Gary R,
Having read your subsequent message, I’m looking forward in the new year to further explication of your schema of the ten classes of signs. So I think I’ll wrap up this thread with a few questions that I hope your new thread on the subject will answer. Mostly I’m just asking for definitions of the terms used in your analysis, in the hope of understanding it better. I do think definitions of these terms are needed, especially for terms that are also used by Peirce, because if you don’t supply them, folks like me will assume that you are using them in the same way that Peirce did, which (as we’ve seen) will only cause more confusion. In the case of the three trichotomies which you refer to as “this particular trichotomy of trichotomies,” I’m not sure whether you meant “this triad of trichotomies,” or are claiming that the three ‘parametric’ trichotomies represent a division of something else into three. (Or maybe you’re just rhetorically elevating the status of this triad, as in the expression “King of Kings”?) If you do regard them as a trichotomy (in the way that icon/index/symbol is a trichotomy of the possible relations of the sign to its object), then I’d like to know what it is that this meta-trichotomy divides into three. Another term you’ll need to define is “involution.” Where Peirce uses this term — notably in “The Logic of Mathematics” (c.1896) — it is implicitly defined by being paired with “evolution,” for instance in CP 1. 484: “The general law of quality, as distinct from the classificatory system of quality (of which we can have but a fragmentary knowledge), has three clauses, relating respectively to single qualities, to pairs of qualities, and to triads of qualities. The first clause is that every quality is perfect and in itself such as it is. The second more complex law is that two qualities have one or other of two sorts of relations to one another; namely, they may be, first, independent of one another, somewhat resembling and somewhat differing from one another, or secondly, one of them may be merely a further determination of the other, this latter being essentially the first of the pair in the order of evolution, or synthesis, while it is the second of the pair in the order of involution or analysis.” In other words, if quality B is merely a further determination of quality A, then evolution, or synthesis, proceeds from A to B, while involution proceeds from B to A, reversing the process of determination. This is what we would expect considering that evolution is a noun formed from the verb evolve and involution a noun formed from involve. This usage is also consistent with Peirce’s use of “involve” in NDTR, where a sinsign “involves a qualisign,” an index involves “a sort of Icon,” a “Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme,” etc. The implication would be that the order of evolution proceeds from rheme to dicisign, and the order of involution from dicisign to rheme, which seems clear enough as applied to the semiotic process of determination. Further on in the “Logic of Mathematics” Peirce writes (CP 1.485): “The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in truth, the idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought which originally put them together and recognizes they are together; from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential process which either first follows the order of involution from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the condition of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case; or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the condition of the law; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of the idea of that law in that case to the living law itself. Thus the law of logic governs the relations of different predicates of one subject.” Here the “order of involution” is one of three orders according to which an inferential process can take place (the other two orders are not named as such); but the usage of the term is consistent with that above. And so is the usage at CP 1.490: “To get at the idea of a monad, and especially to make it an accurate and clear conception, it is necessary to begin with the idea of a triad and find the monad-idea involved in it. But this is only a scaffolding necessary during the process of constructing the conception. When the conception has been constructed, the scaffolding may be removed, and the monad-idea will be there in all its abstract perfection. According to the path here pursued from monad to triad, from monadic triads to triadic triads, etc., we do not progress by logical involution — we do not say the monad involves a dyad — but we pursue a path of evolution. That is to say, we say that to carry out and perfect the monad, we need next a dyad. This seems to be a vague method when stated in general terms; but in each case, it turns out that deep study of each conception in all its features brings a clear perception that precisely a given next conception is called for.” But I have great difficulty in seeing how Peirce’s usage, as exemplified above, can be compatible with yours, for instance when you write of “the involution of Peirce's analysis of each class of signs (again, beginning at the place in the triangle of each class which represents the Interpretant, passing through the Object, arriving at the Sign)”. I know that your bent arrows are supposed to represent some kind of semiotic process, or movement, but don’t see a connection with what Peirce calls “the order of involution or analysis.” This is why I’d like to see your definition of this term; and toward that end, my first questions about the meaning of “involution” would be: Is it the reverse of “evolution”? If A involves B, does that mean that the order of involution is A —> B? Following the order of involution in a typical semiotic process, does the Interpretant involve the Object, which in turn involves the Sign? Of course, when we interpret some of the terms used in your explication (rhematic, symbol, sinsign etc.) we may be quite justified in assuming that you are using them just as they are defined by Peirce. It’s only the terms that you are using in special senses, especially those used by Peirce in other senses, that you need to define in order to clarify your exposition of the ten classes of signs. (Or else invent new terms for those uses, as Peirce recommends in his “Ethics of Terminology.”) In the meantime I’ll go back to immersing myself in the Peirce texts, and if anything worth posting occurs to me, I’ll start a different thread for it. Gary f. From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 22-Dec-15 15:27 Gary F, list, Yes, it appears that we continue to disagree on this matter of terminology, and especially since I don't believe it is merely a matter of our possibly different analytical purposes, although that is no doubt part of it and may even be at the heart of it. For now I'll just comment on one of your interleaved paragraphs which for me at the moment suggests what I see as our most significant disagreement, and I'll try to get to your other comments at a later date as we seem to have some disagreements there as well. (I'm breaking your paragraph up a bit.) You wrote in the first part: GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between nominal and adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce does not make. For Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong to. GR: It may be that in the segment of NDTR that you are forcusing that "For Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong to." But it is precisely that way of speaking, which is another kind of shorthand for the particular purposes of his analysis at that point and in that context, again, it is that shorthand, stripped of its specific context of illustrating the possible trichotomies of relations possible for S/O/I that has caused confusion for a number of folk, the result, as I'd earlier noted, of conflating the aspects of the three trichotomies--which are not, as I will continue to argue--signs themselves, but, in a kind of "mix and match" will together generate ten sign classes (which, btw, are not themselves 'real' signs at all until they are 'embodied' in some actual semiosis; which is also to say that, as with the three trichotomies you've been considering, the 10 classes are a mere analytical abstraction, albeit at another level than the trichotomies). If, as you wrote, "an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign a symbol" (although using 'sign' in these phrases already begs the question), then we have such cases as these: (a) Signs (in the classes 8,9, and 10 of the classification) are all both symbols and legisigns. Now, while that is true in one sense, and we can properly--and frequently do--refer to the argument, the dicisign, and the rheme as 'symbols', considering for the moment just sign 8, the rheme, if all "rhematic signs" (to use your terminology) are 'rhemes' "regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong to," then the rheme which is a symbolic legisign might appear to be merely one of six such signs, and it loses the special position it rightly has in our thinking and speaking about the relation of the three sign classes, rheme (term), dicisign (proposition), and argument. You continued: GF: Some of the names of signs (each of which is, logically speaking, a hypostatic abstraction) do not seem to have adjectival forms — Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t see any ontological significance in that. . . GR: Well, yes, and most certainly Qualisign, Sinsign, and Legisign not only "do not seem to have adjectival forms," but they can't and shouldn't have them in the classification as they are the three kinds of possibly to-be-embodied Signs that might be uttered--they are the final term, the arrival point in the involution of Peirce's analysis of each class of signs (again, beginning at the place in the triangle of each class which represents the Interpretant, passing through the Object, arriving at the Sign). So, for example, Sign 8 in the classification is involutionally analyzed as a rhematic indexical legisign. This is the result of the application of the 3 trichotomies in my understanding. The use of the adjectival form in the places of the Interpretant and Object, and the noun form for the Sign, are Peirce's (it's true that in creating his diagram Peirce doesn't employ the adjectival form for the Argument and Dicent (although he might have written 'argumentative'--but that expression has a different connotation; while dicentic is used by some commentators), but perhaps that may be because he expected these particular classes to be refered to as Argument and Dicent. Finally, and in similar manner, he surely expected the first of the three symbolic classes to be termed Rheme (which he himself often enough does, although in the diagram of the 10 classes he calls it Rhematic Symbol). You concluded this paragraph by commenting: GF. . . I don’t see why or how you distinguish between “a Sign taken as a whole” and some other way of taking a Sign. GR: While I think I've already suggested why above (namely, that only the triads of the classification represent potentially embodied sign classes), I'll try to continue an answer by referring to one other point you made, and then call it quits for now. You commented: GF: I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term “trichotomies." GR: For one thing, there are so many 'trichotomies' in Peirce's semiotic, and very, very many more in his mathematics, science and philosophy (Peirce even thought that an entire 'art', Trichotomic, might be developed around these myriad trichotomies) that to distinguish this particular trichotomy from the other semiotic trichotomies I have found it helpful in my own thinking to see what it is doing, its function, in relation to the 'bigger semiotic picture' involving the other trichotomies. Finally, there's no need for me to reiterate that this particular trichotomy of trichotomies in my view merely prepares for the classification into 10 signs and cannot stand on its own as representing possible signs. You seem to be suggesting, for example, that the term 'Icon' in the second trichotomy concerning the Object, that this term in this context represents an "actual" Sign. I disagree. For me, context is everything here, and while I'd be happy to switch to another expression if one better than 'parameter' can be found, this, in my opinion, is how each of the 9 aspects functions in generating the 10 classes. But, I'm beginning to repeat myself Perhaps I am principally motivated here by witnessing the confusion which can occur when these two (the 9 and the 10) are conflated. (Btw, this is not to suggest that the 9 parameters might not be employed in other contexts effectively, for example, as Claudio Guerri has in architecture, but even here I think their use is as parameters, less types or classes). In sum: So yes, and for final example, one can say that there are indeed three symbols in Peirce's classification of signs. But 'symbol' in that context refers to possible classes which might actually be uttered and interpreted, while 'symbol' in the context of the three trichotomies is but a parameter to be used in the generation of the those 10 sign classes. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
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