> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:03 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> 
> wrote:
> 
> On Nov 19, 2015, at 2:42 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> 
>> Peirce just doesn’t see the whole universe in those terms unlike Leibniz or 
>> Spinoza.
> 
> Your judgment is hard for me accept.
> 
> I could argue that CSP not only sees the whole universe, but he see's it with 
> the exquisite details available only to those that have mastered the chemical 
> symbol system, it's logic and its extension to life itself. 

I was more thinking in terms of his fairly explicit writing on fundamental 
ontology. While I confess it’s these areas I find Peirce most speculative and 
hardest to take seriously, they are there.

Again I’d point people to Kelly Parker’s work on this in “Peirce as 
neoPlatonist.” While there are one or two places I have some problems with the 
paper, overall it’s hard to argue with that this forms an important aspect of 
Peirce’s cosmology.

http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html 
<http://agora.phi.gvsu.edu/kap/Neoplatonism/csp-plot.html>

The key passage from Peirce I think relevant to your questions is this one:

Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have come 
something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by 
the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would 
not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because 
resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and 
more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into 
something like a continuous flow. 

The quasi-flow which would result would, however, differ essentially from time 
in this respect, that it would not necessarily be in a single stream. Different 
flashes might start different streams, between which there should be no 
relations of contemporaneity or succession. So one stream might branch into 
two, or two might coalesce. But the further result of habit would inevitably be 
to separate utterly those that were long separated, and to make those which 
presented frequent common points coalesce into perfect union. Those that were 
completely separated would be so many different worlds which would know nothing 
of one another; so that the effect would be just what we actually observe. (CP 
1.412)

Again we needn’t accept Peirce on this but I don’t think we can dismiss it as a 
part of Peirce’s thinking. (Recognizing we need to keep clear dates for the 
various writings)

Now whether we take this as quanta obtaining continuum or in other phenomena 
continuum achieving quanta seems a slightly different issue. Peirce sees habits 
as the ontological underpinning of what we’d call matter and I’d call the 
measurable. Whether we can as a practical matter relate this more neoPlatonic 
ontology to the practical requirements of contemporary quantum field theory is 
yet still an other matter.

I should note that this paper of Parker’s is tied to his book on Peirce, The 
Continuity of Peirce’s Thought. It’s an interesting introduction to Peirce as 
well as a focus on Peirce’s notion of continuity. I find it very good although 
not as technical as some others on the same subject (like say Zalamea’s)
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