Jeff, list, Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were > attached to the email. The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete. > There are a large number of divisions that need to be considered, and the > labels on the diagrams I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions > about how we might understand a relatively small number of the different > classes of signs/.
Oh, certainly. The task is really monumental, and you have my sympathy and support with trying to get it all worked out. My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was to > ask how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of > cognition are related to those at another higher level of cognition. As > such, I asked how the relations between the percept, qualisign and > immediate interpretant on the left part of the diagram fit with the > relations between the sinsign, dynamical object and dynamical interpretant > in the middle, and I then ask the same kind of question about the relations > between legisign, dynamical object and final interpretant on the right. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'higher' level of cognition. Do you mean a cognition, more fully developed? Or do you mean two cognitions occurring at the same time, in which the lower one somehow is serving or participating in the higher one? I wonder about that because of the way you split things up. I am somewhat curious about it and why you did it the way you did. But then I see you go on to remark about that. In doing so, was trying to ask the following question: When an > interpretant at a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, > is it only the interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the > whole complex of sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of > the sign? One reason I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that > the interpretant itself involves the triadic relation between its object > and the sign it is interpreting. As such, if only the interpretant is > serving as the sign at the next higher level, then we are leaving out of > the picture an essential part of what makes the interpretant the kind of > thing it is. This is tricky. We know that the (original) sign is supposed to determine the interpreter to be determined in such a way as to be in relation to the object in the way in which the sign is itself determined by the object. So there is a question there: If the interpreter becomes so determined, is there any necessity for the original sign now? Since the interpreter (new sign) is determined to the object in the same way the original sign was, perhaps this is enough, and the interpreter doesn't need the original sign. To take an example for explaining this, we could consider how often we hear arguments in favor of a certain conclusion, the conclusion becomes adopted, we now act upon that conclusion as a proposition believed, but then we forget about the arguments that originally brought us to this believed proposition. Also consider the case of perceptual judgment. Typically, we just won't remember all the various percepts that determined the judgment in us; we just remember the judgment. It simplifies things, and it's supposed to, because such simplification facilitates the work of thought, and consequently action. Now, I take it you are suggesting that from the standpoint of conscious awareness, this might all be true; but really, the original signs never go away. That might be a tough argument to make. Could you come up with some examples that make this case seem likely? I could see one making an argument from continuity, perhaps. Perhaps. It's not clear to me. Going back to the point about the "interpretant at a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level," I'm still not sure what this amounts to. I would think this means the fuller development of a cognition. But, when I observe your diagrams, and your remarks above regarding the diagrams, I feel as though something else is going on. I don't understand why you think there are these three triads, in which one is contained in the other, and the other in the last, or what this has to do with the interpretant still having the original sign as part of the interpretant's functioning as its own sign. If I were to hazard a guess, the immediate interpretant becomes a sign with a dynamic interpretant, and then then the dynamic interpretant becomes a sign with a final interpretant. But because, as you suggest, the interpretant must involve the whole previous sign-object-interpretant relation, it's not simply the immediate interpretant, but the whole thing, that becomes the sign with a dynamic interpretant, and then not just the dynamic interpretant, but the whole relation yet again, which becomes the sign with a final interpretant. So far as I can tell, this is what you are up to, from the diagram and what you just remarked about it. Well, what I have to say to this idea, supposing I've got it right, is that I'm not really sure what to say. My first inclination was that this is simply wrong. But then I pondered it, and realized what you are getting at. At least, I understand the picture and how it makes sense of some things about the development of cognition. But at the moment, I'm thinking that since the ten-trichotomy system has the presentative aspect of the sign as one of the trichotomies, and the immediate, dynamic, and final interpretants all have their own trichotomies, and yet all these trichotomies go into any given sign classification for the sixty-six classes, it is likely not the case that the interpretive process is nested in the way you have been suggesting with your diagram. Otherwise, why wouldn't we consider the presentative aspect of the sign as simply being all three possibilities. It seems your diagram even suggests that all three presentative aspects must be present, one in each of the three triads given in the diagram. But in the sixty-six classes, I don't think it works this way; each presentative aspect still gets matched up with all nine of the other trichotomies, not just two each. Moreover, the presentative aspect plays a big role in determining which category applies in all the other trichotomies. If the presentative aspect is in the category of Firstness, then every other trichotomy must follow suit. Consequently, a qualisign and rheme is the only possibility; no sinsign, no legisign, no dicent, no argument. I don't see how you can account for this in the diagram you have produced. If you could explain how your approach could deal with these considerations, that would certainly make a much stronger case for it. With respect to what you have to say about the percipuum: He tells us, in a footnote, that he formed each of these terms on the model > of how Praecipuum was formed from Praecipio. I see you rounded up some definitions after that. However, I think that the formation of the terms is straightforwardly about the way the letters get arranged, rather than any sort of analogy from how praecipuum relates to praecipio to how percipuum relates to percipio. Maybe you didn't mean to suggest he meant an analogy, but that's the idea I got from the listing of the definitions. I just want to say I think it's not about an analogy, just linguistic morphism. (Unless the footnote explicitly says it's about an analogy?) Of course, that still leaves us with the problem of the percipuum, and the definitions with respect to perception are still very much relevant for that cause. However, I'm not sure how helpful they will be. Setting them aside, I find myself liking your suggestion, viz. your hunch that the percipuum is a continuous process of interpretation and the percept and perceptual judgment are parts of that process. At the same time, I think you're right that we need to consider the relations between antecipuum, ponecipuum, and percipuum. Unfortunately, I'm not well aware of the former two ideas (not having read "On Telepathy" yet, just the excerpts from the commens), so I'm not sure what those relations are. Perhaps it would be helpful if you discussed them, and maybe I could offer some help interpreting them. I'm not really into the idea of reading the piece at this time for myself, but perhaps I'll end up doing that. Anyway, with respect to your suggestion about what the percipuum is, although I like it, I remain cautious. I had an experience in a class with Andre De Tienne on Peirce's semiotics about this very idea. When discussing ideas for our term papers, I was planning to talk about abduction and perceptual judgment. I mentioned the percipuum in this context, with respect to the percept and the perceptual judgment, and he cautioned me that there is more going on with the percipuum. Because of that experience, I remain cautious of trying to apply this idea of the continuous process with percept and perceptual judgment, because it was that very idea he cautioned me about. This is not really any argument against the idea, but I have the greatest respect for his judgment when it comes to all things Peirce. Then again, I could be mis-remembering, though I don't think so. Perhaps this is all just to say, it would probably be best to bring out the ideas of antecipuum and ponecipuum, and consider in fuller detail with respect to them what might be going on with the percipuum. -- Franklin ------------------------------------------ On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Franklin, List, > > Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were > attached to the email. The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete. > There are a large number of divisions that need to be considered, and the > labels on the diagrams I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions > about how we might understand a relatively small number of the different > classes of signs/. > > My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was > to ask how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of > cognition are related to those at another higher level of cognition. As > such, I asked how the relations between the percept, qualisign and > immediate interpretant on the left part of the diagram fit with the > relations between the sinsign, dynamical object and dynamical interpretant > in the middle, and I then ask the same kind of question about the relations > between legisign, dynamical object and final interpretant on the right. > > In doing so, was trying to ask the following question: When an > interpretant at a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, > is it only the interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the > whole complex of sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of > the sign? One reason I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that > the interpretant itself involves the triadic relation between its object > and the sign it is interpreting. As such, if only the interpretant is > serving as the sign at the next higher level, then we are leaving out of > the picture an essential part of what makes the interpretant the kind of > thing it is. > > The example I was considering draws on the formation of perceptual > judgments from percepts. You cite a passage that is telling: "Perhaps I > might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both percept and > perceptual judgment." (7.629) In what sense does the percipuum include the > other two? My hunch is that the percipuum is taken to be a continuous > process of interpretation--and that percept and perceptual judgments are > taken to be parts of that process. In order to spell out how that process > might take shape, we would need to consider the relations between > antecipuum, ponecipuum and percipuum. Towards this end, let's consider > what Peirce means by this technical term. He tells us, in a footnote, that > he formed each of these terms on the model of how Praecipuum was formed > from Praecipio. > > Here are the definitions of the Latin terms: > 1. Praecipio: to advise, give counsel, give rules, instruct, teach > 2. Praecipuum (Roman law): a portion received from an inheritance > before general distribution > > What does this teach us about the relationships between the following > definitions and the definition of the percipuum? > > 3. Percipio: to understand, to be aware of the meaning of, observe, take > possession of > > 4. Perceive: 1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of > some object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; > to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind (commonly upon > the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential > > 5. Percept: the immediate object in perception > > 6. Perception: 1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of > the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the > operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or > resulting construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue > of a real action of an object upon the mind. > > The last three definitions are given by Peirce in the Century Dictionary. > So, how should we understand Peirce's technical term "Percipuum?" > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > ________________________________ >
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