Hi Jon,
That is an excellent point.
Can we then say that
"All actual signs derive from potential signs but not all potential signs
need be actual signs." (122115-1)
This statement may be related to the the fact that
"There can be no Thirdness without Secondness and Firstness;
(122115-2)
there can be no Secondness without Firstness."
If (122115-2) is true, then why stop at Firstness? Why can't we continue
and say
"There can be no Firstness without 'Zeroness'."
(122115-3)
The concept of Zeroness was invoked in 2013 as a logical consequence of the
9 types of signs defined by Peirce as detailed in [biosemiotics:4440]
forwarded to you separately.
All the best.
Sung
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
> Sung,
>
> Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone
> of something. The first is potential, the second is actualization.
>
> Regards,
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> Edwina,
>
> You said
>
> "All signs are triads".
>
> I disagree. Not all signs are triads. Only symbols are. There can be
> signs without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it;
> see below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometric line), according to Peirce:
>
>
> "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it
> significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil
> streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,
> at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant.
> Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign
> of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is
> a hole there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or
> not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
> sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which
> signifies what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that
> signification."
>
> (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in
> http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf).
>
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the
>> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of
>> that Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It
>> is not in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'.
>>
>> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be
>> functioning within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those
>> three relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary
>> sign'. All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O],
>> my Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON,
>> to result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O.
>> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign.
>>
>> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic
>> relations
>>
>> Hi Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms.
>> (122015-1)
>> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the
>> Representamen and the Object."
>>
>> I disagree.
>>
>> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their
>> names.
>>
>> We agree that the *meaning *of 'icon' is *the relation between
>> representamen and object in the mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the *name* of (and
>> hence a sign for) *the relation between representamen and object in the
>> mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat.
>>
>> *Sung*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before
>>> you jump in with your views.
>>> We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon'
>>> refers to the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So,
>>> no-one, including me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine
>>> terms refer to the Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R,
>>> between R-O, and R-I.
>>>
>>> These 9 terms are not, as you insist, 'elementary terms', nor are they
>>> ambiguous. They are very specifically outlined, repeatedly, as to their
>>> meaning, in numerous Peircean texts.
>>>
>>> And as John Collier's post just explained, these relations are not
>>> stand-alone. COLLIER:" I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise
>>> relations are abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So
>>> talking about, say, the relation between the representamen and its object
>>> always has the interpretant in the background."
>>>
>>> That is - the relations operate within the semiosic triad. THREE
>>> relations - but you can't 'decompose' them.
>>>
>>> Your lion-cat picture is totally irrelevant to the discussion.
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>>> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 7:41 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic
>>> relations
>>>
>>> Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
>>> representamen relations'. (122015-1)
>>> Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . "
>>>
>>> These '9 types of representmane relations' are the *objects* of the 9
>>> types of *signs* that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign',
>>> 'dicisign', etc. For example, icon, index , and symbol are the *signs*
>>> referring to the* relation* between representamen and its object in
>>> the mode of being of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.
>>> It seems to me that you are conflating *representmen *and *object. *
>>>
>>> The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs is an *ambiguous* diagram, since
>>> it an be intepreted in more than one ways with equal validity, like the
>>> figure shown below. Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting
>>> a *lion*, a *cat*, or *both*, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of
>>> signs. I see both a lion (*relations, i.e., objects*) and a cat (name
>>> of the relations, i.e., *signs*) in the picture, but, metaphorically
>>> speaking, Edwina seems to see only a lion, and Helmut only a cat.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <image.png>
>>>
>>> Retrieved from
>>> http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/
>>> on 12/20/2015.
>>>
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
>>>> representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite
>>>> Sung's description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition,
>>>> a triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself,
>>>> can't be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign.
>>>>
>>>> That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and
>>>> the Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of
>>>> course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The
>>>> Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its
>>>> history.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
>>>> *To:* colli...@ukzn.ac.za
>>>> *Cc:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> ; PEIRCE-L
>>>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic
>>>> relations
>>>>
>>>> John, Sung, list,
>>>> for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The
>>>> difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is
>>>> not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it
>>>> is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs,
>>>> and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen
>>>> relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not
>>>> completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or
>>>> interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole
>>>> sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because,
>>>> if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of
>>>> its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already
>>>> is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A
>>>> logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of
>>>> signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct?
>>>> Best,
>>>> Helmut
>>>>
>>>> 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
>>>> "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are
>>>> only picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is
>>>> fine, but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is
>>>> no difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not
>>>> shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are
>>>> grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't
>>>> done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing
>>>> different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I
>>>> don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the
>>>> classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could
>>>> be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how
>>>> we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about
>>>> with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars
>>>> who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a
>>>> good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to.
>>>> This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference
>>>> has experimental consequences.
>>>>
>>>> John
>>>>
>>>> Sent from my Samsung device
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -------- Original message --------
>>>> From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>>>> Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
>>>> To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>>>
>>>> John, List,
>>>>
>>>> You wrote:
>>>>
>>>> "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for
>>>> “measurable”
>>>> (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom
>>>> without more clarity
>>>> than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make,
>>>> the distinction
>>>> between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what
>>>> exists; you would
>>>> be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no
>>>> information."
>>>>
>>>> The distinction between *elementary signs* and *composite signs* is
>>>> the same as the distinction between the *9 types of signs *and the *10
>>>> classes of sign* that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these
>>>> terms, any one is entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the
>>>> distinction must have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the
>>>> 9 types and 10 classes. The only thing that I am trying to do here, since
>>>> 2012, is to give "names" or "*representamens*" to these distinct
>>>> *objects*, so that we can avoid conflating them, or so that we can
>>>> have two different *interpretants*. Right now, we have only one
>>>> representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 10
>>>> classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can
>>>> plainly see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10
>>>> classes. This is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused.
>>>>
>>>> All the best.
>>>>
>>>> Sung
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung, Lists,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is
>>>>> important is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the
>>>>> Pragmatic Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle
>>>>> properties are directly measurable. The best we can do is to have
>>>>> evidence
>>>>> for them by way of properties that *are* directly measurable,
>>>>> together with the theory (the measurements of quark properties are what is
>>>>> called “theory-laden”). So the notion of measurement that you are using is
>>>>> void unless there is some measurable difference between “there are nine
>>>>> elementary signs” and “there are ten composite signs”). The same would, of
>>>>> course hold for quarks and baryons unless there is a detectable difference
>>>>> to experience. In this case the difference is, of course, by your notion
>>>>> of
>>>>> a baryon as isolatable, that we can isolate baryons but not quarks (for a
>>>>> combination of theoretical and experimental reasons). So it seems to me
>>>>> that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable” (or even
>>>>> “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more
>>>>> clarity than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to
>>>>> make, the distinction between elementary signs and composite signs have no
>>>>> basis in what exists; you would be making a distinction without a
>>>>> difference, and thus containing no information.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> John Collier
>>>>>
>>>>> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>>>>>
>>>>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On
>>>>> Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
>>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05
>>>>> *To:* PEIRCE-L
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Gary R,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You wrote :
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite
>>>>> recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters
>>>>> (121915-1)
>>>>> as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly
>>>>> embodied signs, I am *always* referring to
>>>>>
>>>>> the 10 classes."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the
>>>>> word "sign" in "qualisign" ?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an
>>>>> unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is
>>>>> only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the
>>>>> 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds
>>>>> of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although
>>>>> he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists
>>>>> use the same word "particles" for both *quarks* and *baryons.* They
>>>>> are both particles but physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are
>>>>> not fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of more fundamental
>>>>> particles called quarks.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to
>>>>> have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10
>>>>> classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different
>>>>> names
>>>>> (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "*elementary
>>>>> signs*" for the 9 types and the "*composite signs*" for the 10
>>>>> classes of signs as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is
>>>>> monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence
>>>>> complete as a sign. Again this situation seems similar to the relation
>>>>> between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete particles in that they
>>>>> cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of
>>>>> three quarks) are complete particles since they can be isolated and
>>>>> experimentally measured.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> All the best.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond <
>>>>> gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung, list,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not
>>>>> possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be
>>>>> a
>>>>> part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic
>>>>> iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To
>>>>> designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .]
>>>>> because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic."
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I
>>>>> do not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am
>>>>> discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring
>>>>> to the 10 classes.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign
>>>>> (that is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete
>>>>> sign (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes),
>>>>> that it simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex
>>>>> (e.g., a 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic
>>>>> universe).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this
>>>>> point clear before there was any further confusion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary R
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>>>
>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>>>
>>>>> *C 745*
>>>>>
>>>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of
>>>>> the 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that
>>>>> in
>>>>> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of
>>>>> the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as
>>>>> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent.
>>>>> However,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to
>>>>> feel it. (121915-1)
>>>>> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>> applied one of them to it."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character
>>>>> which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be
>>>>> index or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose
>>>>> the
>>>>> character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not
>>>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> By extension, I wonder if we can say that
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
>>>>> sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in
>>>>> avoiding confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of
>>>>> signs, i.e., 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are
>>>>> experimentally measurable; (121915-3)
>>>>>
>>>>> Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but
>>>>> only the latter can be
>>>>>
>>>>> used as a means of communicating information."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of
>>>>> signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs
>>>>>
>>>>> as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being
>>>>> composed of elementary quarks.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all !
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <
>>>>> gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Jeff, Gary F. list,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good
>>>>> example of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a
>>>>> more complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary R
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Communication Studies*
>>>>>
>>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>>>>
>>>>> *C 745*
>>>>>
>>>>> *718 482-5690*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>>>>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hello Gary F., List,
>>>>>
>>>>> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts
>>>>> of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential
>>>>> characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this
>>>>> distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign
>>>>> that are less complete?
>>>>>
>>>>> --Jeff
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>>>> Associate Professor
>>>>> Department of Philosophy
>>>>> Northern Arizona University
>>>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
>>>>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM
>>>>> To: 'PEIRCE-L'
>>>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>>>>
>>>>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic
>>>>> Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main
>>>>> text this thread has been referring to, so far.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed
>>>>> at some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of
>>>>> the manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius
>>>>> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or
>>>>> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,”
>>>>> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is
>>>>> Peirce’s. — gary f.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the Foundations of Mathematics
>>>>> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining
>>>>> rendered as italics]
>>>>> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or
>>>>> think is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign.
>>>>> The word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us
>>>>> endeavor to analyze it.
>>>>> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular
>>>>> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is
>>>>> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not
>>>>> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though
>>>>> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more
>>>>> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of
>>>>> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately
>>>>> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never
>>>>> contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On
>>>>> the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause
>>>>> appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs
>>>>> although
>>>>> there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be
>>>>> because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present
>>>>> condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of
>>>>> feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a
>>>>> sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore
>>>>> essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign.
>>>>> Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a
>>>>> real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of
>>>>> definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the
>>>>> sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under
>>>>> “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one
>>>>> thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that
>>>>> there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every
>>>>> real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there
>>>>> must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a
>>>>> sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any
>>>>> replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real
>>>>> object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though
>>>>> it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever
>>>>> the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of
>>>>> itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that
>>>>> proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even
>>>>> if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete,
>>>>> there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the
>>>>> ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a
>>>>> sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that
>>>>> universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all
>>>>> the
>>>>> real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to
>>>>> the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in
>>>>> an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch
>>>>> was
>>>>> translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’
>>>>> Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in case
>>>>> the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant of
>>>>> the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not
>>>>> specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there
>>>>> may be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, unless it so happens
>>>>> that
>>>>> it is a part of a sign which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if
>>>>> it be a part of a sign of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign
>>>>> ‘some man is mortal’ becomes an interpretant of it. This may be more
>>>>> conveniently expressed by speaking of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’
>>>>> Then the utterer says to the interpreter, “you are at liberty to
>>>>> understand
>>>>> me as referring to any man [of] whom you can get any indication, and of
>>>>> him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must
>>>>> signify some quality; and it is no more important to recognize that the
>>>>> real object to which a sign refers is not a mere sign than to recognize
>>>>> that the quality it signifies is not a mere sign. Take the quality of the
>>>>> odor of attar. There is no difficulty in imagining a being whose entire
>>>>> consciousness should consist in this alone. But, it may be objected, if it
>>>>> were contrasted with nothing could it be recognized? I reply, no; and
>>>>> besides, such recognition is excluded by the circumstance that a
>>>>> recognition of the smell would not be the pure smell itself. It may be
>>>>> doubted by some persons, however, whether the feeling could exist alone.
>>>>> They are the persons whom it ought to be easiest for me to convince of my
>>>>> point. For they, at least, must admit that if such pure homogeneous
>>>>> quality
>>>>> of feeling were to exist alone, it would not be a sign. Everybody ought to
>>>>> admit it because it would be alone, and therefore would have no object
>>>>> different from itself. Besides, there would be no possible replica of it,
>>>>> since each of two such things would be nonexistent for the other; nor
>>>>> could
>>>>> there be any third who should compare them. So, then, the whole question
>>>>> of
>>>>> whether such a quality is a sign or not resolves itself into the question
>>>>> of whether there could be such a tinge upon the consciousness of a being,
>>>>> supposing the being could be conscious (for I shall show presently that
>>>>> the
>>>>> fact that he would be asleep is only in my favor). In order to decide this
>>>>> question, it will be sufficient to look at any object parti-colored in
>>>>> bright red and bright blue and to ask oneself a question or two. Would
>>>>> there be any possibility of conveying the idea of that red to a person who
>>>>> had no feeling nearer to it than that blue? Plainly not, the quality of
>>>>> the
>>>>> red is in the red itself. The proximity of the blue heightens the shock
>>>>> up[on] the seer[']s organism, emphasizes it, renders it vivid, perhaps
>>>>> slightly confuses the feeling. But the red quality is altogether positive
>>>>> and would remain if the blue were not there. If every other idea were
>>>>> removed, there would be no shock, and there would be sleep. But the
>>>>> quality
>>>>> of that sleep would be red, in this sense, that if it were taken away
>>>>> frequently and brought back so as to wake the being up, the tinge of his
>>>>> consciousness would be of that quality. A quality, in itself, has no being
>>>>> at all, it is true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the
>>>>> quality is as it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign,
>>>>> which exists only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A
>>>>> quality, then, is not a sign. Eleventhly, we may assume that this is as
>>>>> true of what is, with excusable inaccuracy, called a composite quality as
>>>>> of a simple one. In itself, one quality is as simple as another. A person
>>>>> who should be acquainted with none but the spectral colors would get no
>>>>> idea of white by being told that it was the mixture of them all. One might
>>>>> as well tell him to make a mixture of water, patriotism, and the square
>>>>> root of minus one. Find a man who has had no idea of patriotism; and if
>>>>> you
>>>>> tell him that it is the love of one's country, if he knows what love is,
>>>>> and what a man's country, in its social sense, is, he can make the
>>>>> experiment of connecting ideas in his imagination, and noting the quality
>>>>> of feeling which arises upon this composition. Tell him this in the
>>>>> evening, and he will repeat the experiment several times during the night,
>>>>> and in the morning he will have a fair idea of what patriotism means. He
>>>>> will have performed an experiment analogous to that of mixing colored
>>>>> lights in order to get an idea of white. If a treasure is buried in the
>>>>> midst of a plain, and there are four signal poles, the place of the
>>>>> treasure can be defined by means of ranges, so that a person who can take
>>>>> ranges and set up new poles can find the treasure. In like manner the name
>>>>> of any color may be defined in terms of four color disks so that a person
>>>>> with a color-wheel can experimentally produce the color and thereafter be
>>>>> able to use the name. Every definition to be understood must be treated as
>>>>> a precept for experimentation. The imagination is an apparatus for such
>>>>> experimentation that often answers the purpose, although it often proves
>>>>> insufficient. No point on the plain where the treasure is hid is more
>>>>> simple than other. Colors may be defined by various systems of
>>>>> coördinates,
>>>>> and we do not know that one color is in itself simpler than another. It is
>>>>> only in a limited class of cases that we can define a quality as simply a
>>>>> mixture of two qualities. In most cases, it is necessary to introduce
>>>>> other
>>>>> relations. But even when that is the case, if a quality is defined as
>>>>> being
>>>>> at once a and b, there will always be another way of defining it as that
>>>>> which is at once c and d. Now all that is either a or c will have a
>>>>> certain
>>>>> quality p, common and peculiar to that class; the class of possible
>>>>> objects
>>>>> that are b or c will be similarly related to a quality, r; and the class
>>>>> of
>>>>> possible objects that are either b or d will be similarly related to a
>>>>> quality, s. Then that quality which was defined as, at once, a and b, can
>>>>> be more analytically defined as that which is at once p, q, r, and s; and
>>>>> so on ad infinitum. We may not be able to make out these qualities; but
>>>>> there is reason to believe that any describable class of possible objects
>>>>> has some quality common and peculiar to it. It is certain that a pure
>>>>> quality, in its mode of being as a pure quality, does not cease to be
>>>>> because it is not embodied in anything. Every situation in life appears to
>>>>> have its peculiar flavor. This flavor is what it is positively and in
>>>>> itself. For the experiment by which it may be reproduced an adequate
>>>>> prescription may be given; but the definition will not itself have that
>>>>> flavor. To say that a flavor, or pure quality, is composed of two others,
>>>>> is simply to say that on experimentally mixing these others in a
>>>>> particular
>>>>> way, that first flavor will be reproduced. Every sufficiently complete
>>>>> sign
>>>>> determines a sign to the effect that on a certain occasion, that is, in a
>>>>> certain object a certain flavor or quality may be observed.
>>>>> This attempt to begin an analysis of the nature of a sign may seem to
>>>>> be unnecessarily complicated, unnatural, and ill-fitting. To that I reply
>>>>> that every man has his own fashion of thinking; and if such is the
>>>>> reader's
>>>>> impression let him draw up a statement for himself. If it is sufficiently
>>>>> full and accurate, he will find that it differs from mine chiefly in its
>>>>> nomenclature and arrangement. [Not unlikely he might insist on
>>>>> distinctions
>>>>> which I avoid as irrelevant.] He will find that, in some shape, he is
>>>>> brought to recognize the same three radically different elements that I
>>>>> do.
>>>>> Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of being in itself, corresponding
>>>>> to my quality; secondly, a mode of being constituted by opposition,
>>>>> corresponding to my object; and thirdly, a mode of being of which a
>>>>> branching line Y is an analogue, and which is of the general nature of a
>>>>> mean function corresponding to the sign.
>>>>> §2. Partly in hopes of reconciling the reader to my statement, and
>>>>> partly in order to bring out some other points that will be pertinent, I
>>>>> will review the matter in another order.
>>>>> The reference of a sign to the quality which is its ground, reason, or
>>>>> meaning appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which any replica is
>>>>> fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain qualities
>>>>> which it would equally possess if the interpretant and the object did not
>>>>> exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could not be a sign; but
>>>>> as
>>>>> far as the sign itself went, it would be all that [it] would be with the
>>>>> object and interpretant. Such a sign whose significance lies in the
>>>>> qualities of its replicas in themselves is an icon, image, analogue, or
>>>>> copy. Its object is whatever that resembles it its interpretant takes it
>>>>> to
>>>>> be the sign of, and [it is a] sign of that object in proportion as it
>>>>> resembles it. An icon cannot be a complete sign; but it is the only sign
>>>>> which directly brings the interpretant to close quarters with the meaning;
>>>>> and for that reason it is the kind of sign with which the mathematician
>>>>> works. For not only are geometrical figures icons, but even algebraical
>>>>> arrays of letters have relations analogous to those of the forms they
>>>>> represent, although these relations are not altogether iconically
>>>>> represented.
>>>>> The reference of a sign to its object is brought into special
>>>>> prominence in a kind of sign whose fitness to be a sign is due to its
>>>>> being
>>>>> in a real reactive relation,—generally, a physical and dynamical
>>>>> relation,—with the object. Such a sign I term an index. As an example,
>>>>> take
>>>>> a weather-cock. This is a sign of the wind because the wind actively moves
>>>>> it. It faces in the very direction from which the wind blows. In so far as
>>>>> it does that, it involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an icon. A
>>>>> photograph which is compelled by optical laws to be an icon of its object
>>>>> which is before the camera is another example. It is in this way that
>>>>> these
>>>>> indices convey information. They are propositions. That is they separately
>>>>> indicate their objects; the weather-cock because it turns with the wind
>>>>> and
>>>>> is known by its interpretant to do so; the photograph for a like reason.
>>>>> If
>>>>> the weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the camera lens is bad,
>>>>> the
>>>>> one or the other will be false. But if this is known to be the case, they
>>>>> sink at once to mere icons, at best. It is not essential to an index that
>>>>> it should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does not, it will convey no
>>>>> information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction from a remarkable
>>>>> situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further information. The
>>>>> letters
>>>>> in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of pure indices not
>>>>> involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to be an icon of
>>>>> their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it has the same
>>>>> startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index acts
>>>>> compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real
>>>>> relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or,
>>>>> more loosely, a thing) that is hic et nunc, single and definite.
>>>>> A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant
>>>>> into prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of
>>>>> any particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it
>>>>> stands
>>>>> in any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it
>>>>> will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an
>>>>> example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve.
>>>>> This
>>>>> is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of
>>>>> its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is
>>>>> that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines
>>>>> an
>>>>> interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the
>>>>> acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of
>>>>> thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of
>>>>> possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An index may be, in one
>>>>> sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an
>>>>> argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, without
>>>>> manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant.
>>>>> It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential
>>>>> to
>>>>> a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation
>>>>> and
>>>>> it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a
>>>>> part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or
>>>>> if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it
>>>>> becomes
>>>>> a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are rhematic:
>>>>> Guiteau assassinated ______
>>>>> ______ assassinated ______
>>>>> Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these
>>>>> terms; but I shall venture to do so.
>>>>>
>>>>> From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On
>>>>> Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
>>>>> Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary F, Jeff, List,
>>>>>
>>>>> Please excuse my ignorance.
>>>>> What is NDTR ?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks in advance.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>>>>
>>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>>>> Rutgers University
>>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>>>> 732-445-4701
>>>>>
>>>>> www.conformon.net
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----------------------------
>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>>>>
>>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>>>> Rutgers University
>>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>>>> 732-445-4701
>>>>>
>>>>> www.conformon.net
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>>>
>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>>> Rutgers University
>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>>> 732-445-4701
>>>>
>>>> www.conformon.net
>>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
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>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------
>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>>
>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>>> Rutgers University
>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>>> 732-445-4701
>>>
>>> www.conformon.net
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>>
>>> -----------------------------
>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>
>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>> Rutgers University
>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> 732-445-4701
>>
>> www.conformon.net
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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