Hi Jeff,
You wrote:
"Kant claims that the singular, particular and universal quantities are the
fundamental modes of quantity that are essential for all demonstrative
arguments. Based on his work on the conceptions involved in working with
various sorts of quantitative relations, Peirce argues that the really
crucial idea is not any particular quantitative ordering (ordinal,
cardinal, etc.) Rather, it is the conception of a quanta itself. This
much was well appreciated by the classical thinkers, including Aristotle
and Euclid. In order to make comparisons based on considerations of
quanta, we need to be able to order the things that are being treated as a
quanta in a way that allows for transitivity. Peirce's argument about what
is necessary for putting the things we are thinking about in a transitive
ordering so that comparisons can be made are found in his long--and rather
technical--discussions of quantity."
The mention of "quanta" in this paragraph, of course, reminded me of
the *quantization
of energy *discovered by Planck in 1900 when he derived his radiation
formula that fitted the blackbody radiation spectra (which are long tailed
histograms).
I think it is fair to say that the idea of "quantization" did not penetrate
into the biomedical science community until 2008-2014 when I generalized
Planck's radiation formula in the form of what I now call the "Planckian
distribution equation (PDE)" and showed that PDE fitted histograms
(including blackbody radiation spectra) generated from all branches of
biomedical sciences [1, 2]. One of the consequences of these findings is
that the *quantization phenomenon* is not confined to quantum physics but
occurs in biomedical sciences as well (e.g., protein folding, enzyme
catalysis, cell metabolism, decision making, speech, music, etc.). In
fact, I was led to conclude that,
"*Without quantization, no counting, no organization, nor comparison*."
(120915-1)
All the best.
Sung
References:
[1] Ji, S. (2015) Planckian distributions in molecular machines, living
cell, and brains: The wave-particle duality in biomedical sciences,
in: *Proceedings
of the International Conference **on Biology and Biomedical
Engineering, *Vienna,
March 15-17, 2015, pp. 115-137. Uploaded to ResearchGate in March, 2015
[2] Ji, S. (2015) Planckian information (IP): A new measure of order
in atoms, enzymes, cells, brains, human societies and the cosmos. In:
Unified Field Mechanics: Natural Science Beyond the Veil of Spacetime (R.
L. Amoroso, P. Rowlands & L. H. Kauffman, eds.), World Scientific, New
Jersey. Pp. 579-589.
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
> Hi Gary F., List,
>
> G.F: Perhaps, but I think it’s better to take each essay in its own terms
> first before trying to map them onto each other.
>
> J.D. I appreciate the approach of taking each essay on its own terms
> first--especially when it comes to helping those who are relatively new to
> Peirce learn how to work carefully with the texts themselves--rather than
> to run off to their own ideas thought about in their own terms. If that is
> your goal, then it might make sense to pick an early published essay such
> as "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" as the piece
> that will be used for such pedagogical purposes. NDTR is a pretty tough
> essay to be reading in such a manner.
>
> For those of us who have read through this and related pieces a number of
> times, and who have read spent more hours fretting over the details of what
> Peirce says than we might care to admit, I do think there are good reasons
> to put some of the key pieces together in other essays--even if it is only
> a few at a time. Let me offer an example: when it comes to reading NDTR,
> I think it helps to frame the discussion in terms of the methods that were
> laid out in the run up to "On a New List of the Categories," and then to
> follow Peirce's lead in the way he develops those ideas in that early set
> of essays in the Cognition series.
>
> First and foremost, we need to draw on Peirce's account of reasoning,
> which has three basic levels to the discussion: self-controlled arguments,
> propositions, and terms. Unlike many philosophers, such as Kant and
> Russell, who say that we should start with the question of what is
> necessary to assert that a proposition is true, Peirce is asking us to
> focus first and foremost on the level of valid arguments. The question of
> what is necessary for the different forms of argument to be valid controls
> the kinds of explanations that can be given about the nature of
> propositions--and the same point holds when it comes to terms as parts of
> propositions. There are many advantages to this more holistic method that
> Peirce is using for the sake of developing a philosophical logic.
>
> So, in asking, "What are the basic kinds of signs when we consider them in
> their mode of apprehension?," we should arrive at the conclusion by seeing
> what role signs having the character of qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns
> have in the various kinds of propositions that function as premisses or
> conclusions in abductive, inductive or deductive forms of argument.
> Initially, we don't even need a theory of valid inference in order to work
> in such a manner. Rather, we can rely on examples drawn from common
> experience. Our logica utens is able to supply us with the most important
> kinds of observations that we need for the sake of improving on the the
> kind of logical grammar that has been developed thus far in Peirce's
> earlier writings on the nature of signs and sign relations.
>
> Let me ask: what is the role of the qualisign in an abductive inference?
> The answer, I think, is that simple things such as the qualisigns that
> consist of the quality of a feeling of yellow or green (considered in
> isolation from the parts they might play in symbolic expressions) can't
> serve as premisses in such self-controlled arguments. All self controlled
> arguments require propositions expressed in symbolic terms. Do the
> inferences giving rise to perceptual judgments require that the premisses
> be stated in symbols? The answer is no, I think. When a young child who
> does not yet have symbolic expressions for "pillow," "chair," "yellow' and
> "green," looks at a green pillow on a yellow chair, the child sees the same
> thing that we see. It is not as if the pillow on the chair initially are
> seen by the child quite darkly, or that it is a buzzing confusion of colors
> and shapes, and then, over time the colors are turned up and order is
> brought to the confusion once the concepts are understood in symbolic
> terms. Rather, gaining the ability to use conventional symbols enables the
> child to focus his attention more clearly on various parts of the pillow
> and chair--and to communicate what his attention is focused on with greater
> clarity to others.
>
> From the early period in his work on the nature of representations, Peirce
> saw a need to draw on the accounts of argument, propositions, and terms in
> the philosophical theory of valid inference for the sake of generalizing on
> those conceptions. What is necessary for a sign to be used in the manner
> that is necessary for making inferences to perceptual judgments? Whatever
> answer we give, Peirce insists that we treat the inference to the
> perceptual judgment as a valid inference--even if it is not
> self-controlled. Based on prior studies of self controlled inference, we
> know that considerations of quantity are really important in such
> inferences. We make assertions about *this* particular pillow, or about
> *some* chairs, or about *all* pillows resting on chairs. Kant claims that
> the singular, particular and universal quantities are the fundamental modes
> of quantity that are essential for all demonstrative arguments. Based on
> his work on the conceptions involved in working with various sorts of
> quantitative relations, Peirce argues that the really crucial idea is not
> any particular quantitative ordering (ordinal, cardinal, etc.) Rather, it
> is the conception of a quanta itself. This much was well appreciated by
> the classical thinkers, including Aristotle and Euclid. In order to make
> comparisons based on considerations of quanta, we need to be able to order
> the things that are being treated as a quanta in a way that allows for
> transitivity. Peirce's argument about what is necessary for putting the
> things we are thinking about in a transitive ordering so that comparisons
> can be made are found in his long--and rather technical--discussions of
> quantity.
>
> Let's leave the details to the side (despite the fact that I believe they
> will matter much), and see if it is possible to shed some light on Peirce's
> claim that the qualisign, sinsign and legisign are essential modes in which
> signs can be apprehended. Why are they essential, and not some other
> list? The quick answer is that they are essential for the very possibility
> of a sign being significant. The more drawn out answer will require that
> we explain why these modes of apprehension are necessary for the very
> possibility of making any sort of valid inference--self controlled or
> otherwise. So, let me ask: why are these three modes of apprehension of a
> sign--of any sort, regardless of what kind of object and interpretant is
> related to--essential for the very possibility of expressing something that
> is significant or of inferring some conclusion in a manner that is valid?
> That, I take it, is what Peirce is asserting in the opening pages of NDTR.
> We know this because he has already told us that this is the way he is
> setting up his arguments in the speculative grammar. Articulating the
> suppressed parts of the arguments is, on my reading of the text, necessary
> to understand what the conclusions really amount to. After all, all we
> have to go on otherwise is some fancy technical terminology and some rather
> thin examples that really supply us with little more than some hints so
> that we can work with vague conceptions. The technical terms and the
> examples offering hints are offered for the purposes of using the method
> ourselves as we seek to understand the underlying arguments. That method
> draws, as Peirce points out on the opening page, on the phenomenological
> analysis of the observations that are taken to be central to this
> investigation. This is something that each of us needs to do for
> ourselves. It will be tough to follow in his footsteps as we analyze the
> observations for ourselves if it isn't clear what observations we supposed
> to be drawing on or what it is that we trying to explain as we frame
> explanations that are meant to explain things we haven't yet been able to
> explain in the speculative grammar with much success up to this point.
>
> --Jeff
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> ________________________________________
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
> Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 10:39 AM
> To: 'Peirce-L'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Jeff, some responses interleaved …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 7-Dec-15 15:35
>
>
> Gary F., Gary R., List,
>
>
>
> Sorry for the errors in transcribing Nathan's table. I put it into my
> notes, and then added a bunch of ideas myself, and then tried to subtract
> what I had added and managed to subtract the wrong terms. Having said
> that, let me ask: where in the texts will I find this table? My
> assumption is that the table isn't taken from any particular text, but that
> Nathan put it together based on suggestions Peirce makes in a number of
> places.
>
>
>
> GF: Yes, I think so, but the primary source for Table 6.2 seems to be MS
> 478, i.e. “Sundry Logical Conceptions” in EP2.
>
>
>
> JD: If the latter is the case, then I think I get the general gist of what
> he is trying to do, but I'm not able to see how he arrived at the
> particularities of this list. It is quite possible I'm missing something
> obvious, in which case I am hoping that someone will straighten me out.
> Otherwise, if I'm missing something less obvious, then I'm still hoping to
> get pointed in the right direction.
>
>
>
> My aim was to make sense of what Peirce says about more and less
> degenerate and genuine forms of the universal categories in the Lowell
> Lectures. So far, I'm not able to tease out what Peirce is doing there
> with any confidence. My hope was to turn to a secondary source, like
> Nathan's essay, for some guidance. Thus far, I'm not able to map what
> Nathan says onto Peirce's remarks about these more and less degenerate
> forms. So, I'm still puzzled.
>
>
>
> GF: I think Nathan’s essay is a good one, for the most part (though I
> don’t like some of the examples he gives for the ten classes of signs). But
> it’s not an essay intended for Peirceans, so he doesn’t bother to cite
> exact sources.
>
>
>
> JD: The reason I was turning to the remarks about the different forms of
> the universal categories is that I thought it might give us insight into
> how Peirce is drawing from the phenomenology as he classifies the different
> sorts of signs and sign relations in NDTR. At the start of the essay,
> Peirce says that triadic relations can be divided into 1) Triadic relations
> of comparison, 2) Triadic relations of performance, and 3) Triadic
> relations of thought. This fits, I think, with points he makes about the
> laws of comparison in his account of genuine triadic relations in "The
> Logic of Mathematics." As such, I'm just trying to draw on those remarks
> about the requirements for making comparisons for the sake of interpreting
> the first division between kinds of signs in NDTR. The comments Peirce
> makes in this essay about the first division of signs won't seem very
> puzzling if taken in isolation. When read in light of these other essays,
> however, I think there are puzzles a plenty.
>
>
>
> GF: Perhaps, but I think it’s better to take each essay in its own terms
> first before trying to map them onto each other. That method makes it
> easier, in my opinion, to distinguish between mere terminological
> variations and deeper conceptual differences.
>
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
>
> Associate Professor
>
> Department of Philosophy
>
> Northern Arizona University
>
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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