One reason to appreciate the Abduction-Deduction-Induction distinction Peirce derives from Aristotle is because it puts us in a different reality from the one promulgated by Analytic Philosophy.
Analytic Philosophy supposes a reality of determinate logical atoms; and finds it challenging to determine them, given the different modes of being implicated by the various kinds of inference we use. Whereas for Peirce, the results of real Abductions-Deductions-Inductions are real Possibilities-Necessities-Potentialities. “A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise determination an endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate, may be more determinate still, but not that it can be made absolutely determinate." (CP3.93) The pragmaticist's reality is a continuum of modes of being, generally, and with regard to any given phenomenon. Martin Kettelhut, PhD www.listeningisthekey.com 303 747 4449 > On Mar 1, 2016, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as > semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. > That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something > else. That's not, in my view, Peirce. > > My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a Sign. > It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that exists as a > Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic set of > Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a Sign. > > Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with other > matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another molecule, one > cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is this continuity > of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see Peirce's outline of > the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the riddle]. This is the > process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of discrete units formed > within a habit, which are in interaction with other discrete units. As formed > and networked, [which is not at all similar to referencing] they are > therefore 'meaningful'. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca> > To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry > > > Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that a > sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, > but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but > perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My grasp > of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even just noise) > is an ordinary object that at least represents some other referred object and > to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer. In other words, the > "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign object" for some "sign > effect" to be a sign overall, but that the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or > "endure" any meaning at all to be such a sign, even if it may or can or will > "yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore > be a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to > some degree. > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
