Matt, list, Matt wrote:
EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts > don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a > perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., > relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or type, to the subject, or percept. Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208: "Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as the subject of the judgment. Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The Seven Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us* and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which *icons* Qualities are immediately presented." In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of the general element in perception. As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason." -- Franklin ---------------------------------------------------- On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > Franklin, Peircers, > > Here a distinction that I find helpful: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts > don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a > perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., > relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. > > Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very > basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x > to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to > generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For > example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is > different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark > side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' > > In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of > dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine > there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If > this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. > > Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good > one. > > * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone > (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. > Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems > to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', > 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level > generalization). > > Matt > > > On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom < > <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Gary F, > > Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is > considered as a singular phenomenon? > > I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is > a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. > Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign? > > -- Franklin > > ------------------------------------------ > > On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Franklin, Jeff, >> >> >> >> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To >> perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of >> that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting >> its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which like all >> predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence >> of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), then you >> have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not). >> >> >> >> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue >> the thread without me for awhile ... >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to <l...@list.iupui.edu>l...@list.iupui.edu with the line > "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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