Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, List,
You wrote: *GF*: I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term “trichotomies." *GR*: For one thing, there are so many 'trichotomies' in Peirce's semiotic, and very, very many more in his mathematics, science and philosophy (Peirce even thought that an entire 'art', *Trichotomic*, might be developed around these myriad trichotomies) that to distinguish this particular trichotomy from the other semiotic trichotomies I have found it helpful in my own thinking to see what it is doing, its function, in relation to the 'bigger semiotic picture' involving the other trichotomies. Finally, there's no need for me to reiterate that *this particular trichotomy of trichotomies *(i.e, the 9 types of signs; my addition) *in my view merely prepares for the classification into 10 signs and cannot stand on its own as representing possible signs.* (*A*) I finally understand why Gary R refers to the 9 types of signs of Peirce as the "parameters" that are necessary for constructing the 10 classes of signs, because the definition of the signs given by Peirce (see below) is not a usual word-based definition but a *parameter*-based definition (i.e., a parametric definition) since it depends on three free parameters, *A*, *B* and* C, *whose *values* are constrained to be one of the 9 types of signs. *"30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July 1905 .* So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows: A "sign" is anything, *A*, which, (1) in addition to other characters of its own, (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, *B,* (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine *C* to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation" Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM on 12/23/2015. (*B*) One example of a *parametric definition* is shown below, which is the definition of *complexity* given by M. Burgin in *Super-recursive Algorithms*, Springer, 2005, New York/Heidelberg/Berlin, which encompasses most if not all currently available definitions of complexity in the literature. The definition of complexity given by Burgin involves three three parameters, *R*, *P* and '*resource*', which can assume various VALUES as you can see below: “…if we analyze what does it mean when we say that some system or process is complex, we come to conclusion that it is complex to do something with this system or process: to study it, to describe it, to build it, to control it, and so on. Thus, complexity is always complexity of doing something. Being related to activity and functioning, complexity allows one to represent efficiency in a natural way: when a process has high efficiency, it is simple and when a process has low efficiency, it is complex. For example, we can take time as a measure of efficiency: what is possible to do in one hour is efficient, while what is impossible to do even in a year is inefficient. There is a corresponding measure of computational complexity that estimates time of computation or any other algorithmic process. *Definition 5.1.5.* *Complexity* of a system *R* is the amount of resources necessary for (used by) a process *P* involving *R*. There are different kinds of involvement. *P *may be a process in the system *R*. For example, *R* is a computer, *P* is an electrical process in *R*, and the *resource* is energy. *P *may be a process that is realized by the system *R*. For example, *R* is a computer, *P* is a computational process in *R*, and the *resource* is memory. *P *may be a process controlled by the system *R*. For example, *R* is a program, *P* is a computational process controlled by *R*, and the *resource* is time. *P *may be a process that builds the system *R*. For example, *R* is a software system, *P* is the process of its design, and the *resource* is programmers. *P *may be a process that transforms, utilizes, models, and/or predicts behavior of the system *R*. In cognitive processes complexity is closely related to information, representing specific kind of information measures.” (*C*) A simple combinatoric consideration leads to the conclusion that there are 9^3 = 729 possible ways of assigning the 9 types of signs to 10 classes of signs, but, as we well know, Peirce selected only 10 out of 729 based on some rules he had in mind apparently rooted in the ordinal relation among the three categories, i.e.,1ns, 2ns and 3ns. So far so good: Every Peircean would accept this characterization of mine. But the continuing debate is about the NAMING of the 9 types of signs -- to some the 9 types are not signs but just short-hand notation of the 9 relations among R-R, R-O and R-I in the 3 modes of being of Firstness (1ns), Secondness (2ns) and Thirdness (3ns), to others the 9 types of signs are all signs no further differentiation of them being necessary, and to still some others the 9 types of signs are the potential *values* for the three *parameters*, A, B, and C, appearing in Peirce's *parametric definition of the sign *(see *A*). These diverse views are summarized in the following table: *Table 1.* The postulate that the 9 types of signs are the potential values for the the parameters, A, B and C, that appear in Peirce's parametric definition of the sign. *Peirce* *Gary R* *Gary F* *Taborsky* *Ji* 9 Types of signs *9 Types of signs* *Parameters* for 10 classes of signs *signs* *Not signs* but the R-R, R-O & R-I relations in 3 modes of being, i.e., 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, where R = representamen; O = object; and I = interpretant *elementary signs*; each of the 9 types of signs is the *name* for (or a *sign* referring to) one of the 9 relations, i.e., the R-R, R-O and R-I relations in each of the three modes of being, i.e., 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. 10 Classes of signs 10 Classes of signs parameters signs signs composite signs, each composed of 3 elementary signs, just as each baryon is composed of three quarks held together by the strong force* Rules of producing 10 classes from 9 types Firstness (1ns) precedes Secondness (2ns) which in turn precedes Thirdness (3ns) Same as Peirce Same as Peirce Same as Peirce i ≤ j ≤ k in Sijk which is the general formula for the 10 triadic signs with i = interpretant, j = object, and k =representamen*. *For a detailed explanation of the quark mode of the Peircean signs, see [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012 or Semiotics of Life available at conformon.net under Publications > Proceedings & Abstract, pp. 65-71. (*D*) It should be pointed out that, just as a baryon is composed of three quarks held together by the *strong force*, so the quark model for the Peircean sign assume that the three elementary signs are held together within each of the 10 triadic signs by *a new kind of force* variously referred to as the "*semantic force*" and "*semiotic force*", but I would not object to a third possible name, i.e., the "*Peircean force*", for the force acting among the 9 types of signs producing 10 classes of signs based on his phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secodness and Thirdness. Again, Happy Holidays and a Healthy, Happy and Productive 2016 for every body! Sung On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary F, list, > > Yes, it appears that we continue to disagree on this matter of > terminology, and especially since I don't believe it is merely a matter of > our possibly different analytical purposes, although that is no doubt part > of it and may even be at the heart of it. > > For now I'll just comment on one of your interleaved paragraphs which for > me at the moment suggests what I see as our most significant disagreement, > and I'll try to get to your other comments at a later date as we seem to > have some disagreements there as well. (I'm breaking your paragraph up a > bit.) > > You wrote in the first part: > > GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between > nominal and adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce > does not make. For Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a > rheme, a symbolic sign a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other > classifications it may belong to. > > > GR: It may be that in the segment of NDTR that you are forcusing that "For > Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign > a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong > to." But it is precisely that way of speaking, which is another kind of > shorthand for the particular purposes of his analysis at that point and in > that context, again, it is that shorthand, stripped of its *specific > context* of illustrating the possible trichotomies of relations possible > for S/O/I that has caused confusion for a number of folk, the result, as > I'd earlier noted, of conflating the aspects of the three > trichotomies--which are *not*, as I will continue to argue--signs > themselves, but, in a kind of "mix and match" *will* together generate > ten sign classes (which, btw, are not themselves 'real' signs at all until > they are 'embodied' in some actual semiosis; which is also to say that, as > with the three trichotomies you've been considering, the 10 classes are a > mere *analytical abstraction*, albeit at another level than the > trichotomies). > > If, as you wrote, "an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a > symbolic sign a symbol" (although using 'sign' in these phrases already > begs the question), then we have such cases as these: > > (a) Signs (in the classes 8,9, and 10 of the classification) are all both > symbols and legisigns. Now, while that is true in one sense, and we can > properly--and frequently do--refer to the argument, the dicisign, and the > rheme as 'symbols', considering for the moment just sign 8, the rheme, if > all "rhematic signs" (to use your terminology) are 'rhemes' "regardless > of whatever other classifications it may belong to," then the rheme which > is a symbolic legisign might appear to be merely one of six such signs, and > it loses the special position it *rightly* has in our thinking and > speaking about the relation of the three sign classes, rheme (term), > dicisign (proposition), and argument. You continued: > > GF: Some of the names of signs (each of which is, logically speaking, a > hypostatic abstraction) do not seem to have adjectival forms — Qualisign, > Sinsign, Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t see any ontological > significance in that. . . > > > GR: Well, yes, and most certainly Qualisign, Sinsign, and Legisign not > only "do not seem to have adjectival forms," but they can't and shouldn't > have them in the classification as they are the three kinds of possibly > to-be-embodied Signs that might be uttered--they are the *final* term, > the *arrival point* in the involution of Peirce's analysis of each class > of signs (again, beginning at the place in the triangle of each class which > represents the Interpretant, passing through the Object, arriving at the > Sign). > > So, for example, Sign 8 in the classification is involutionally analyzed > as a rhematic indexical legisign. This is the result of the *application* > of the 3 trichotomies in my understanding. The use of the adjectival form > in the places of the Interpretant and Object, and the noun form for the > Sign, are Peirce's (it's true that in creating his diagram Peirce doesn't > employ the adjectival form for the Argument and Dicent (although he might > have written 'argumentative'--but that expression has a different > connotation; while dicentic is used by some commentators), but perhaps that > may be because he expected these particular classes to be refered to as > Argument and Dicent. Finally, and in similar manner, he surely expected the > first of the three symbolic classes to be termed Rheme (which he himself > often enough does, although in the diagram of the 10 classes he calls it > Rhematic Symbol). > > You concluded this paragraph by commenting: > > GF. . . I don’t see why or how you distinguish between “a Sign taken as a > whole” and some other way of taking a Sign. > > > GR: While I think I've already suggested why above (namely, that only the > triads of the classification represent potentially embodied sign classes), > I'll try to continue an answer by referring to one other point you made, > and then call it quits for now. You commented: > > GF: I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term > “trichotomies." > > > GR: For one thing, there are so many 'trichotomies' in Peirce's semiotic, > and very, very many more in his mathematics, science and philosophy (Peirce > even thought that an entire 'art', *Trichotomic*, might be developed > around these myriad trichotomies) that to distinguish this particular > trichotomy from the other semiotic trichotomies I have found it helpful in > my own thinking to see what it is doing, its function, in relation to the > 'bigger semiotic picture' involving the other trichotomies. Finally, > there's no need for me to reiterate that this particular trichotomy of > trichotomies in my view merely prepares for the classification into 10 > signs and cannot stand on its own as representing possible signs. > > You seem to be suggesting, for example, that the term 'Icon' in the second > trichotomy concerning the Object, that this term in this context represents > an "actual" Sign. I disagree. For me, context is everything here, and while > I'd be happy to switch to another expression if one better than 'parameter' > can be found, this, in my opinion, is how each of the 9 aspects > *functions* in generating the 10 classes. But, I'm beginning to repeat > myself > > Perhaps I am principally motivated here by witnessing the confusion which > can occur when these two (the 9 and the 10) are conflated. (Btw, this is > not to suggest that the 9 parameters might not be employed in other > contexts effectively, for example, as Claudio Guerri has in architecture, > but even here I think their use is as parameters, less types or classes). > > In sum: So yes, and for final example, one can say that there are indeed > *three* symbols in Peirce's classification of signs. But 'symbol' in that > context refers to possible classes which might actually be uttered and > interpreted, while 'symbol' in the context of the three trichotomies is but > a parameter to be used in the generation of the those 10 sign classes. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 12:24 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Gary R, >> >> >> >> I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have >> every reason to believe that Peirce’s choice of terms in his “Nomenclature >> and Divisions of Triadic Relations” is as careful and exact as it is in the >> rest of the 1903 Syllabus, and for that matter as exact as in any of his >> works written for publication. This judgment is based not only on my >> experience of closely reading Peirce, but also on my purpose in posting >> these remarks on NDTR: I feel it is incumbent on me to understand Peirce’s >> semiotic as exactly as I can before I proceed to disagree with or modify >> his analysis. I don’t believe a reader can do that while believing that >> Peirce is using loose terminology for his purposes. >> >> >> >> By the same token, I can’t say that your terminology or Edwina’s is >> “loose” for your purposes. What I can do, though, is point out to the >> differences between your terminology and Peirce’s; and I think this may be >> worth doing because those differences may be symptomatic of differences >> between your purpose and mine in interpreting Peirce (rather than mere >> differences in terminological taste). If we are indeed at cross-purposes, I >> think it’s better to be aware of that. So my insertions below will consist >> mostly of comparison’s between Peirce’s terminology and yours, along with >> some questions about terms of yours that I don’t understand. >> >> >> >> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >> *Sent:* 21-Dec-15 21:03 >> >> Gary F. list, >> >> >> >> GR: I think you may be glossing over some important terminological >> considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even >> relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind >> of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial* >> distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various >> ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his >> semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote: >> >> >> >> GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no >> positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if >> Peirce says that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he >> does here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an >> icon is *not* a sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s >> nomenclature is difficult enough without introducing claims that directly >> contradict what he actually says. >> >> >> >> However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear >> enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an *Icon* is >> a sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in >> some *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a >> whole is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns, >> sinsigns, or legisigns. >> >> GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between >> nominal and adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce >> does not make. For Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a >> rheme, a symbolic sign a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other >> classifications it may belong to. Some of the names of signs (each of which >> is, logically speaking, a hypostatic abstraction) do not seem to have >> adjectival forms — Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t >> see any ontological significance in that, and I don’t see why or how you >> distinguish between “a Sign taken as a whole” and some other way of taking >> a Sign. >> >> >> So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking >> which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9 >> parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities >> available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as >> such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one* >> of the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', >> viz. (1, 2, and 5), all three of these being, btw, 'rhematic' In like >> manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which *are* >> rhematic as 'rhemes" since one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and >> three are legisigns. Those six are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'. Only one >> of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the symbolic >> legisign). >> >> >> >> Since I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term >> “trichotomies,” I’ll continue to use the latter. What you are saying is >> true (approximately) IF you only look at the triangle diagram of the ten >> classes and ignore the text of NDTR. But, as Peirce says, the Ten Classes >> result from “the three trichotomies of Signs” which he defines in the text. >> If Peirce had chosen to divide triadic relations into a different set of >> three trichotomies — which he could have, as he points out in the opening >> paragraphs of NDTR — he would have come up with a different set of ten >> classes. And of course, a few years later he did generate a new set of >> classes, 66 in all, by dividing signs according to *ten* trichotomies >> (which did *not* include the qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy). >> Now, if we look at how these “classes” are generated by Peirce’s analysis, >> it’s clear that his process is to observe the correlations between >> trichotomies. For instance, he asks, Can a qualisign be an icon? Yes. Can >> it be an index or a legisign? No. Can a law (or legisign) be an icon? Yes. >> And so on, with each division of signs. If you read the 1908 Welby letter, >> he follows exactly the same procedure there, but with a different and >> larger set of trichotomies. He says that this procedure presents him with “3 >> 10, or 59049, difficult questions to carefully consider.” This is the >> “arduous analysis” which he describes in the very first paragraph of NDTR, >> and the purpose of this analysis is “ to place in the system the >> conceptions to which experience has led us. In the case of triadic >> relations, no part of this work has, as yet, been satisfactorily performed, >> except in some measure for the most important class of triadic relations, >> those of signs, or representamens, to their objects and interpretants.” >> >> >> >> As I said above, I think Peirce’s terminology is fully adequate to this >> purpose. If it is not adequate to your purpose, my guess is that your >> purpose is different. Maybe what you’re after is a way of systematically >> interpreting Peirce’s diagram that’s included in NDTR, without going >> through the arduous analysis of placing in that system the conceptions to >> which our actual experience of signs has led us. I have no objection to >> that project or to your choice of terminology to serve that purpose. I >> merely point out that it’s different from my purpose in reading NDTR >> closely, and from Peirce’s stated purpose in writing it. >> >> >> >> GR: So, again, what I'm suggesting is that there is a kind of >> unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the course of his >> analysis. While this most certainly *is* problematic, we shouldn't allow >> that difficulty to lead us into discussing aspects (expressed more >> properly as adjectives) of the sign as if they were the whole of the >> sign *as* sign. I do not see this distinction as being, say, >> 'fastidious'. >> >> >> >> GF: I certainly wouldn’t call it fastidious! >> >> >> In short, one needs to recall that at 2.264 that Peirce writes: "The >> three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN >> CLASSES OF SIGNS," and I consider it a grave error in semiotic analysis not >> to clearly distinguish the elements of the trichotomies from the classes. >> Or, in other words, conflating those three trichotomies involving nine >> categorial parameters with the ten classes themselves has, in my opinion, >> historically brought about a great deal of confusion, so that it behooves >> us to clear up--and not gloss over--the potential confusions resulting >> from that conflation. >> >> I should add that I agree with you (and what I took John Collier to be >> saying recently) in opposing what Edwina has been arguing, namely, by our >> holding, contra Edwina, that the sign is *not* three relations, but one >> genuine triadic relation. >> >> >> >> Here again I prefer to stick with Peirce in focusing on “the most >> important class of triadic relations, those of signs, or representamens, to >> their objects and interpretants.” >> >> >> >> Peirce has been quoted here repeatedly as stating that a sign should >> *not* be conceived as "a complexus of dyadic relations" (although, >> admittedly, his terminology can get a little loose in this matter as well). >> Finally, the *integrity* of the sign is further emphasized by his >> insisting that the interpretant stands in *the same relation* to the >> object as the sign itself stands (I don't see that Edwina deals with that >> last principle in her three-relations analysis whatsoever). >> >> You concluded: >> >> GF: I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on >> awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement*described above is a >> sort of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts >> are applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. >> >> >> >> I would very much like to take up this mirror image notion in terms of >> involvement (categorial involution) *and* degeneracy (and the relation >> of the two), although I don't think that this thread is the place to do it. >> I began another thread on that 'mirror' theme, and perhaps after the first >> of the year we can take up these issues there if you and others are >> interested. >> >> >> >> GF: OK, I’ll try to get back to that. In the meantime maybe I should keep >> my close reading of NDTR to myself instead of posting it here; I only >> started doing that because I thought others might be interested. If the >> thread under this subject line has led to a divergence of purposes, I guess >> I’d better not use it for mine. >> >> >> >> Meanwhile, I wish you and all Peirce e-forum members a happy, healthy, >> and intellectually productive new year! >> >> >> >> GF: Ditto that! >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> [image: Image removed by sender. Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> >> *Communication Studies* >> >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *C 745* >> >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:12 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >> Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of >> Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides >> signs “according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the >> sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to >> that object, or in its relation to an interpretant” (CP 2.243). >> >> >> >> My reason for including Peirce’s text in these posts is mostly to bring >> us back to his own terminology, since it is *his* analysis of semiosis >> that we are investigating here. Some of the arguments over terminology in >> this thread make no positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. >> For instance, if Peirce says that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* >> is a sign” (as he does here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by >> asserting that an icon is *not* a sign, or that a symbol is *not* a >> sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult enough without introducing claims >> that directly contradict what he actually says. >> >> >> >> So here is the second trichotomy: >> >> >> >> >> >> CP 2.247. According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an >> *Icon,* an *Index,* or a *Symbol.* >> >> An *Icon* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by >> virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, >> whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless >> there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this >> has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it >> quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as >> it is like that thing and used as a sign of it. >> >> 248. An *Index* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by >> virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a >> Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of >> anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it >> necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in >> respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve >> a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere >> resemblance of its Object, even in these respects, which makes it a sign, >> but it is the actual modification of it by the Object. >> >> 249. A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by >> virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to >> cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus >> itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts >> through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which >> it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being >> in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be >> existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here >> understand by “existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe to >> which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the >> association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the >> Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind. >> It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the >> Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the >> Symbol. >> >> >> >> >> >> Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second >> trichotomy with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy. >> Since the Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective >> trichotomies, each exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The >> Firstness of the Qualisign is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness >> of the Icon, on the other hand, is the Firstness of its relation to its >> Object, specifically the fact that it “refers to the Object that it >> denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, >> just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not.” >> >> >> >> Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the >> Secondness of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or >> event. The Index “refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being >> really affected by that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its >> relation to its Object — which, as a genuine Secondness, *involves* a >> Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). The *peculiarity* of that >> Firstness, I would guess, is that its genuine Secondness to the Object *does >> *have something to do with its character, which is not the case with the >> Icon as defined above. >> >> >> >> Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The >> Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general >> type.” The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being >> but *also* in its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts >> through a Replica, *and* that there must be existent instances of what >> the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,” >> existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. >> Hence, just as genuine Secondness involves Firstness, so also does the >> Thirdness of a Symbol *involve* Secondness, in the form of “a sort of >> Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.” >> >> >> >> To close, I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up >> on awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement* described above is >> a sort of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts >> are applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. I won’t >> elaborate on that, though, but just wish everyone a happy Solstice! >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> } We are natural expressions of a deeper order. [Stuart Kauffman] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
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