Gary F. list,
Gary wrote:
I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial*
distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various
ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his
semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:
GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here), I
don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is *not* a
sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually
says.
However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an *Icon* is a
sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in
some *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a
whole is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns,
sinsigns, or legisigns.
So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking
which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as
such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one* of
the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz.
(1, 2, and 5), all
three of these being,
btw, 'rhematic'
. In
like manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which *are*
rhematic as 'rhemes"
since
one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six
are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'.
Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the
symbolic legisign).
So, again, what I'm suggesting is
that
there is a kind of unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the
course of his analysis. While this most certain
ly
*is* problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us into
discussing aspects
(expressed more properly as adjectives)
of the sign
as if they
were the whole of the sign
:
the sign *as* sign. I do not see this distinction as being, say,
'
fastidious
'
.
In short, one needs to recall that at 2.264 that Peirce writes: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS," and I consider it a grave error in semiotic analysis not to clearly
distinguish the elements of the trichotomies from the classes. Or, in other
words,
conflating
those three trichotomies involving nine categorial parameters with the ten
classes themselves has, in my opinion, historically brought about a great
deal of confusion, so that it behooves us to clear up--and not gloss
over--the potential confusion
s
resulting from that conflation.
I should add that I agree with you (and what I took John Collier to be
saying recently) in opposing what Edwina has been arguing, namely,
y
our holding, contra Edwina, that the sign is *not* three relations, but one
genuine triadic relation. Peirce has been quoted here repeatedly as stating
that a sign should *not *be conceived as "a complexus of dyadic relations"
(although, admittedly, his terminology can get a little loose in this
matter as well). Finally, the *integrity* of the sign is further emphasized
by his insisting that the interpretant stands in *the same relation* to the
object as the sign itself stands (I don't see that Edwina deals with that
last principle in her three-relations analysis whatsoever).
You concluded:
GF: I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on
awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement*described above is a sort
of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts are
applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia.
I would very much like to take up this mirror image notion in terms of
involvement (categorial involution) *and* degeneracy (and the relation of
the two), although I don't think that this thread is the place to do it. I
began another thread on that 'mirror' theme, and perhaps after the first of
the year we can take up these issues there if you and others are interested.
Meanwhile, I wish you and all Peirce e-forum members a happy, healthy, and
intellectually productive new year!
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:12 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of
> Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides
> signs “according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the
> sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to
> that object, or in its relation to an interpretant” (CP 2.243).
>
>
>
> My reason for including Peirce’s text in these posts is mostly to bring us
> back to his own terminology, since it is *his* analysis of semiosis that
> we are investigating here. Some of the arguments over terminology in this
> thread make no positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For
> instance, if Peirce says that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a
> sign” (as he does here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by
> asserting that an icon is *not* a sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign.
> Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult enough without introducing claims that
> directly contradict what he actually says.
>
>
>
> So here is the second trichotomy:
>
>
>
>
>
> CP 2.247. According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an
> *Icon,* an *Index,* or a *Symbol.*
>
> An *Icon* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by
> virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same,
> whether any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless
> there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this
> has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it
> quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as
> it is like that thing and used as a sign of it.
>
> 248. An *Index* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
> virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a
> Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of
> anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it
> necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in
> respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve
> a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere
> resemblance of its Object, even in these respects, which makes it a sign,
> but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.
>
> 249. A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
> virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to
> cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus
> itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts
> through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which
> it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being
> in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be
> existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here
> understand by “existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe to
> which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the
> association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the
> Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.
> It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the
> Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the
> Symbol.
>
>
>
>
>
> Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second
> trichotomy with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy.
> Since the Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective
> trichotomies, each exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The
> Firstness of the Qualisign is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness
> of the Icon, on the other hand, is the Firstness of its relation to its
> Object, specifically the fact that it “refers to the Object that it
> denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses,
> just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not.”
>
>
>
> Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the
> Secondness of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or
> event. The Index “refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being
> really affected by that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its
> relation to its Object — which, as a genuine Secondness, *involves* a
> Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). The *peculiarity* of that Firstness,
> I would guess, is that its genuine Secondness to the Object *does *have
> something to do with its character, which is not the case with the Icon as
> defined above.
>
>
>
> Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The
> Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general
> type.” The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being
> but *also* in its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts
> through a Replica, *and* that there must be existent instances of what
> the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,”
> existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers.
> Hence, just as genuine Secondness involves Firstness, so also does the
> Thirdness of a Symbol *involve* Secondness, in the form of “a sort of
> Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.”
>
>
>
> To close, I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up
> on awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement* described above is a
> sort of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts
> are applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. I won’t
> elaborate on that, though, but just wish everyone a happy Solstice!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } We are natural expressions of a deeper order. [Stuart Kauffman] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
>
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