I agree with Gary R's analysis here, and reject Gary F's and Sung's insistence
that the singular term is a sign. Agreed, the 9 parameters, as Gary R, calls
them (I call them the 9 Relations) can't be defined, in themselves, as signs
(Gary F), or as Sung terms them, elementary signs.
Such an approach, in my view, rejects the basic dynamics of Peircean semiosis
and instead, reduces the system to a mechanical one, where 'complex signs' are
formed from simple signs. I think that loses the basic dynamics of the Peircean
semiosis.
As for my sticking to my three relations rather than one relation in the
analysis of the triad, I referred to this, privately to John Deely, as similar
to the Christian argument between the Athanasian versus Arian analysis of the
Trinity - with the former viewing the Trinity as One, and the latter, as three
interactions. I am not persuaded, so far, that my view of the semiosic triad,
as a 'whole' of three relations is wrong, for in my view - to say that it is
ONE relation, misses the fact that each of the three 'nodes' can be in a
different categorical mode. The insistence on the triad as ONE relation doesn't
capture this fact.
Even saying it is One Triadic relation, doesn't, to me, capture that fact. The
Interpretant (output) and the Object (input) relations to the representamen
(sign) can each be in a different categorical mode, so calling them the SAME
relation obscures this fact. What IS a fact is their dependency on the
Representamen as mediator - that dependency is, to me, the SAME.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, December 21, 2015 9:02 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F. list,
Gary wrote:
I think you may be glossing over some important terminological considerations
here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even relevant to your present
inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind of slow read of portions of
NDTR--but I think that there are crucial distinctions to be made here, as
difficult as they are given the various ways Peirce expresses himself at
particular phases and moments of his semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:
GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no
positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce
says that “an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does here), I
don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is not a
sign, or that a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult enough
without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually says.
However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an Icon is a sign,"
that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in some iconic
way, and that he does not mean that the Sign taken as a whole is an Icon, since
signs in themselves are either qualisigns, sinsigns, or legisigns.
So, to say "an Icon is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking which
has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as such). To
confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where not one of the 10 none is
an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz. (1, 2, and 5), all
three of these being, btw, 'rhematic'. In like manner, I would not
characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which *are* rhematic as 'rhemes" since one
is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six are not
rhemes, but 'rhematic'. Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme'
(namely, the symbolic legisign).
So, again, what I'm suggesting is that there is a kind of unfortunate
looseness in Peirce's terminology in the course of his analysis. While this
most certainly is problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us
into discussing aspects (expressed more properly as adjectives)of the sign
as if they were the whole of the sign: the sign as sign. I do not see this
distinction as being, say, 'fastidious'.
In short, one needs to recall that at 2.264 that Peirce writes: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS," and I consider it a grave error in semiotic analysis not to clearly
distinguish the elements of the trichotomies from the classes. Or, in other
words, conflating those three trichotomies involving nine categorial
parameters with the ten classes themselves has, in my opinion, historically
brought about a great deal of confusion, so that it behooves us to clear
up--and not gloss over--the potential confusionsresulting from that
conflation.
I should add that I agree with you (and what I took John Collier to be saying
recently) in opposing what Edwina has been arguing, namely, your holding,
contra Edwina, that the sign is not three relations, but one genuine triadic
relation. Peirce has been quoted here repeatedly as stating that a sign should
not be conceived as "a complexus of dyadic relations" (although, admittedly,
his terminology can get a little loose in this matter as well). Finally, the
integrity of the sign is further emphasized by his insisting that the
interpretant stands in the same relation to the object as the sign itself
stands (I don't see that Edwina deals with that last principle in her
three-relations analysis whatsoever).
You concluded:
GF: I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on
awhile back, by suggesting that the involvementdescribed above is a sort of
mirror image of degeneracy, in the way that the two concepts are applied to
these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia.
I would very much like to take up this mirror image notion in terms of
involvement (categorial involution) and degeneracy (and the relation of the
two), although I don't think that this thread is the place to do it. I began
another thread on that 'mirror' theme, and perhaps after the first of the year
we can take up these issues there if you and others are interested.
Meanwhile, I wish you and all Peirce e-forum members a happy, healthy, and
intellectually productive new year!
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:12 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of
Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides signs
“according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's
having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that
object, or in its relation to an interpretant” (CP 2.243).
My reason for including Peirce’s text in these posts is mostly to bring us
back to his own terminology, since it is his analysis of semiosis that we are
investigating here. Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make
no positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if
Peirce says that “an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does
here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is
not a sign, or that a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually
says.
So here is the second trichotomy:
CP 2.247. According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon,
an Index, or a Symbol.
An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by
virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether
any such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is
such an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do
with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent
individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing
and used as a sign of it.
248. An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
virtue of being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a
Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything
else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some
Quality in common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers
to the Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of
a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in
these respects, which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it
by the Object.
249. A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to
cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus
itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a
Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of
a general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances
which it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what
the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,” existent in
the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will
indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those
instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index
of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight
effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant
character of the Symbol.
Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second
trichotomy with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy.
Since the Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective
trichotomies, each exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The Firstness
of the Qualisign is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness of the Icon,
on the other hand, is the Firstness of its relation to its Object, specifically
the fact that it “refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of
characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such
Object actually exists or not.”
Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the
Secondness of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or
event. The Index “refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being
really affected by that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its relation
to its Object — which, as a genuine Secondness, involves a Firstness (namely “a
sort of Icon”). The peculiarity of that Firstness, I would guess, is that its
genuine Secondness to the Object does have something to do with its character,
which is not the case with the Icon as defined above.
Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The
Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general type.”
The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being but also in
its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts through a Replica, and
that there must be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we
must here understand by “existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe
to which the Symbol refers. Hence, just as genuine Secondness involves
Firstness, so also does the Thirdness of a Symbol involve Secondness, in the
form of “a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.”
To close, I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on
awhile back, by suggesting that the involvement described above is a sort of
mirror image of degeneracy, in the way that the two concepts are applied to
these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. I won’t elaborate on that,
though, but just wish everyone a happy Solstice!
Gary f.
} We are natural expressions of a deeper order. [Stuart Kauffman] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
