Franklin, List,
(*1*) I like to number statements in my posts to keep track of them, and
this is a common practice in physics and mathematics and some physicist
writers even recommend this practice for non -technical writings. Also it
makes it easier to refer to them when necessary. In fact I would recommend
that the PEIRCE-L managers consider numbering each and every post
consecutively as the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post
that I wrote for the [biosemiotics] list is [biosemiotics:46] dated
December 26, 2012, I believe.
(*2*) You wrote:
"With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
not (121315-1)
necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
proposition
can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer
to the
grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point.
Perhaps
some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea,
but I
am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is
going
to get us anywhere in philosophy."
I agree. Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal
language evolved in the human society, and all organism must be making
judgement although they do not have any sentences as we do.
But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of
reasoning in both humans and non-human species. For me, human language (or
humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms
as well as the Universe itself. In fact I am now of the opinion that there
may be two aspects to language -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be
denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and (ii) the languages as *tokens* of *L* (to
be denoted as L), leading to the following notations:
* L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln)
(121315-2)
where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe,
including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e.,
mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.). It is possible that *L* can
be identified with Peircean semiotics. Do you know of any evidence to
invalidate this possibility ?
All the best.
Sung
On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Sung, list,
>
> Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll
> respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and
> since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I
> wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice
> in which you participate?
>
> With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
> not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
> proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it
> wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a
> logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to
> agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think
> the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy.
>
> So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have
> said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a
> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is
> a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or
> an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
>> Franklin, List,
>>
>> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
>>
>>
>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
>> (121315-1)
>> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
>>
>> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
>> introducing (1213`15-2)
>> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
>> dicisign)."
>>
>> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
>> (121315-3)
>> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
>> type, to the subject, or percept."
>>
>> These fit with my understanding [1] that
>>
>> <Words denote and sentences assert or make judgement.
>> (121315-4)
>> In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
>> vehicle of a sentence.>
>>
>> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
>>
>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
>> (121315-5)
>>
>> Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.
>>
>> "A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
>> (121315-6)
>> the general as its predicate."
>>
>> Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a
>> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.
>>
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> Reference:
>> [1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961). *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*.
>> The University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4.
>>
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
