I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can be a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t have a predicate.
Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has potential breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only potential depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like man “is never used alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
Gary f.
} The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G. Bateson] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: 8-Nov-15 15:27
Gary F, list,
I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either, so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's, characters, I call an interpretant of A. What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe."
Note that every sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters.
How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs?
Franklin
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .